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Abstract
Drawing on insights from the corporate finance and industrial economics liter-
atures, this thesis combines different empirical strategies and econometric tech-
niques to study the role of capital-market imperfections on the financial and
operational activities of firms. The thesis is mainly composed of three differ-
ent but interlinked empirical chapters as summarized below using an unbalanced
panel data on 1122 UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange during the
period 1981 to 2009.
Stochastic Frontier Analysis to Corporate Efficiency : Using the stochas-
tic frontier analysis (SFA), long run and short run corporate efficiencies are pre-
dicted in this chapter focusing on value and profit maximization approach re-
spectively. The estimation results reveal that, an average firm in the sample
achieves 74.5% of it’s best performing peer’s market value and 86.6% of it’s best
performing peer’s profit and both of them are highly significant in the analysis.
The inverse of these serve as proxies of agency costs and significantly related to
the chosen explanatory variables. The general conception that larger firms are
more efficient remains valid in this study. The long run market value efficiency
supports the agency cost of outside equity and the short run profit efficiency
supports the agency cost of outside debt hypothesis. Also there is a positive
rank correlation between these two efficiencies which confirms that an average
firm in the UK suffers from inefficiency or agency conflicts to a certain extent,
no matter whether the firm is driven by short run or long run growth perspectives.
Corporate Efficiency, Credit Status and Investment : The endogenous
switching regression models (SRM) incorporating the predicted corporate effi-
ciencies are estimated in this chapter in an effort to clarify the role of cash flow in
examining the impact of capital-market imperfections. It is revealed that a finan-
cially constrained firm is more likely to be smaller, younger, deficient in capturing
better investment opportunities, reserves higher safety stock, pays low dividends,
has less collaterizable assets and less external debt. Moreover, a firm’s constrained
credit status changes with the improvement of it’s efficiency. The results further
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reveal that financially constrained firm’s investment is comparatively more sensi-
tive to cash flow, but this sensitivity is negatively and significantly related with
corporate efficiency. These results point to the fact that high investment sensi-
tivity to cash flow may not be solely driven by measurement error in investment
opportunity, but may still be interpreted as a consequence of imperfect substi-
tutability between internal and external financing arising from the capital market
imperfections.
Financial constraints and the dynamics of firm size and growth : Dif-
ferential quantitative effects of cash flow on growth among firms facing different
degrees of financial constraints are found in this chapter using the generalized
methods of moments (GMM) estimations and the results are consistent with
financial constraints arising from capital market imperfections. The results in
general reject Gibrat’s “Law of Proportionate Effects” and smaller and younger
firms are found to grow faster. The estimated results indicate a substantially
greater sensitivity of growth to cash flow for firm years facing the most bind-
ing financial constraints on their growth. Furthermore, these firms can actually
expand their size more than the extent of increase in cash flow they may have
supporting the leverage effect hypothesis. The estimated impact decreases mono-
tonically thereafter as financial constraints become less binding allowing the firms
to finance successively bigger portion of their growth through external financing.
JEL classification : C23, C34, D82, G32, L25
Keywords : Asymmetric information, agency costs, market imperfections, cor-
porate efficiency, stochastic frontier, maximum likelihood, financial constraints,
internal finance, investment cash flow sensitivity, Tobin’s Q, investment opportu-
nity, measurement error, switching regression, law of proportionate effect, liquid-
ity constraint, instruments, growth cash flow sensitivity, leverage effect, GMM.
4
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I am grateful to Almighty Allah for giving me the courage to
take up the challenge of Doctor of Philosophy degree and the strength to carry
on research over three years for it.
I am especially thankful to my supervisors, Professor Karl Taylor and Dr.
Anita Ratcliffe for their continuous support, guidance and invaluable suggestions.
I am very happy about the way they steered me in my endeavor to complete this
thesis, but the responsibility for any errors and omissions remains my own of
course. I would like to thank Dr. Michael Dietrich, with whom I initially started
my work and I am greatly indebted to him for his generous encouragements. I am
also thankful to Dr. Steven McIntosh for his kind support all through, specially
during my application and admission to the university. My heartfelt thanks to
all the participants in the departmental internal seminars for their comments on
different chapters of this thesis.
All the good achievements in my life were because of my parents and for my
parents only and my prospective doctorate will not be an exception. I am happy
to mention about my little boy here who has been my another source of inspiration
since he was born in October, 2011. I would also take this opportunity to thank
other members of my family, specially my younger brother for his considerations.
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to all my colleagues and friends in
Sheffield for their time and University of Sheffield for the financial support, all of
which helped me to survive for an unusually long period away from my home.
5
Contents
Abstract 3
Acknowledgements 5
Table of Contents 6
List of Tables 9
List of Figures 11
Chapter 1: Introduction 12
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3 Specific aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4 Structure & methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.5 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.6 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Chapter 2: Stochastic Frontier Analysis to Corporate Efficiency 25
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4 Model Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4.1 Market value frontier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4.2 Profit frontier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4.3 Inefficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4.4 Variables in the two frontier equations . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4.5 Variables in the inefficiency equation . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.5 Data and descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.6 Empirical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.6.1 Market value frontier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.6.2 Profit frontier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.6.3 Comparison between short run and long run efficiency . . . 57
6
2.6.4 Variation in efficiency with firm size . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Chapter 3: Corporate Efficiency, Credit Status and Investment 63
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.2.1 Classification of firms into financially more or less con-
strained groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2.2 Measurement error in investment opportunities . . . . . . 73
3.2.3 Alternative ways to verify the performance of the cash flow
sensitivity of investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.4 Model Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.4.1 Investment equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.4.2 Selection equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4.3 Variables in the investment equation . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.4.4 Variables in the selection equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.5 Data and descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.6 Empirical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.6.1 Effect of efficiency on investment cash flow sensitivity . . . 92
3.6.2 Credit multiplier effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.6.3 Predicted probability of facing financially unconstrained
regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.6.4 Robustness check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Chapter 4: Financial constraints and the dynamics of firm size
and growth 109
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.2.1 Skewness in the firm size distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.2.2 Gibrat’s regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
7
4.4 Model specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.4.1 Variables in the growth equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.5 Data and descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.6 Empirical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.6.1 Presence of finite sample bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.6.2 Dynamics of size-growth relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.6.3 Differential effects of internal finance on firm growth . . . 141
4.6.4 Robustness check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Chapter 5: Conclusion 155
5.1 Summary and implications of the findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.2 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.3 Implications for future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Appendix A: 161
A.2 Worldscope data definition along with their field number/ identifier 164
Appendix B: 166
Appendix C: 167
References 172
8
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Table 2.2 Market value frontier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Table 2.2.a Diagnostics for Market value frontier . . . . . . . . . 53
Table 2.2.b Market value efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Table 2.3 Profit frontier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Table 2.3.a Diagnostics for Profit frontier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Table 2.3.b Profit efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Table 2.4 Tests of the difference between profit and market
value efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Table 2.5 Efficiency among four size groups (sorted by total
sales) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Table 2.6 Efficiency among four size groups (sorted by total
assets) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Table 3.2 Switching regression models with market value effi-
ciency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Table 3.2.a Selection equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Table 3.2.b Investment equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Table 3.3 Probability of facing financially unconstrained regime 99
Table 3.4 Switching regression models excluding efficiency from
the selection equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Table 3.4.a Selection equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Table 3.4.b Investment equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Table 3.5 Switching regression models with sales-to-capital ratio102
Table 3.5.a Selection equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Table 3.5.b Investment equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Table 3.6 Switching regression models controlling for endogene-
ity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Table 3.6.a Selection equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Table 3.6.b Investment equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
9
Table 3.7 Switching regression models with profit efficiency . . 106
Table 3.7.a Selection equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Table 3.7.b Investment equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Table 4.2 Fisher-type panel-data unit-root test . . . . . . . . . . 134
Table 4.3 AR(1) specification with growth as dependent variable136
Table 4.3.a Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Table 4.4 Baseline equation using different estimators . . . . . . 137
Table 4.4.a Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Table 4.5 Twostep robust system GMM results for the baseline
equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Table 4.5.a Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Table 4.6 Differential effects using likelihood of facing finan-
cially unconstrained status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Table 4.6.a Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Table 4.7 Differential effects using corporate efficiency index . 147
Table 4.7.a Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Table 4.8 Robustness checks using other traditional measures
of financial constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Table 4.8.a Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Table A.1 FTSE/Dow Jones Industrial Classification Benchmark
(ICB) codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
Table B.1 Correlation of the probability of facing unconstrained
financial status with the selection variables . . . . . . 166
Table C.1 AR(1) specification with size as dependent variable . 168
Table C.1.a Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Table C.2 Robustness check using sales as proxy for firm size . 169
Table C.2.a Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Table C.3 Differential effects on sales growth using different
proxies for financial constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
Table C.3.a Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
10
List of Figures
Figure 2.1 Kernel density of profit and market value efficiency 58
Figure 3.1 Cut off points for the predicted market value effi-
ciency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Figure 3.2 Non monotonic relationship between investment cash
flow sensitivity and efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Figure 4.1 Firm size distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Figure 4.2 Firm growth distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Figure A.1 Market imperfections and investment cash flow sen-
sitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Figure C.1 Growth cash flow sensitivity and “leverage” effect . 167
11
Chapter 1
Introduction
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1.1 Motivation
Firm efficiency, investment and growth are widely considered as the three most
crucial economic dimensions of firm performance, and more importantly, avail-
ability and cost of different financing sources are two of the major factors in-
fluencing any of these dimensions. The impact of financial constraints on the
real activity of firms has remained one of the preferred areas of research in cor-
porate finance and a number of studies explain financial constraints as an im-
portant barrier to firm evolution (Fazzari and Athey, 1987, Schiantarelli, 1996,
Hubbard, 1998, Stein, 2003). Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that,
effects of asymmetric information and agency costs upon lending are not evenly
distributed across firms and these imperfections expose some firms to relatively
more constrained or rationed access to external financing than others (Hu and
Schiantarelli, 1998, Hovakimian and Titman, 2006). Drawing on insights from
the literature in corporate finance and industrial economics, this thesis strives to
advance our understanding about the role of credit-market frictions in financial
and operational activities of firms by exploring the underlying reasons behind
firms’ heterogeneous performances in terms of the three key economic dimensions
mentioned above.
1.2 Background
The classical Modigliani and Miller (1958) approach to financial policy concluded
that the financial structure of a firm is irrelevant to both it’s value and operating
decisions. However, recent literature notes that most firms operate in incom-
plete and imperfect markets, have limited access to external finance, and need
to pay a relatively higher cost for the external funds compared to their internal
source. A number of market imperfections arising from asymmetric information
and conflict of interests among various stakeholders are considered responsible
for invalidating the traditional view and henceforth financial structure of a firm
and it’s investment decision becomes interdependent. The theoretical foundation
of how the investment decision is affected by financial structure under market
imperfections is pioneered by the following influential papers. The limited li-
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ability of owners-managers in a levered firm induce them to choose too risky
projects expecting that their shareholders will get larger benefits if they turn out
to be profitable and losses will be inflicted on to debt holders in case of failure
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Anticipating such behavior, debt holders demand
a premium on debt or bond covenants restricting the firm’s future use of debt.
Underinvestment may also be caused by a moral hazard problem when share-
holders have an incentive to abandon profitable investment projects due to the
wealth transfer from shareholders to debt holders that occurs whenever the net
present value (NPV) of the project is lower than the amount of debt issued (My-
ers, 1977). Informational asymmetry in the credit market also does not allow
lenders to price discriminate between good and bad borrowers in loan contracts,
and as a result, a fraction of good investment projects which are not profitable
enough to compensate for the excessively high cost of external financing face
credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). A firm’s equity financing can also suf-
fer from informational asymmetry problems when the prospective shareholders
do not have enough information about the firm value and it’s projects (Myers and
Majluf, 1984). To cover their potential losses from the adverse selection prob-
lem, the prospective shareholders demand a risk premium to purchase the shares
of all firms considering the risk of an average investment project. The existing
shareholders lose more if the investment projects are undertaken with this costly
funding and hence prefer to abandon them. In short, the problems of asymmetric
information in the capital market raises the cost of issuing new debt or equity
limiting firms’ ability or willingness to undertake good investment projects and
leads to underinvestment.
Suboptimal investment can also occur due to agency costs between sharehold-
ers and management, which arises when the ownership and control of the firms
are separated and as a consequence, shareholders’ interests are not reflected by
management’s objective function. In the presence of informational asymmetries,
neither the mechanisms devised to align the interests of these two parties may be
fully functional nor the monitoring of managerial actions may be done efficiently
or cost effectively. In such situations, the availability of cash flow in excess of
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that required to finance positive NPV projects may lead inefficient managers to
increase investment spending instead of distributing the excess funds to sharehold-
ers. Such situations occur as the utility managers derive from managing firms has
been shown to be an increasing function of the corporations’ size because of the
associated pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits (Jensen, 1986, 2001, Bernanke
and Gertler, 1989, Stulz, 1990) and therefore, management’s corporate objective
may be growth rather than value. As a consequence, investments with negative
net present value could be undertaken and result in overinvestment. Therefore,
moral hazard and adverse selection due to asymmetric information and agency
cost due to owner-manager conflicts are the sources behind suboptimal level of
investment and prevent firms from achieving their best potential.
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Calomiris and Hubbard (1990), Gertler (1992),
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) and Schiantarelli
(1996) discuss a variety of methodological issues and provide econometric evidence
on the consequences of informational asymmetries on the investment behavior of
firms. These models emphasize the costs of adverse selection and moral hazard in
generating frictions in the capital markets. The conclusions drawn in these liter-
atures are twofold. Firstly, the effective cost of external financing becomes higher
than that of the internal finance unless the loans are fully collateralized and sec-
ondly, the premium on such external financing is inversely related to a firm’s net
worth. The underlying reason for this inverse relationship is that the potential
conflict of interests between borrowers and suppliers of external funds is greater
when borrowers do not have sufficient funds to contribute to project financing
and whenever there occurs a negative shock to a firm’s net worth, these conflicts
deteriorate further. Therefore, lenders must be compensated with a premium for
the risk that borrowers may either misrepresent the quality of a given investment
project or behave in a manner that expropriates value from lenders. In general,
such risk premium increases with the severity of information asymmetries or dif-
ficulty in mitigating the opportunistic behavior (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 1995).
The higher premium and hurdled access to external financing compel firms to rely
more on internal financing sources and result in higher sensitivity of investment
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to their availability. Hubbard (1998) presents an excellent graphical illustration
of these arguments which is reproduced as figure A.1 in appendix A (p. 161).
The debate on whether this high sensitivity of investment to internal financing
can be interpreted as an indicator of financial constraints started with Fazzari
et al. (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) who hold completely different views
in terms of classifying firms as financially constrained or not and also their in-
vestment responsiveness to cash flow. Fazzari et al. (1988) argue that the impact
of credit frictions on corporate spending can be evaluated by comparing the sen-
sitivity of investment to cash flow across samples of firms sorted on proxies for
financing constraints. They classify low dividend paying firms as most financially
constrained which show higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow and vice
versa. They also propose the monotonicity hypothesis according to which such
sensitivity should increase with the severity of market imperfection. In contrast,
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) classify firms without access to more funds than
needed as financially constrained. They report that the sensitivity of investment
to cash flows is non-monotonic with respect to financial constraints and in partic-
ular, it is the lowest for the likely financially constrained firms according to their
classification. More recently Moyen (2004) argues that it is hard to identify firms
with financial constraints. Using two different unconstrained and constrained firm
models, she finds evidence in support of both Fazzari et al. (1988) and Kaplan
and Zingales (1997). Cleary et al. (2007) show that the relationship between the
firm’s internal funds and investment is not monotonic, but U-shaped and with this
prediction, explain the contrasting findings of Fazzari et al. (1988) and Kaplan
and Zingales (1997). Lyandres (2007) also complements this U-shaped relation-
ship by examining the effects of costly external financing on the optimal timing
of a firm’s investment. By splitting the sample into groups of firms with different
degrees of external financing costs, he finds investment-cash flow sensitivity to be
decreasing in the cost of external financing when the latter is relatively low and
increasing in the financing cost when it is high. Guariglia (2008) also finds varying
investment cash flow sensitivity for internally and externally financial constrained
firms. Therefore, it is quite evident from the literature that investment cash flow
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sensitivity critically depends on the classification criteria or procedure used and
this has been considered as one of the reasons for the conflicting findings in the
existing literature. Schiantarelli (1996), Hubbard (1998), Lensink et al. (2001),
Bond and Van Reenen (2007) provide ample support for this implication.
The above theories and the majority of the empirical evidence focus on the
effects of financing constraints on firms’ investment, however their effects on firm
growth can be quantitatively important as well. This is because if the problems
of market imperfection restrict firms’ access to lower cost external financing, then
such firms may not be successful in pursuing their optimal investment policy and
may suffer from lower growth rates in the future (Fazzari et al., 1988, Devereux
and Schiantarelli, 1990). There may also be some discernible factors which shape
the growth pattern of firms with different credit status as well. A growing liter-
ature in industrial economics also postulates that firm size and age are likely to
affect firm growth dynamics through two different and inversely directed channels.
One of them is that smaller and younger firms are more likely to be at an earlier
stage in their development or firm life cycle which can possibly facilitate them to
grow faster until they reach some critical or sustainable size. On the contrary,
smaller and younger firms are characterized by idiosyncratic risk, less collateral,
insufficient track record and weak socioeconomic networks which raise the cost of
external capital and limit their access to external financing. Audretsch and Elston
(2006) name the first one as “other” and the latter one as “financial-related” size
effects and recommend decomposing them to better understand the differences
in the dynamics of the size-growth relationship between smaller younger firms
and their matured counterparts. Therefore, to evaluate the effects of financial
constraints on firm growth, any causal growth regression must be conditioned on
firm size, age and productivity differences as well.
1.3 Specific aim
With respect to the investment decision, the major imperfection that has been
mentioned is the existence of asymmetric information between the main stake-
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holders which gives rise to several conflicts among them. In situations where a
firm is forced to forego valuable investment opportunities, to participate in un-
economic activities or is exposed to some organizational inefficiencies, the firm’s
ability to achieve the best practice relative to it’s peers will be restricted. Also, it
should be carefully considered that a firm’s shortfall from the optimal achievable
value can be either simply due to random luck beyond the control of the firm’s
principals or agents rather than influenced by any firm specific reasons and failure
to control for this will give a misleading indication. Therefore, it is worthwhile
to determine the extent of a firm’s underachievement which is solely due to firm
specific inefficiencies and that is the first aim of this thesis.
The studies focusing on investment under market imperfections mostly clas-
sify firms a priori as financially constrained or unconstrained on the basis of a
single and in some cases two quantitative or qualitative indicators that proxy
for the informational and agency problems. Then the estimated cross-sectional
difference in the sensitivity of investment to internal finance is interpreted as an
indicator of the presence of market imperfections. Two crucial points loom over
this much debated role of internal financing in an investment equation. One is
the difficulty in controlling for the investment opportunities of a firm and the
other is the potential static and dynamic misclassification problem. This thesis
aims to clarify the role of internal finance in an investment equation by suggest-
ing that sensitivity of investment to internal finance ought to change with capital
market imperfections if it is at all linked with these and by taking care of the
misclassification issues as well.
Following the growing body of literature investigating the role of financial
constraints on firm investment, another strand of empirical studies has sought to
identify the effects of financing problems on the size-growth dynamics of firms.
These studies mostly start with Gibrat (1931)’s “Law of Proportionate Effects”
(LPE) as an empirical benchmark, which plays a remarkable and prominent role
in this field of studies. However, the robustness of the existing evidence favoring
or rejecting a LPE type of dynamics has been questioned on several method-
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ological grounds like failure to control for financial factors, firm heterogeneity,
sample selection etc. The final objective of this thesis is to make a quantitative
prediction about the effects of financing problems on the size-growth trajectories
of firms within the framework of a Gibrat’s regression after tackling the common
problems in estimating a dynamic growth equation.
1.4 Structure & methodology
Apart from this prelude and the final concluding chapter, this thesis is divided
into three different but interlinked chapters where the outcome of one chapter
is used to resolve the problems of the others. Due to the nature and aims of
this particular thesis, all the estimations and analysis are based on one single
dataset covering the same sample of firms and period. Each chapter is individu-
ally structured into different sections, e.g., literature survey, methodology, model
specification, description of the variables, empirical results and finally it’s own
conclusion.
In chapter 2, the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) is used to estimate cor-
porate efficiency of firms. To estimate firm efficiency, a set of firms is considered
each of which faces the same opportunity set, but tends to avail this opportunity
set in different ways due to diverse firm-specific characteristics such as managerial
strengths, technical efficiency and investment choices. By varying the opportunity
set and firm characteristics, an optimal value function or frontier function for the
sample of firms can be estimated and the smaller the shortfall of a firm from the
frontier, the higher is it’s predicted efficiency. To distinguish between inefficiency
and luck asymmetry, SFA assumes an error term composed of one symmetric
random component and another non-symmetric component which enables to es-
timate a measure of net efficiency. We estimate two different frontiers to predict
short run efficiency focusing on the traditional profit maximization approach and
long run efficiency focusing on the modern value or wealth maximization approach
following the technique pioneered by Battese and Coelli (1995), which allows to
explain the inefficiency in terms of various firm related control factors simultane-
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ously. The method of maximum likelihood is used for simultaneous estimation of
the parameters of the stochastic frontier and the model for the inefficiency effects.
In chapter 3, the predicted corporate efficiency scores are used to identify
the divergent investment behavior of endogenously classified constrained and un-
constrained firms using the switching regression model (SRM). Each firm at each
point of time can face either constrained or unconstrained access to external fi-
nancing and the probability of facing any of these two is determined by a switch-
ing function of variables proxying for firm’s financial health, informational and
agency problems. The model also simultaneously estimates two separate invest-
ment equations for firms across the groups assuming a non-zero coefficient for
unconstrained firms’ internal finance so that it can capture any residual part of
future profitability which may not be property taken into consideration. Given
this, if the internal finance coefficient for the constrained firms is still higher
than that of the unconstrained ones, then this variation more plausibly indicates
the presence of market imperfections. Moreover, if this higher sensitivity for the
constrained firms decreases with the improvement of their efficiency, then it more
strongly supports the role of internal finance in seizing the effects of capital market
imperfections and cannot be nullified on the ground of measurement error issue.
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood and calculates the probability of
facing a particular financial constraint status for each firm year observations.
In chapter 4, attempts are made to determine the differential quantitative
effects of internal finance on growth among firms facing different degrees of fi-
nancial constraints using the generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimator.
Even though the main motivation of using switching regression model in chap-
ter three is to overcome the static and dynamic misclassification problems, such
a cross sectional method is not suitable for estimating dynamic growth equa-
tions as it is expected to suffer from dynamic panel bias and give inconsistent
results. Instead, a dummy variable interaction technique is applied to allow the
estimated coefficients of internal finance to differ across observations in the dif-
ferent financial constraint categories overriding the need to estimate equations
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on separate sub-samples of firms. The predicted likelihood index of facing a par-
ticular financial constraint status obtained from the switching regression model,
which accommodates the necessary features of a good financial constraint proxy
by construction, is used in this chapter to create time varying dummy categories
to classify firm year observations according to the degree of financial constraints
they face. This approach avoids the endogenous selection problem and also allows
firms to transit between different financial constraint categories. Furthermore, the
GMM estimator controls for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity and the pos-
sible endogeneity of the regressors and hence avoids the bias that arises in this
context.
Finally in chapter 5, an overall conclusion of this thesis is given. This chap-
ter presents summary and significance of the findings in relation to the aim of
this thesis and also gives their limitations and prospects for future studies.
1.5 Data
We have collected data from the Worldscope Database currently owned by Thom-
son Reuters which describes the database as the financial industry’s premier re-
source of most comprehensive and accurate financial data on public companies
resided outside of the United States of America.1 Worldscope offers annual and
interim/quarterly data, detailed historical financial statement content, per share
data, calculated ratios, pricing and textual information from the late 1980s for
firms in developed markets and is widely respected for content quality, depth
of detail, extensive company coverage and content presentation. It provides a
standardized format of presentation and uses different templates for industrial,
insurance, banks and other financial companies aiming to enhance the compara-
bility of the financial data of companies from different countries, industries and
across time. Worldscope is available through a variety of Thomson Financial soft-
ware products, including Thomson One products, Datastream, and Quantitative
1The data definitions and other information about the contents of the Worldscope database
are contained in http://extranet.datastream.com/Data/Worldscope/index.htm.
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Analytics. For this study, the data were collected through Datastream.
We started with a panel of firms listed in the London Stock Exchange over
the period 1981 to 2009. In this primary selection, some firms were accumulated
as unclassified and unquoted equities, so we excluded those first. In World-
scope each company is assigned a general industry classification (GIC), which
reports whether a company is an industrial (01), utility (02), transportation (03),
bank/savings and loan (04), insurance (05) and other financial (06) company.
Also the FTSE/Dow Jones Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) codes are
adopted by the database as it’s standard global classification tool and the ICB is
much more detailed than the GIC. The ICB structure enables the comparison of
companies across four levels of classification, namely 10 industries, 19 supersec-
tors, 41 sectors and 114 subsectors. We managed to collect the 41 sectoral codes
against all the firms. We excluded all banks, life and non-life insurance, real
estate, general financial, equity and non-equity investment instrument companies
according to both the GIC and ICB codes as they follow different accounting
practices. This left us with three industries and 33 sectors according to the GIC
and ICB codes respectively and these 33 sectors are listed in table A.1 of ap-
pendix A (p. 162) along with the industries and supersectors they are in. We
also dropped all the observations with unexpected signs, like negative revenue,
assets or investment. To avoid loss of firm years, we replaced missing values for
intangible assets with zero and created a dummy variable for that considering
the significant number of missing observations for intangible assets. Other than
this, we dropped all the other observations with missing values for the required
variables. Then we deleted all the firms with less than three consecutive years of
observations for any of the required variables. Some firms operating for relatively
longer period still have gaps in their panels, but have multiple three consecutive
observations in them. Finally, the dataset we use in our estimations have an un-
balanced panel of 1122 firms from thirty three different sectors with a minimum
of three to a maximum of twenty nine consecutive years of observations and a
total of 13183 firm-years. As we allow both entry and exit of firms along the
way, our estimations using this unbalanced panel data are expected to be free
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from any potential selection and survivor bias.2 All required financial variables
are deflated with the GDP deflator and all regression variables are winsored at
the 1% and 99% level to get rid of the extreme outliers. The latter rule is ex-
pected to eliminate observations reflecting very large mergers, extraordinary firm
shocks, coding or severe measurement errors and is applied as a common proce-
dure in contemporary finance literatures, e.g., Hovakimian and Titman (2006).
Worldscope data items are identified by a five-digit field number and a field name
according to which they are collected for this thesis. The data definitions along
with their unique identifiers of all the variables used in the three chapters of
this thesis are presented in section A.2 of appendix A (p. 164). Each chapter
separately reports the mean and distributional information for all the regression
variables used in the different empirical models and also explains how those vari-
ables are constructed in detail.
1.6 Contributions
In order to appreciate the contributions of this thesis, it is necessary to review
the methodologies and limitations of the work that has already been done with
similar research interests as of this thesis. In each of the three chapters sepa-
rately, we have tried to make an up-to-date and comprehensive literature review
based on which we have also asserted our contributions to the literature. These
are reiterated briefly in this section.
This thesis makes the first contribution by selecting a large panel of UK firms
and a long period of time that we consider. Investigating the role of capital mar-
ket imperfections focusing on the UK firms’ performance rather than that of US is
important because compared with the amount of work done focusing on the latter
economy, comparable UK based studies are few. Our emphasis to estimate short
run and long run efficiency and the empirical implications of the distinctions be-
2The closest dataset we found to compare with ours is the one used by Carpenter and Guar-
iglia (2008). Allowing entry and exit, they had 902 UK quoted manufacturing companies over
1980-2000 with a total of 10,143 firm-years and a minimum of three consecutive observations
before dropping some more observations due to the lagged form of their variables.
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tween them are novel. Introducing corporate efficiency in an investment equation
to clarify the role of cash flow in detecting the presence of market imperfections
is another significant contribution of this thesis. Finally, utilizing the predicted
likelihood index from the switching regression model as an indicator of financial
constraints to find out the differential quantitative effect of internal finance on
firm growth within an augmented Gibrat’s equation is another contribution we
make to the existing literature. Overall, our composition of different empirical
strategies and econometric techniques, provides a distinctive complement to the
existing literature by suggesting new ways to study the impact of capital market
frictions on firm performance.
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Chapter 2
Stochastic Frontier Analysis to
Corporate Efficiency
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2.1 Introduction
The existence of post-contract asymmetric information between shareholders and
bondholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Myers, 1977) and the pre-contract
asymmetric information between current and prospective shareholders (Myers
and Majluf, 1984) may lead to rejection of some investment projects with a pos-
itive net present value (NPV) due to differential cost of internal and external
financing. On the other hand, according to agency cost of free cash flow theory
(Jensen, 1986), there can be negative NPV investment projects that end up being
undertaken. The general perception of these literatures is that, shareholders take
too risky projects and misrepresent the quality of the investment project due to
their conflict of interest with debtholders and this requires the shareholders to
pay higher cost of finance and face higher risk of financial distress, bankruptcy, or
liquidation as a result. On the other hand, managers misappropriate firm value
due to their conflicts of interest with the shareholders which requires shareholders
to bear the cost of providing incentives or monitoring to limit the opportunistic
activities of the managers. The first of these two costs is termed as agency cost
of outside debt and the latter one as agency cost of outside equity and Jensen
and Meckling (1976) defines total agency cost as the sum of these two. Overall,
all these market imperfection led inefficiencies are the sources behind suboptimal
level of investment and hence may prevent the firms from value or profit max-
imization (Morgado and Pindado, 2003). Also the paper by Harris and Raviv
(1991) gives an extensive review on these problems affecting the financing and
investment decisions.
Agency costs can be apparent in various forms like managers exerting insuf-
ficient work effort, indulging in executive perks, choosing inputs or outputs or a
financial structure that suits their own preferences, firms loosing their credibility
to external financiers, forfeiting their ability to undertake profitable investment
opportunities in the future etc and all these firm specific factors may cause drop
in productivity or loss of profit or value for the firm. At times, firms can also be
positively or negatively affected by some external factors which are completely
beyond the control of managers or shareholders and a net measure of agency costs
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must leave out those factors. Moreover, according to the framework of Jensen
and Meckling (1976), agency costs incurred by firms can be either zero or posi-
tive. Due to their multidimensional nature, it is difficult to measure agency cost
in either absolute or relative terms and hence they are largely unquantifiable.
Previous studies have used qualitative measures of firm performance based on
financial ratios or stock market values or some combination of these, which are
regressed on leverage and other control variables for testing the various agency
costs hypothesis (Mehran, 1995, Cole and Mehran, 1998, Himmelberg et al., 1999,
Florackis and Ozkan, 2009), but have not attempted to calculate the magnitude
of agency costs. Also, the two crucial properties mentioned above cannot be ac-
commodated by the empirical methodologies used in these studies and the results
are inconclusive as well.
Agency costs arising from the conflict of interests between different stakehold-
ers prevent a firm to achieve the best practice relative to it’s peers. Considering
that these best practice peers have minimized agency costs, recent developments
consider efficiency measurement as closest to the concept of (inverse) agency cost
(Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006) which is basically how close an individual
firm with similar technologies can reach to it’s benchmark. This benchmark rep-
resents a hypothetical value and the shortfall of the actual firm value from the
hypothetical one gives an estimate of the level of inefficiency of the firm. Firms
with lower degrees of shortfall, and hence lower inefficiencies, are the more effi-
cient firms. For calculating efficiency in this fashion, stochastic frontier analysis
(SFA) is in a number of respects superior to other alternative parametric and non-
parametric methods. Several studies have analyzed data with both data envel-
opment analysis (DEA) and parametric, deterministic frontier estimators (DFA)
and have produced mixed evidence. The main disadvantage of DEA method is
that there is no provision for statistical noise or measurement error in the model.
Under the deterministic frontier specification, random external events or error
in the model specification or measurement of the component variables could also
translate into increased inefficiency measures. But stochastic frontier is randomly
placed by the whole collection of stochastic elements that might enter the model
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outside the control of the firm. Due to this attractive feature along with the inter-
nal consistency and ease of implementation, stochastic frontier is being considered
as the standard and most widely accepted econometric technique for efficiency
analysis (Greene, 2008).
Therefore, in this paper, we rely on stochastic frontier approach to estimate
the corporate efficiency of firms,3 but from two different perspectives considering
that the focus has been shifted from traditional to modern approach in contem-
porary financial management. The traditional approach focuses on short term
horizon and fulfils objective of earning profit. The modern approach focuses
on wealth or value maximization rather than profit maximization which gives a
longer term horizon for assessment, making way for sustainable performance by
businesses. For a business firm, profit should not necessarily be the only objec-
tive. It may concentrate on various other aspects like increasing sales, capturing
more market share etc, which will take care of profitability. So, it can be said that
profit maximization is a subset of wealth maximization and facilitates wealth or
value creation. Giving priority to value creation, managers of modern corpora-
tions have now shifted to modern approach of financial management which leads
to better and true evaluation of business.
Using an unbalanced panel data on 1122 UK firms listed on the London Stock
Exchange during the period 1981 to 2009, we estimate two different frontiers
considering both the approaches, one on market value and the other on profit to
predict firm efficiency following the technique pioneered by Battese and Coelli
(1995), which allows to explain the inefficiency in terms of various firm related
control factors simultaneously. Efficiency calculated from the market value fron-
tier is termed as long run efficiency and the one estimated from the profit fron-
tier is called short run considering the different maximizing objectives and thus
introduces dynamism in the manager shareholder conflicts or agency cost and
facilitates comparison between the two. Our work is distinguished by the large
3For the purpose of brevity and consistency, we define inefficiencies as the agency costs due to
conflicts between shareholders and managers or the agency costs due to conflicts between debt
holders and shareholders; define corporate efficiency as an inverse proxy of these inefficiencies
and we use these two words interchangeably in this chapter.
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and more complete set of firms that we consider. Our emphasis on the empir-
ical implications of the distinction between short run and long run efficiency is
also novel. Also, it has been reported in past studies that the corporate gover-
nance environment under which the UK companies operate is not disciplined by
the market for corporate control (Short and Keasey, 1999, Franks et al., 2001,
Ko¨ke and Renneboog, 2005) and also the monitoring role of large shareholders,
institutional investors and board of directors is limited (Faccio and Lasfer, 2000,
Goergen and Renneboog, 2001, Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). These cause a signifi-
cant degree of managerial discretion to be present in these firms and for all these
reasons, the UK is considered as an excellent choice for agency cost study. So,
this makes it an interesting pursuit to study further the agency conflicts and
their impact on the level of investment for firms in the UK aiming to make some
contribution to the existing literatures.
This chapter is structured into different sections as follows. Section 2.2 draws
literature survey, section 2.3 describes the methodology, section 2.4 brings model
specification and description of the variables, section 2.5 introduces data and
descriptive statistics, section 2.6 presents the empirical results and analysis and
finally section 2.7 concludes the paper.
2.2 Literature review
Tests of the agency costs hypothesis typically are based on regressions of mea-
sures of firm performance on the equity capital ratio or other indicators of leverage
plus some control variables, but the results are inconclusive due to the difficulty
in defining a measure of performance close to the theoretical definition of agency
costs. For example, Himmelberg et al. (1999) use Tobin’s Q, Mehran (1995) uses
return on asset and Tobin’s Q as well, Cole and Mehran (1998) use stock market
price, Ang et al. (2000) use expense ratio and asset utilization ratio, Florackis
and Ozkan (2009) use asset turnover ratio and selling, general and administrative
expense ratio as proxies for firm performance. The tests using these traditional
measures of firm performance based on financial ratios and stock market values
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may be confounded by factors that are unrelated to agency costs due to the mea-
surement problem mentioned earlier. Also, the empirical strategies used in these
studies do not allow to calculate the extent of firms’ performance shortfall due
to agency costs by setting a separate benchmark for each of them. Ang et al.
(2000) provide an estimate of such shortfall in small corporations where 100%
manager-owned firms constitute the zero agency cost benchmark and any devia-
tions of expense and efficiency ratios from this benchmark measures the agency
cost. But there is no obvious benchmark like that for large firms against which a
firm’s actual value can be judged as 100% manager ownership is quite improbable
in large corporations.
In these respects, efficiency measures are considered closer to the theoretical
definition of agency costs as they have provision to control for firm-specific fac-
tors outside the control of management and to define a standard performance
for the firms which they would be expected to achieve under minimum agency
costs (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). Estimates of efficiency often vary
substantially across studies according to the data source, as well as the efficiency
concepts and measurement methods used in the studies. At least three defini-
tions of efficiency measures may be recalled from the literatures: (i) technical
efficiency which implies maximizing output from a given combination of factors;
(ii) allocative efficiency which refers to minimizing costs of the input mix, at given
relative prices, for any output level; (iii) revenue efficiency which is related to the
maximization of value added, gross earnings or any other financial parameters.
However, there is really no consensus on the preferred method for determining
the best-practice frontier against which relative efficiencies are measured. The
individual studies simultaneously differ from one another in so many different
dimensions that it is hard to track the sources of differences in efficiency across
firms (Berger and Mester, 1997).
Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) examine the bi-directional relationship
between capital structure and firm performance by using a parametric measure
of profit efficiency as an indicator of (inverse) agency costs for evaluating US
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commercial banks’ performance from 1990 through 1995. This accounts for how
well managers raise revenues as well as control costs or how close a firm is to
earning the profit that a best-practice firm would earn facing it’s same exogenous
conditions. To measure net efficiency, they use the distribution-free method over
the six-year period that tends to average out random error. However, they ac-
knowledge that profit efficiency measures are imprecise and may embody some
measurement error if the profit function is not perfectly specified and the ran-
dom error does not average out completely. A similar study is conducted by
Margaritis and Psillaki (2007) on a sample of 12,240 New Zealand firms to an-
alyze the effect of leverage on firm performance as well as the reverse causality
relationship. But, they prefer to calculate technical efficiency and their frontier
is based on non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) and provides evi-
dence supporting the positive effect of leverage on efficiency over the entire range
of observed data, but the effect of efficiency on leverage is found to be positive
at low to mid-leverage levels and negative at high leverage ratios.
Stochastic frontier analysis also provides a way to benchmark the relative
value of each firm and allows for a distinction between random elements beyond
the control of the firm and agency costs. Motivated by the above idea, Aigner
et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van Den Broeck (1977) pioneered stochastic fron-
tier analysis (SFA). The literature on stochastic frontier estimation has grown
vastly since then and has been widely used in economic studies of productiv-
ity and technical efficiency in hospital costs, airport, electric power, commercial
fishing, farming, manufacturing of many sorts, public provision of transportation
and sewerage services, education, labor markets, and a huge array of other set-
tings. An extensive survey of the underlying models, econometric techniques and
empirical studies can be found in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003) and Fried et al.
(2008). A substantial research effort has also gone into measuring the efficiency of
financial institutions, particularly commercial banks. Berger and Mester (1997)
documents 130 studies (24 of which use SFA) on financial institutions’ efficiency,
using data from 21 countries, from multiple time periods, and from various types
of institutions including banks, bank branches, savings and loans, credit unions,
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and insurance companies. Wang (2003) follows SFA in a different approach to
calculate investment efficiency index using liquidity augmented Tobin’s Q invest-
ment model and this index measures the extent to which a firm’s rate of invest-
ment is close to the frictionless and deterministic level. Using data on Taiwanese
manufacturing firms between 1989 and 1996, he tries to identify and quantify the
effects of financing constraints on the level of investment.
However, the use of stochastic frontier analysis in capital market studies is rel-
atively new. Stochastic frontier analysis is utilized by Hunt-McCool et al. (1996)
to analyze IPO under-pricing and also by Annaert et al. (2003) to judge mutual
fund under performance. A new initiative in this field has been taken by Habib
and Ljungqvist (2005), Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) and Nguyen and Swanson
(2009) who use SFA to compute an estimate of the magnitude of agency costs by
comparing a firm’s actual Tobin’s Q with it’s best performing benchmark Q. The
question whether a firm’s managers maximize value is rephrased by Habib and
Ljungqvist (2005) as follows: whether the firm trades at a Tobin’s Q that is as
high as it could be, i.e. Q* if all operating and investment decisions were made
optimally. This benchmark Q* should hold a firm’s opportunity set and charac-
teristics constant and it should be stochastic. By varying the opportunity set and
firm characteristics, a frontier function can be traced that gives the maximum Q
observed in a sample for any combination of opportunity sets and firm charac-
teristics. A firm whose actual Q plots below the frontier, falls short of it’s best
performing peer valuation and the ratio (Q / Q*) can be used as a size neutral
measure of inefficiency or agency cost. Using a panel of 1307 US quoted firms
in the S&P Super Composite Index from 1992 to 1997, Habib and Ljungqvist
(2005) find that the average firm in their sample attains a value that is 16%
below it’s benchmark value and they consider that as a measure of agency cost
in U.S. corporations. Simultaneously, they relate the shortfall from the bench-
mark to measures of managerial incentives, controlling for firm differences in the
costs of solving the agency problem. The same approach is used by Pawlina and
Renneboog (2005) on 985 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange from 1992
to 1998 and their finding is that the market value of an average firm could be
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increased by 18.2% (15.4% below the benchmark) if all it’s resources were used
efficiently or agency cost can be minimized.4 They find positive effect of insider
and outsider shareholding on inefficiency and their interpretation for this is that,
firms subject to managerial entrenchment are on average less efficient and this
problem is exacerbated by the presence of outside block shareholders (financial
institutions, the government, and industrial firms) at high levels of ownership.5
And finally in the study by Nguyen and Swanson (2009) on 49 industries listed
in NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ from 1980 to 2002, the average efficiency for the
entire sample is 70% (30% below the benchmark), however Tobin’s Q has been
log normalized by them.
In comparison to the production frontier approach mentioned above, Weill
(2008) adopts cost efficiency measure which shows how close a firm’s actual cost
is to it’s optimal for producing the same bundle of outputs. He uses frontier
efficiency scores to evaluate the relationship between leverage and corporate per-
formance in seven European countries. Using a sample of 11836 manufacturing
companies from seven European countries including Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, Norway, Portugal and Spain, he estimates stochastic cost frontier and simul-
taneously an equation relating cost inefficiency to leverage, tangibility, inventory
and size for each country in his sample.6 The results reveal a positive relationship
between leverage and corporate performance across five countries and negative in
the remaining two.
Besides Pawlina and Renneboog (2005), a few of the UK based studies with
particular interest in the capital market and agency costs can also be recalled
here. In contrast to using market value frontier to measure efficiency, Amess and
Girma (2009) use an empirical model to evaluate the effect of efficiency on the
4They use a balanced panel of firms listed on London Stock Exchange, excluding bank, insur-
ance and other financial firms and retaining agricultural, mining, forestry, fishing, construction,
manufacturing, retail, wholesale and service firms.
5Estimated coefficients of both these variables in their inefficiency equation are hardly signif-
icant, but the likelihood ratio (LR) test indicates that they are overall significant in explaining
the inefficiency effect.
6To do that, he includes interactive terms for each explanatory variables with a dummy for
each country in the inefficiency equation.
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market value. They use stochastic frontier production approach to estimate tech-
nical efficiency involving revenue, number of employees and fixed assets. Using an
unbalanced panel of 706 public limited companies observed over the period 1996-
2002, they estimate technical efficiency of 54% for the service sector and 51% for
the manufacturing sector. However, they also use productive efficiency estimated
by the DEA technique and labor productivity as alternative measures of firm effi-
ciency and all these three measures are found to have positive effect on the market
value of the manufacturing firms only. Amess (2003) finds positive transitory ef-
fect of management buyouts (MBOs) on firm level technical efficiency using the
stochastic production frontier approach on a panel of UK manufacturing firms as
well. Florackis and Ozkan (2009) employ asset turnover ratio as an inverse proxy
and selling, general and administrative expense ratio as a direct proxy for agency
costs to test the relationship between managerial entrenchment and agency costs
for a sample of 587 UK firms over the period 1999-2005. To measure managerial
entrenchment, they employ principal component analysis to combine ownership
concentration, board structure, type of block holders and voting power of major
shareholders as corporate governance indicators and executive ownership and ex-
ecutive compensation as proxies for managerial incentives. Their dynamic panel
data analysis shows that there is a positive relationship between managerial en-
trenchment and agency costs.
For this study, we stick to the stochastic frontier analysis to measure net effi-
ciency as a firm’s relative position to it’s frontier can be affected by random luck
irrespective of manager’s effort. The variables exposed to the market volatility
are expected to suffer from measurement error problem which is also not likely to
have an effect upon the measure of efficiency by construction. We believe that our
measures of corporate efficiency from two perspectives can be used as reasonable
(inverse) proxies for all the market imperfections related firm specific problems,
like agency conflict, technical or managerial inefficiencies, financial distress etc
and their imposed costs on the firms.
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2.3 Methodology
To estimate firm efficiency, a set of firms is considered each of which faces the
same opportunity set. Obviously due to diverse firm-specific characteristics such
as managerial strengths, technical efficiency and investment choices, different
firms tend to avail this opportunity set in different ways and therefore create
different firm values. The logic implies that firms with higher valuations are the
ones generating more value per unit of assets and consequently, the market per-
ceives them to be the more efficient firms. On the other hand, firms with lower
valuations are the ones not making the best use of their assets. Hence, they
are regarded as the less efficient firms. By varying the opportunity set and firm
characteristics in a sample of any combination of firms, an optimal value func-
tion or their frontier function can be estimated. The intuition behind the SFA
is that a point on the frontier represents the maximum value that a given firm
can obtain given it’s fundamentals and no inefficiencies and each firm’s shortfall
from the frontier is an approximate indicator of the perceived firm inefficiency
by the market. The smaller the shortfall from the frontier, the higher will be
the efficiency. Before estimating the optimal value or the frontier, the following
important points must be noted as suggested by Nguyen and Swanson (2009):
First, as the frontier function gives the optimal value achievable by the firms,
it is only possible that firms can lie on or below the frontier, but not over it.
Second, the benchmark optimal achievable value is hypothetically derived by
an econometric estimation over the best performing companies facing a specific
opportunity set, but the true optimal value for a particular firm remains unob-
served.
Third, a firm’s shortfall from the optimal achievable value can be either sim-
ply due to random luck rather than superior management or foresight and so
unrelated to any firm specific reasons.
Therefore, it is important to be able to distinguish between actual inefficiency
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and the random elements beyond the control of the firm’s principals or agents.
As explained earlier, determination of an efficiency score based on the technique
of SFA can discriminate between both the inefficiency and luck asymmetry and
enables us to estimate a measure of net inefficiency. To distinguish between the
two, SFA assumes an error term composed of two components. One is a symmet-
ric random component capturing measurement error, random shocks and omitted
variables and the other is a non-symmetric component representing systematic
shortfall from the frontier or inefficiency. Unfortunately, standard ordinary least
squares (OLS) cannot distinguish between these two as the inefficiency compo-
nent is incorporated into the intercept in OLS and is therefore unidentifiable. In
contrast, the non-symmetric inefficiency in SFA appears as skewness in residuals,
which can be computed for each firm and ranked accordingly. This is what makes
this technique more appealing in the inefficiency or agency cost analysis.
Using conventional panel data notation, Y can be expressed as a function of a
(1xk) set of explanatory variables X which determines the location of the frontier,
and the composite error term . Here Y represents the market value or profit to
be maximized in this study.
Yit = Xitβ + it (2.1)
And
it = νit − uit (2.2)
Where β is a (kx1) vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated, i=1,......,N
firms and t=1,.....,T years. The location of the frontier is allowed to shift by virtue
of the time dependence of the X variables. Here, νit is a random variable which is
assumed to be independently and identically distributed, N (0, σ2ν) and allows for
estimation errors in locating the frontier itself, thus preventing the frontier from
being set by outliers. The error term uit ≥ 0 permits the identification of the
frontier, by making possible the distinction between firms that are on the frontier
(uit = 0) and firms that are strictly below the frontier (uit > 0) and magnitude
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of this variable uit corresponds to the shortfall in a firm’s actual valuation from
the potential. By assumption, this uit ≥ 0 measures the net inefficiency that the
firm incurs as a result of misalignment of the stakeholders’ objectives and can
be related to factors explaining the inefficiency or agency cost. cov(νit, uit) = 0
restricts the stochastic error νit around the frontier to be independent of the
firm inefficiencies uit. The main advantage of this econometric approach is that
the symmetric random component νit takes account of the effects of factors be-
yond the control of the managers, any measurement error or omitted variables
by taking them away from the estimates of inefficiencies. The parameters of the
stochastic frontier and the inefficiency models can either be estimated by using
joint maximum likelihood or by a two step approach, given appropriate distribu-
tional assumptions.
The two stage estimation procedure, in which the first stage involves the spec-
ification and estimation of the stochastic frontier function and the prediction of
the inefficiency effects, under the assumption that these inefficiency effects are
identically distributed. The second stage involves the specification of a regres-
sion model for the predicted inefficiency effects, which contradicts the assumption
of identically distributed inefficiency effects in the stochastic frontier. This two
stage procedure is used by a number of empirical studies (Pitt and Lee, 1981,
Kalirajan, 1981) and has long been recognized as a useful exercise. But this pro-
cedure has also been criticized for it’s assumption regarding the independence of
the inefficiency effects in the two estimation stages.
The above estimation procedure is unlikely to provide estimates which are as
efficient as those that could be obtained using a single stage estimation proce-
dure. Kumbhakar et al. (1991) and Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) propose a
stochastic frontier model for cross sectional data in which the inefficiency effects
(ui) are expressed as an explicit function of a vector of firm specific variables and
random error. The parameters of the stochastic frontier and the inefficiency model
are estimated simultaneously, given appropriate distributional assumptions. Bat-
tese and Coelli (1995) propose a similar model for panel data and according to
37
their model specification, uit is assumed to be obtained by truncation at zero of
N (mit, σ
2
u).
uit = Zitδ + wit (2.3)
mit = Zitδ (2.4)
where, Zit is a (1xp) set of variables which may influence the inefficiency of
the firms and wit is obtained by truncation of N(0, σ
2
u) such that the point of
truncation is −Zitδ, i.e., wit ≥ Zitδ. δ is a (px1) vector of unknown coefficients to
be estimated, and wit denotes the unexplained component of uit. Zit may include
some input variables in the stochastic frontier, provided the inefficiency effects
are stochastic. The uit and their determinants Zit are allowed to vary over time,
accommodating changes in a firm’s position relative to the frontier over time and
this captures the dynamics of the managers and shareholders conflicts. The time
variant inefficiency effect is expressed as uit = exp{(−η(t−Ti)}ui, where η is the
decay parameter to be estimated and Ti is the last time period in the respective
panel.
The Battese and Coelli (1995) model uses the parameterizations of Battese
and Corra (1977) where σ2 = σ2ν + σ
2
u and γ = σ
2
u/(σ
2
ν + σ
2
u). The method of
maximum likelihood is proposed for simultaneous estimation of the parameters
of the stochastic frontier and the model for the technical inefficiency effects. The
likelihood function of the model is presented in the appendix in the working pa-
per of Battese and Coelli (1993). It is evident from the earlier discussion that,
firm i maximizes Y at time t if and only if it is on the frontier or in other words
uit = 0. If uit = 0 for all i and t, then σ
2
u = 0. This will make the likelihood
function of the SFA specification identical to the OLS likelihood function. But
if uit > 0 for sufficiently many i and t, then SFA specification will lead to a
likelihood gain because OLS wrongly restricts σ2u = 0. Whether any form of
stochastic frontier function is required at all can be checked by testing the sig-
nificance of the γ parameter, which facilitates a comparison of random variables
uit and νit and must lie between 0 and 1. If γ is zero then the variance of the
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inefficiency term σ2u, here interpreted as the variance of inefficiency is zero and
the model reduces to the traditional mean response function. This would indi-
cate that the uit term should be removed from the model, leaving a specification
with parameters that can be consistently estimated using ordinary least squares.
On the contrary, as γ approaches one, then the deviations from the frontier are
characterized more so by inefficiency or agency costs rather than white noise. A
likelihood ratio test can also be used to check the presence of inefficiency effect
or the one sided error which basically corresponds to testing whether the OLS
and the SFA functions are identical. LR statistic for this test follows a mixture of
χ2 distributions, critical values of which can be obtained from table 1 of Kodde
and Palm (1986). The degrees of freedom of this statistic equals the number of
parameters used to parameterize the distribution of uit. The null hypothesis to
be tested is γ = δ0 = δ1 · · · · = δk = 0 and the rejection of the null hypothesis
confirms that the inefficiency effects are stochastic and are related to the chosen
explanatory variables in the Zit vector.
Firm specific effect (fi) and the aggregate time effect (τt) should also be in-
cluded in the model. As the measure of uit is based on the composite error term
and the composite error term is in turn influenced by the parameter estimates of
the frontier function, failure to include firm and time specific effects in a panel
stochastic frontier model is likely to bias the estimate of uit (Kumbhakar, 1991,
Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson, 1995). The problem of confounded inefficiency
measurement with individual-specific effects which may not be related to ineffi-
ciency can be avoided in the panel stochastic frontier model, especially when the
inefficiency measurement is allowed to vary over time in a parametric form (Corn-
well et al., 1990, Kumbhakar, 1990). Because of the truncated error distribution,
first difference or mean difference technique cannot be applied to eliminate the
effects as differenced truncated normal distributions do not result in a known
distribution (Wang, 2003). So, the composite error term in equation (2.2) will
actually be like the following:
it = νit − uit + fi + τt (2.5)
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Once the parameters have been estimated and the location of the frontier is
identified, computation of the efficiency score is straightforward. Specifically, for
each firm, the relative distance from the frontier or firm i’s predicted efficiency
at time t can be measured as follows:
P̂Eit =
E(Yit|ûit > 0, Xit)
E(Y ∗it |ûit = 0, Xit)
(2.6)
The prediction of the efficiency is based on it’s conditional expectation, given
the model assumption. The efficiency score, PE, is a normalized measure between
0 and 1. A score of .85 means that the firm achieves 85% of it’s best-performing
peer’s market value or profit given other things constant. If a second firm achieves
only 70%, then the market will consider the second firm as less efficient or suffer-
ing from higher agency cost compared to the first.
Maximum-likelihood estimates of the parameters of the model are obtained us-
ing the computer program Frontier 4.1, which is specially written by Tim Coelli to
provide maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of a number of stochastic
production and cost functions.7 The program accommodates unbalanced panel
data and assumes firm effects that are distributed as truncated normal random
variables. It has the most flexible options available in terms of modeling the
stochastic frontier model and allows individual level efficiency estimates to vary
over time. The program Frontier 4.1 follows a three step procedure in estimating
the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of a stochastic frontier pro-
duction function. First an OLS estimation of the functions is obtained and then
a two-phase grid search of γ is conducted, with the β parameters set equal to the
OLS values. The values selected in the grid search are then used as starting val-
ues in an iterative procedure (using the Davidson-Fletcher-Powell Quasi-Newton
method) to obtain the final maximum likelihood estimates (Coelli, 1996).
7frontier package in Stata can be used to estimate our desired model specification, but that
cannot be used on panel data. There is also one package for panel data, xtfrontier, but that
does not allow to estimate the inefficiency equation simultaneously with the panel frontier.
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2.4 Model Specification
2.4.1 Market value frontier
Tobin’s Q represents the future investment growth opportunity in a firm and a
firm which is trying to maximize the Tobin’s Q or market value focusing on the
modern approach of financial management, can be considered to be optimizing
it’s growth prospect for a sustainable business performance. As described earlier,
if a firm’s managers aim to maximize the value of the firm by making optimal and
persistent operating and investment decisions, then the firm can achieve a Tobin’s
Q that is as high as it could be. There will be less misalignment of interest among
managers, shareholders and debtholders and the market will perceive this firm as
efficient considering it’s long run growth objective. The efficiency estimated from
this perspective can so be termed as long run efficiency. To construct a theoretical
benchmark value for each firm controlling for firm characteristics and opportunity
set, a market value frontier can be estimated by the following equation, where
the determinants of Q have been chosen based on underlying theory and the
results established in prior literature. For example, Himmelberg et al. (1999)
develop an empirical model to estimate the effect of managerial ownership on
firm performance, where they regress Tobin’s Q on a number of explanatory
variables associated with the scope for managerial discretion or moral hazard,
namely, size, capital intensity, profit margin, R&D intensity, advertising intensity
and gross investment rates. We try to control for all these along with a few more
variables.
Tobin′s Qit = β0 + β1Sizeit + β2Size2it + β3Leverageit
+ β4Capital expenditureit + β5Intangible assetsit
+ β6Tangibilityit + β7Tangibility
2
it + β8Dividendit
+ β9Firm riski + β10Profit marginit + νit − uit + fi + τt (2.7)
After log transformation, the above equation turns to the following, where
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market value, size and asset base are in natural logarithm form. The asset base or
the log of book value of total assets is a control factor from the log transformation
of Tobin’s Q. The variables with many zero observations are scaled by total assets
instead of log transformation to avoid losing observations following Nguyen and
Swanson (2009). Log transformation is commonly used in SFA and is expected
to reduce the skewness of the sample. As we have a total of 1122 firms, so
rather than including dummy for each individual firm to capture the firm fixed
effect, the frontiers are estimated with sector dummies based on the assumption
that firm characteristics will be similar within each of the 33 sectors classified
by the FTSE/Dow Jones Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) codes. Year
dummies are included to capture year specific effects.
Market valueit = β0 + β1Sizeit + β2Size
2
it + β3Leverageit
+ β4Capital expenditureit + β5Intangible assetsit
+ β6Tangibilityit + β7Tangibility
2
it + β8Dividendit
+ β9Firm riski + β10Profit marginit + β11Asset baseit
+ νit − uit + fi + τt (2.8)
2.4.2 Profit frontier
On the other hand, profit efficiency evaluates how well managers raise revenues
as well as control costs which settles how close a firm is to earning the profit that
a best-practice firm would earn facing the same exogenous conditions. The closer
is a firm’s profit to it’s best performing peer, the lower will be the inefficiency or
agency costs. The reason why profit efficiency can be a reasonable (inverse) proxy
for the agency cost is that the conflicts between debt holders and shareholders may
raise the cost of funding for the firm and may also affect other input or output
choices if the resources are misallocated due to aberrant managerial behavior.
These may reduce profits relative to a best-practice firm and hence reduce profit
efficiency. Efficiency estimated from this short run profit maximizing motive, can
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be termed as short run efficiency. For the profit efficiency, the equation no (2.7)
above is rearranged as follows:
Profit marginit = β0 + β1Sizeit + β2Size
2
it + β3Leverageit
+ β4Capital expenditureit + β5Intangible assetsit
+ β6Tangibilityit + β7Tangibility
2
it + β8Dividendit
+ β9Firm riski + β10Tobin
′s Qit + νit − uit + fi + τt (2.9)
2.4.3 Inefficiency
The following inefficiency equation is estimated simultaneously with each of the
frontier equation given the appropriate distributional assumptions explained ear-
lier and here as well the explanatory variables are chosen based on earlier litera-
tures.
uit = δ0 + δ1Sizeit + δ2Size
2
it + δ3Leverageit + δ4Firm riski
+ δ5Ageit + δ6Age
2
it + δ7Y earit + wit (2.10)
2.4.4 Variables in the two frontier equations
Tobin’s Q: Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio of market value of assets to the
book value of assets. Market value is estimated as book value of total assets mi-
nus book value of equity plus market capitalisation and book value of total assets
is simply value of total assets (Smith and Watts, 1992, Whited, 1992, Barclay
and Smith Jr, 1995, Rajan and Zingales, 1995, Julio and Yook, 2012). For the
profit frontier, this is included as an explanatory variable because a firm with
better investment growth opportunity may have high profitability as well.
Size: Firm size is an important determinant of firm value or profit and the
43
expected relationship between them is positive. Firm size is measured by natural
logarithm of sales and square of size is also included to capture possible non-
linearities in the relationship following Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Habib and
Ljungqvist (2005). Large firms are expected to employ better technology and
skilled workers and can easily insulate themselves from adverse external or inter-
nal shocks. However, the diminishing nature of the relationship between size and
firm value (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) can also be captured by this variable,
as each additional unit of capital employed may have a lower productivity than
the previous one and so the average Q may fall as firms grow larger (Habib and
Ljungqvist, 2005).
Leverage: Long-term debt scaled by total assets proxies for firm leverage which
is included in this chapter as a control variable in order to capture the effects of
capital structure on the market value and profit of the firm. The expected sign is
indeterminate because on one hand, higher levels of debt in the capital structure
acts as a disciplinary control of managerial behavior. This discipline involves
reducing sub-optimal investments in order to service debt (Jensen, 1986). In ad-
dition, to retain control of the firm by preventing from liquidation and to avoid
personal losses, managers will be motivated to give their best effort and generate
cash flows to meet the fixed interest obligation associated with debt (Grossman
and Hart, 1982, Thompson et al., 1992). On the other hand, high levels of lever-
age reduce the market value of the firm because high leverage increases equity
holders financial risk because of the fixed interest obligation associated with debt.
Moreover, it also increases the likelihood of liquidation and the expected future
costs of liquidation are reflected in the current market value of the firm (Myers
and Majluf, 1984).
Capital expenditure: Capital expenditure (CAPEX) includes additions to
property, plant and equipment and is a measure of investment opportunities.
Scaled by total assets, it is included in the empirical model in order to determine
whether it adds to the value of the firms (Morgado and Pindado, 2003). Equity
holders will assess whether such investments will lead to a particular firm’s success
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and the present value of such future success will be reflected in the contempo-
raneous market value or profit of the firm. The expected relationship between
investment opportunity and firm value is positive (Habib and Ljungqvist, 2005,
Nguyen and Swanson, 2009) which indicates that equity holders value the invest-
ments that arise from such expenditures. If equity holders believe that firm’s
investments will yield a negative net present value, then a negative sign on the
coefficient estimate for capital expenditure will be obtained.
Intangible asset: Past studies use research and development (R&D) and adver-
tising as proxy for growth opportunity. It is generally expected that companies
with substantial intangible investment opportunities will tend to adopt faster and
better technology, be better managed and thereby will be value or profit enhanc-
ing. On the other hand the intangible assets are more discretionary and less easily
monitored which may ease the way to suboptimal utilization of these intangible
assets and may lead to a negative effect on market value or profit as well. In this
study, intangible investment opportunity is measured by the ratio of intangible
assets to total assets which is also considered as an indicator of future growth
opportunities (Titman and Wessels, 1988, Michaelas et al., 1999, Ozkan, 2001).8
Tangibility: The ratio of property, plant, and equipment or total tangible assets
to total assets and it’s square are used to measure the degree of capital inten-
sity or tangibility of the firm. Firms with more fixed assets should be worth
more because such firms may face less agency cost related problems, as capital
providers can observe, monitor and assess spending on tangibles easily (Habib
and Ljungqvist, 2005). On the other hand, more dependence on fixed assets also
incurs higher operating leverage and reduces firm value (Nguyen and Swanson,
2009). Therefore, the relationship is ambiguous.
Dividend: According to the traditional dividend policy views, Arnott and As-
ness (2003) find that higher dividends result in higher earnings growth. High
8As we have lots of missing values in the intangible asset variable, we create a dummy variable
that equals 1 when data are missing, and 0 otherwise to avoid loss of firm-years. Himmelberg
et al. (1999) and Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) both deal with missing data in similar fashion.
45
dividend payments restrict managerial discretion in spending company resources
(Farinha, 2003, Khan, 2006) and tend to increase firm value. The ratio of total
cash dividends to total assets is used here to proxy for earnings growth.
Firm risk: Firms are uncertain about a wide range of factors, including taxes,
regulations, interest rates, wages, exchange rates, and technological change all of
which may affect firm value or profit. Firm risk has been measured by the stan-
dard deviation of annual earnings before taxes by Castanias (1983) and MacKie-
Mason (1990). In a similar way, we use standard deviation of earnings before
interest, tax and depreciation (EBITD). The expected sign of firm risk on value
or profit is indeterminate. Firm risk may work as a disciplinary device to tame
the discretionary behavior of the managers. On the other hand, riskier firms may
sometimes be poorly managed and are prone to various shocks.
Profit margin: Free cash flow, as measured by the ratio of operating profits
or earnings before interest, tax and depreciation to total assets, is considered as
a proxy for firm profitability (Palia, 2001, Nguyen and Swanson, 2009, Titman
and Wessels, 1988, Whited, 1992). Firms with a large profit margin are expected
to have high market value.
2.4.5 Variables in the inefficiency equation
As Battese and Coelli (1995) suggested, the explanatory variables in the ineffi-
ciency model may include some input variables in the stochastic frontier, provided
the inefficiency effects are stochastic or the null hypothesis of γ = 0 is rejected.
This implies that the inefficiency effects are significant and related to the chosen
explanatory variables. On the contrary, if all elements of the δ vector are equal
to zero, then the predicted inefficiency effects are not related to the explanatory
variables in the Z vector and so the half-normal distribution originally specified
in Aigner et al. (1977) is obtained. As regards to the explanatory variables,
Margaritis and Psillaki (2007) assume that leverage, risk, size, growth opportu-
nities, market power and exposure to international trade are likely to influence
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firm efficiency. Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) also use leverage, firm size,
variance of earnings as firm risk along with regulatory environment, ownership
structure and market concentration as control variables for efficiency. Both of the
above studies estimated efficiency index first and estimated separate regression
of the estimated efficiency on various explanatory variables. In this study, the
following variables are included in the Z vector. The choice of variables are quite
different from Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) and Pawlina and Renneboog (2005)
due to data unavailability.
Size: The effect of size on inefficiency is likely to be negative as larger firms
are expected to use better technology, be more diversified, better managed and
better organized. Square of size is also included for similar reasons as in the
frontier equations.
Leverage: According to the agency cost of outside equity hypothesis, the ef-
fect of leverage on inefficiency should be negative. This is because debt financing
along with other external financing can induce monitoring by lenders (Agrawal
and Knoeber, 1996). Second, debt may directly reduce agency costs by reducing
free cash flow available for expropriation or for investment in risky and negative
net present value projects (Jensen, 1986, Myers, 1977). Third, compared to the
alternative of issuing new equity, the issue of debt increases the manager’s equity
holding as a proportion of equity financing which enhances alignment of inter-
ests further. In contrast to these, the opposite relationship between leverage and
inefficiency may arise from conflicts between debt holders and shareholders. If
the shareholders find the risk of financial distress too high, they may opt to shift
risk to the debtholders or become reluctant to control risk cushioned by their
limited liability advantage and may even deteriorate the financial distress of the
firm and give rise to the agency cost of outside debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Firm risk: The effect of this variable on firm inefficiency is expected to be
positive as riskier firms tend to be those which are poorly organized and may be
less efficient (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006).
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Age: It is not unlikely that the length of operation and active presence in the
market can be related to a firm’s efficiency. Due to the effects of learning curve
and survival bias, older firms are likely to be more efficient than younger or the
start-up firms (Ang et al., 2000). However, Battese and Coelli (1995) finds that
the older firms are more inefficient than the younger ones. Many researchers use
date of incorporation to calculate firm age. We are using the date a company
or security was added to the Worldscope database. This can be a good enough
proxy for firm age as it is very likely that a company will start appearing in the
database soon after they are incorporated with any stock exchange. Almeida
and Campello (2007) follow the same approach and use number of years a firm
appears in their chosen database as a proxy for firm age.
Year: Year variable in the inefficiency equation accounts for the possibility that
the inefficiency effects may change linearly with respect to time. The distribu-
tional assumptions of the Battese and Coelli (1995) model on the inefficiency
effects allow to identify the time-varying behavior of the inefficiency effects in
addition to the intercept parameter δ0.
2.5 Data and descriptive statistics
We use the data collected from the Worldscope Global Database. We have an
unbalanced panel of 1122 firms from thirty three different sectors from 1981 to
2009 with a minimum of three to a maximum of twenty nine consecutive years
of observations and a total of 13183 firm-years. These thirty three sectors are
differentiated according to FTSE/Dow Jones Industrial Classification Benchmark
(ICB) codes. All financial variables are deflated with GDP deflator and all re-
gression variables are winsored at the 1% and 99% level to get rid of the extreme
outliers. Table 2.1 reports means and distributional information for all the re-
gression variables used in this chapter.
Firm size is captured by natural logarithm of sales, mean of which is 10.92
and this gives an impression that average firm size is reasonably big. However,
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table gives mean and distributional information for all the regression
variables for which data is collected from the Worldscope Global Database for
1122 UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange over the period 1981 to
2009. All financial variables are deflated with GDP deflator and all regression
variables are winsored at the 1% and 99% level to get rid of the extreme outliers.
Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio of market value of assets to the book value
of assets. Market value is estimated as book value of total assets minus book
value of equity plus market capitalization and book value of total asset is simply
value of total assets. Natural logarithm of total sales and natural logarithm of
the number of years a firm appears in the database are used as proxies for firm
size and firm age respectively. Leverage is calculated as ratio of long term debt
to total assets; capital expenditure as ratio of capital expenditure or additions
to fixed assets to total assets; intangible asset as ratio of intangible assets to
total assets, tangibility as ratio of total tangible assets to total assets; dividend
payout as ratio of total cash dividend paid to total assets; profit margin as ratio
of operating profits or earnings before interest, tax and depreciation to total
assets. Standard deviation of profit margin is used as a proxy for firm specific risk.
Mean SD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Market value 11.83 2.230 7.693 10.13 11.59 13.30 17.64
Size 10.92 3.243 4.301 9.448 11.28 12.97 16.74
Age 2.114 0.862 0 1.609 2.303 2.833 3.367
Leverage .1043 .1352 0 .0003 .0524 .1596 .6539
Capital expenditure .0584 .0610 0 .0175 .0405 .0757 .3306
Intangible asset .1406 .2120 0 0 .0131 .2198 .8148
Tangibility .2900 .2386 .0021 .0873 .2453 .4253 .9220
Dividend .0207 .0240 0 0 .0157 .0312 .1312
Firm risk .1354 .1449 .0028 .0469 .0808 .1530 .6598
Profit margin .0527 .2766 -1.520 .0357 .1180 .1813 .4325
Tobin’s Q 2.033 1.864 .5193 1.072 1.464 2.178 12.69
Asset base 11.35 2.280 6.722 9.681 11.14 12.82 17.07
the standard deviation of firm size is 3.243 which hints on the diversity of firm
size in the sample. An average firm in the sample has Tobin’s Q of 2.033 and
the maximum is 12.69. An average firm is highly capital intensive, with median
investment in tangible assets is 24.53% of total assets, a bit lower than the mean
of 29%. The leverage of an average firm is 10.43% which is almost exactly twice
of the median value. The sample contains unlevered firms as well as highly lev-
ered firms with a maximum 65.39% of leverage. There are firms with a negative
profit margin, but mean and median are both positive at 5.27% and 11.80% re-
spectively. The average rate of capital formation is 5.84%, the median of which
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is 4.05%. The risk is measured as the standard deviation of the operating profit
margin of each of the firms over their respective panel years. This measure of
risk is thus working as a static variable with a mean of 13.54%. This is driven up
by the quartile of largest firms and thus may not be representative of the average
firm risk. The median firm risk of 8.08% rather gives a better representation. The
dividend payment with respect to total assets by an average firm is 2.07%, which
seems quite low. Intangible investment opportunity of an average firm is 14.06%,
but again this is not representative of the sample as the twenty fifth percentile
has a value of zero and the last percentile has a value of 81.48%.
2.6 Empirical results
2.6.1 Market value frontier
In case of the market value frontier, the result of which is shown in panel A of
table 2.2, most of the variables have the expected signs. In model 1, we have only
controlled for the variables as in Himmelberg et al. (1999). Model 2 is our final one
where we extend the set of explanatory variables and we explain the results of this
model only. The frontiers are estimated with sector and year dummies and also a
missing dummy variable for the intangible asset. Market value of the firm changes
negatively with firm size but positively with the square firm size with a turning
point at 12.39, slightly less than the 75th percentile value. The initial negative
relationship up to the turning point may be due to the diminishing returns after
controlling for firms’ asset base. It should be noted here that, multicollinearity
tests between asset base and firm size did not expose any potential problems.
The overall U shaped relationship gives an impression that the market does not
react positively to initial growth in sales, but relies on firms with a substantially
higher level of sales or with persistently positive growth rate, which is quite log-
ical considering that here the firm is relying on long run value maximizing motive.
Similarly, tangibility or capital intensity shows a negative effect but square of
them have the opposite effect on firm value. The turning point of tangibility is
1.75, which is outside the range of the sample. As described earlier, the average
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Table 2.2: Market value frontier
Following the technique proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995), maximum likeli-
hood method is used for simultaneous estimation of the parameters of the stochas-
tic frontiers and the models for the inefficiency effects. Here, frontiers are esti-
mated based on market value maximization approach and efficiencies predicted
from these market value frontiers are termed as long run efficiencies. The frontiers
have been estimated with sector and year dummies and also a missing dummy
variable for the intangible asset.
A: Frontier Model 1 Model 2
coeff std.er t-ratio coeff std.er t-ratio
Size -0.548 0.020 -27.23 -0.570 0.018 -31.83
Size2 0.024 0.001 29.34 0.023 0.001 30.09
Leverage 0.348 0.045 7.789
Capital expenditure 2.375 0.090 26.26 2.273 0.089 25.64
Intangible asset -0.497 0.029 -17.25 -0.454 0.029 -15.80
Tangibility -0.930 0.077 -12.07 -1.096 0.074 -14.76
Tangibility2 0.115 0.086 1.331 0.312 0.083 3.746
Dividend 0.065 0.002 32.07
Firm risk 0.710 0.070 10.21
Profit margin 0.201 0.022 9.343 0.096 0.023 4.236
Asset base 0.917 0.007 127.5 0.944 0.007 141.4
Constant 4.389 0.147 29.81 4.294 0.138 31.22
B: Inefficiency
Size -0.347 0.021 -16.35 -0.380 0.022 -17.17
Size2 -0.003 0.001 -2.614 -0.003 0.001 -2.714
Leverage -1.539 0.196 -7.847 -0.714 0.193 -3.694
Firm risk -1.291 0.112 -11.54 0.007 0.166 0.045
Age -0.019 0.131 -0.147 -0.088 0.132 -0.671
Age2 0.061 0.027 2.258 0.080 0.025 3.229
Year 0.054 0.006 9.879 0.053 0.006 9.104
Constant 1.886 0.271 6.962 1.873 0.274 6.824
firm in the sample is highly capital intensive and such dependence on fixed assets
brings with it higher operating leverage or higher business risk which creates a
negative impact among the risk averse investors. Both Habib and Ljungqvist
(2005) and Nguyen and Swanson (2009) find such negative effects in their stud-
ies. Leverage is positively affecting the firm value because a rise of debt in the
capital structure reins the discretionary managerial behavior and managers will
be prompt to generate cash flows for servicing the debt to avoid liquidation which
will drive up the value of the firm. Capital expenditure, dividend, risk and profit
margin all have positive effects on firm value. So, the equity holders assess ad-
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ditions to fixed capital, higher dividend payment, firm risk caused by any of the
diverse factors and profit margin as the outcome of firms’ success or key to further
growth and such prospects boost up the market value of the firm. The impact
of intangible investment is negative on firm value and this can be related to the
suboptimal and discretionary expenditure on intangibles which the shareholders
may feel redundant.
The model also involves the specification of a regression model for the pre-
dicted mean inefficiency effects, the result of which is given in panel B of table
2.2. The predicted inefficiency is changing negatively with firm size and leverage.
So, the general conception that larger firms are more efficient remains valid in
this case. Larger firms benefit from better corporate governance, possess skilled
and proficient workers, have closer tie with the legal and financial institutions,
are more diversified and all these lead to better management and higher effi-
ciency. Also the inverse relationship between inefficiency and leverage supports
the agency cost of outside equity hypothesis which predicts that higher leverage
puts more pressure on managers to maximize value, and thus mitigates agency
problems between the shareholders and managers. Inefficiency decreases nega-
tively with firm age initially which is expected, even though it is insignificant
before it starts to increase significantly with age. This may be due to the speed
of adjustment as very old firms may not be quick enough in reacting to news
about future investment opportunities (Tobin’s Q), possibly due to their differ-
ent production technologies or because they suffer more from bureaucracy and
divisional hierarchies (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995). The level of inefficiency
is also found to increase over time.
The value for the γ parameter is reported in table 2.2.a, which shows that
73% of total error variance is caused by the one sided inefficiency term or devia-
tions from the frontier are characterized more so by inefficiency or agency costs
rather than white noise and this is statistically significant as well. The null hy-
pothesis of γ equals zero is rejected and this indicates that the inefficiency effects
are stochastic and the SFA specification leads to a likelihood gain. The LR test
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also supports this by rejecting the null hypothesis that the inefficiency effects are
absent and unrelated to the chosen explanatory variables.
Table 2.2.a: Diagnostics for Market value frontier
This table gives the diagnostics tests for our market value frontiers. Here, σ2 =
σ2v + σ
2
u and γ = σ
2
u/(σ
2
v + σ
2
u). LR test statistics are reported for the likelihood
ratio test for the null hypothesis of γ = δ0 = δ1 · · · · = δ7 = 0. The degrees of
freedom of this test statistic is 9 which has a critical value of 20.97 at the 1%
level of significance.
Model 1 Model 2
coeff std.er t-ratio coeff std.er t-ratio
σ2 0.552 0.012 46.47 0.588 0.014 42.22
γ 0.663 0.011 58.26 0.734 0.010 73.66
No of firms 1122 1122
No of observations 13183 13183
Log likelihood
value -9592.24 -8997.12
LR test statistics of
the one sided error 1041.69 1119.40
Table 2.2.b: Market value efficiency
This table gives mean and distributional information for our predicted market
value efficiencies (MVE) from model 1 and 2.
Mean SD Skewness Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
MVEModel1 0.752 0.193 -2.087 0.007 0.704 0.822 0.877 1
MVEModel2 0.745 0.201 -2.005 0.006 0.696 0.821 0.876 1
The mean efficiency predicted from the second market value frontier model
is 74.5% which means that an average firm has market value 25.5% below it’s
best performing peer or an average firm fails to maximize value due to agency
conflict. The statistical and distributional information of the efficiency term is
presented in table 2.2.b. Although the mean of the predicted efficiency is almost
10 percentage point lower than that estimated by Pawlina and Renneboog (2005)
who considered period 1992-1998 only, our mean predicted efficiency turns to 80%
over that period.
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2.6.2 Profit frontier
In the second frontier where the dependent variable is operating profit which the
firms are expected to maximize, the results presented in panel A of table 2.3
are not quite similar to that of the market value frontier. Keeping similarity
with market value frontier, here as well model 1 includes variables suggested by
Himmelberg et al. (1999) only and model 2 is the extended one. Here, the rela-
tionship between profit margin and firm size is inverted U shaped in contrast with
the U shaped relationship in the market value frontier. Similarly the contrasting
inverted U shaped relationship is present between profit margin and tangibility
as well. However, capital expenditure, dividend, and risk are still affecting the
operating profit positively and so is Tobin’s Q. Profit margin is found to have the
same negative relationship with intangible investment, but the negative relation-
ship between leverage and profit margin is again a disparity.
So, the profit frontier differs from the earlier market value frontier in terms
of firm size, tangibility and leverage. The operating profit responds positively
with firm size and tangibility initially, but the relationship turns the other way
after firm size of 12.50 and tangibility of 0.37. Here the managers are perhaps
inclined to raise the profit at any cost to create a positive impression among the
owner shareholders about their work effort or competence desiring to capture a
better compensation package for them. This short sighted strategy may raise
the agents benefit and even inflate the principle’s financial position for the time
being, but most unlikely be sustainable for the company. This can be the reason
behind the inverted U shaped relationship between profit margin and firm size.
Capital intensity and it’s related operating leverage was adversely affecting the
market value earlier, but here initially the negative effect is compensated more by
the positives of investment in tangible assets on firm’s operation before inverting
again. The negative relation of intangible investment opportunity and leverage
with profit margin is again perhaps due to the agent’s short sighted growth motive
due to which they might not feel the urge to reduce sub-optimal investments, take
excess leverage and pay higher repayment for that and these push the profit down.
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Table 2.3: Profit frontier
Following the technique proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995), maximum likeli-
hood method is used for simultaneous estimation of the parameters of the stochas-
tic frontiers and the models for the inefficiency effects. Here, frontiers are esti-
mated based on profit maximization approach and efficiencies predicted from
these profit frontiers are termed as short run efficiencies. The frontiers have been
estimated with sector and year dummies and also a missing dummy variable for
the intangible asset.
A: Frontier Model 1 Model 2
coeff std.er t-ratio coeff std.er t-ratio
Size 0.027 0.002 13.14 0.025 0.002 11.58
Size2 -0.001 0.0001 -15.44 -0.001 0.0001 -13.89
Leverage -0.015 0.007 -2.017
Capital expenditure 0.386 0.021 18.28 0.386 0.017 22.19
Intangible asset -0.055 0.007 -8.543 -0.043 0.006 -7.196
Tangibility 0.099 0.016 6.083 0.064 0.014 4.485
Tangibility2 -0.140 0.018 -8.007 -0.087 0.015 -5.666
Dividend 0.015 0.0004 33.50
Firm risk 0.249 0.011 21.93
Tobin’s Q 0.040 0.001 49.35 0.025 0.001 32.28
Constant 0.001 0.015 0.069 -0.002 0.015 -0.133
B: Inefficiency
Size 0.076 0.004 21.94 0.081 0.004 20.95
Size2 -0.015 0.0002 -79.38 -0.014 0.0002 -73.73
Leverage 0.387 0.032 12.24 0.275 0.030 9.116
Firm risk 2.544 0.068 37.55 2.759 0.043 64.14
Age -0.188 0.032 -5.860 -0.234 0.031 -7.570
Age2 -0.005 0.006 -0.822 0.016 0.006 2.707
Year 0.003 0.001 2.817 0.004 0.001 4.258
Constant -0.097 0.069 -1.410 -0.219 0.050 -4.363
Turning to the regression on inefficiency presented in panel B of table 2.3,
profit inefficiency is found to be negatively related to firm size and increasing over
time, similar to that of market value inefficiency. However, the results differ in
case of leverage. Even though the positive effect of leverage on profit inefficiency
contradicts with the earlier findings, but it is in line with the managerial short
run growth perspective. Excess leverage brings with it the risk of bankruptcy and
financial distress. These may prompt the limited liability shareholders or their
managers to engage in deleterious activities and thus raise the agency cost of
outside debt. Profit inefficiency remains negatively related with age throughout
the whole sample.
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Table 2.3.a reports the diagnostics test according to which the null hypothesis
of γ = 0 and inefficiency effect is absent are rejected in this case as well. The
estimate for the variance parameter, γ, is close to one (0.990), which indicates
that the inefficiency effects are likely to be highly significant in this analysis as
well and are clearly stochastic. Also they are significantly related to the chosen
explanatory variables as suggested by the LR test. In this case, the predicted
mean efficiency is 86.6%, detail information of which is given in table 2.3.b.
Table 2.3.a: Diagnostics for Profit frontier
This table gives the diagnostics tests for our profit frontiers. Here, σ2 = σ2v + σ
2
u
and γ = σ2u/(σ
2
v + σ
2
u). LR test statistics are reported for the likelihood ratio test
for the null hypothesis of γ = δ0 = δ1 · · · · = δ7 = 0. The degrees of freedom
of this test statistic is 9 which has a critical value of 20.97 at the 1% level of
significance.
Model 1 Model 2
coeff std.er t-ratio coeff std.er t-ratio
σ2 0.196 0.005 39.90 0.167 0.003 58.52
γ 0.988 0.001 2064.80 0.990 0.0004 2726.99
No of firms 1122 1122
No of observations 13183 13183
Log likelihood
value 9540.31 10512.23
LR test statistics of
the one sided error 17747.24 16642.35
Table 2.3.b: Profit efficiency
This table gives mean and distributional information for our predicted profit
efficiencies (PE) from model 1 and 2.
Mean SD Skewness Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
PEModel1 0.863 0.162 -2.438 0.099 0.853 0.928 0.955 1
PEModel2 0.866 0.163 -2.426 0.099 0.853 0.933 0.960 1
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2.6.3 Comparison between short run and long run efficiency
In this study, two different frontiers are estimated aiming to capture the dy-
namism in the inefficiency or agency conflicts. And the results suggest that long
run or market value efficiency is consistently (in 11537 out of the 13183 firm years
or 87.5% cases) smaller than the short run or profit efficiency. As shown in table
2.4, the sign test rejects the null hypothesis that the median of the difference be-
tween the two measure of efficiency is zero. The signed-rank test rejects the null
hypothesis that both of their distributions are the same, which is also supported
by the kernel density graphs in figure 2.1.
Table 2.4: Tests of the difference between profit and market value
efficiency
Sign test rejects the null hypothesis that the median of the differences between
profit and market value efficiency is zero and signed-rank test rejects the null
hypothesis that both of their distributions are the same. Here, the difference
between profit efficiency (Pr.eff) and market value efficiency (Mv.eff) are positive
for 11537 observations out of total 13183 and negative for the remaining 1646.
Sign test Wilcoxon signed-rank
test
One-sided tests:
Ho : median of Pr.eff - Mv.eff = 0 Ho: Pr.eff = Mv.eff
Ha : median of Pr.eff - Mv.eff > 0 Ha: Pr.eff 6= Mv.eff
Pr(# positive ≥ 11537)= 0.000 z= 74.726
Ho : median of Pr.eff - Mv.eff = 0 Prob >| z | =0.000
Ha : median of Pr.eff - Mv.eff < 0
Pr(# negative ≥1646)= 1.000
Two sided tests:
Ho : median of Pr.eff - Mv.eff = 0
Ha : median of Pr.eff - Mv.eff 6= 0
Pr(# positive ≥ 11537 or # negative ≥ 11537)
= 0.000
From the firm owner’s perspective, profit maximization should not be the only
objective; it should be coupled with capturing more market share, maintaining a
stable earnings growth, insulating from financial crunch, diversifying operation,
etc. So, even though profit maximization facilitates wealth creation, but when
the managers give priority to value creation by shifting their focus to an array of
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objectives, it may not be possible for them to maintain a stable and high level of
operational or managerial effectiveness, which might otherwise be possible and
hence overall efficiency may fall down at the expense of longer term broader out-
look.
Figure 2.1: Kernel density of profit and market value efficiency
The kernel density estimations of both the predicted profit and market value
efficiencies confirm the variation in their distributions.
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Spearman correlation between the two predicted efficiency is also calculated
and the null hypothesis that the two are independent is rejected and the cor-
relation coefficient between the two is found to be .5108. Even though the two
efficiencies are predicted from different maximization objectives, but it is revealed
by the joint maximum likelihood estimation that 73% of the deviations from the
market value frontier and 99% of the deviations from the profit frontier are charac-
terized by inefficiency or agency costs. In other words, the predicted inefficiencies
are highly significant and related to the different firm specific variables. So, even
though maximizing accounting profit and maximizing shareholder value are not
identical, it seems reasonable that the correlation between them is positive. And
this can also be supported by the fact that profit maximization is a subset of
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wealth maximization and no matter whether the firm managers are driven by
short run or long run horizon, inherent inefficiencies or agency conflict to a cer-
tain extent are always there in an average firm.
2.6.4 Variation in efficiency with firm size
In the case of both the market value frontier and profit frontier, the predicted
inefficiencies are found to be significantly decreasing with firm size. So, larger
firms tend to show better efficiency, both from the short run and long run point
of view. To check the distributional characteristics of the predicted efficiencies
by firm size, the firms are partitioned into small, small medium, medium large
and large on the basis of average sales (in natural logarithm form which we have
used as a proxy for firm size) over their respective panel years. The firm year
observations are also partitioned similarly on the basis of their appearance on
different parts of the sales distribution. The predicted efficiencies from the two
frontier equations (2.8 and 2.9) covering the whole sample are then sorted first
into these four quartiles of firms and then into four quartiles of firm year obser-
vations separately. For a robustness check, firms are also partitioned in the same
way on the basis of total assets as well so that any variability between input and
output based sorting is revealed, if there is any.
Table 2.5 and 2.6 confirm that performance shortfall is present among firms
of all sizes, but decreasing monotonically with firm size. These results are ex-
pected and in line with the explanations given earlier that larger firms are likely
to enjoy better corporate governance structures, have closer tie with the legal
and financial institutions which are likely to put more restrictive covenants on
the operational and financial activities of the firm and monitor managerial activ-
ities closely, are more diversified both in terms of their production and financing
choices and vertically integrated. All these factors are expected to alleviate the
conflicts of interest among the stakeholders (Hoshi et al., 1991) and can lead to
better management and higher efficiency. Lack of further investigations may raise
some questions on the magnitude of this effect in both the tables, for panel A in
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Table 2.5: Efficiency among four size groups (sorted by total sales)
The firms and the firm year observations are partitioned separately into small,
small medium, medium large and large in panel A and panel B respectively using
sales as a measure of firm size. The predicted efficiencies from the two frontier
equations covering the whole sample are then sorted into these four quartiles.
Market value efficiency Profit efficiency
(mean) (mean)
A: No of firms
Small 281 .3999 .6385
Small medium 280 .6716 .8206
Medium large 281 .7924 .9076
Large 280 .8702 .9389
B: No of obs.
Small 3296 .5122 .7100
Small medium 3295 .7537 .8866
Medium large 3297 .8344 .9251
Large 3295 .8815 .9437
particular where we use time invariant size classification. It can be enquired that
facing such possibility of increasing their efficiency significantly, the small firms
may have a keen incentive to merge with their larger counterparts. But, it may
be argued in response that, a prospective merger between a very small inefficient
firm with a very large efficient one, may not necessarily be as advantageous for
the large firm as it could be for the small one. And also, the magnitude of size
effect on efficiency is relatively less pronounced in panel B of both the tables,
where we allow the firm year observations to switch between sizes and the latter
way of classification may be more appropriate for considering the evolution of
firms over time. It could be interesting to include some firm specific variables
as a proxy for monitoring and incentives in the inefficiency equation following
Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) and Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) to investigate
the reasons for this positive monotonic relationship between firm size and effi-
ciency. But, unfortunately we could not get data for ownership structure for our
sample firms and capital and product market regulatory factors from the chosen
database. This can be a good avenue for future research.
As it was revealed in the estimation of inefficiency equations that both the
short and long run inefficiencies were increasing over time, average efficiency of
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Table 2.6: Efficiency among four size groups (sorted by total assets)
The firms and the firm year observations are partitioned separately into small,
small medium, medium large and large in panel A and panel B respectively
using total assets as a measure of firm size. The predicted efficiencies from the
two frontier equations covering the whole sample are then sorted into these four
quartiles.
Market value efficiency Profit efficiency
(mean) (mean)
A: No of firms
Small 281 .5288 .6820
Small medium 280 .6439 .8328
Medium large 281 .7809 .9007
Large 280 .8707 .9388
B: No of obs.
Small 3296 .5650 .7304
Small medium 3296 .7152 .8779
Medium large 3295 .8215 .9146
Large 3296 .8802 .9424
all firms by year from 1981 to 2009 is calculated and average efficiency of the
sample firms are found to be significantly decreasing from 89% in 1981 to 68%
in 2009 in case of market value efficiency and moderately decreasing from 95%
to 83% in case of profit efficiency. The comparison of mean predicted short and
long run efficiency among each of the thirty three sectors also demonstrate high
short run efficiency among each of the sectors, and deviation is smallest in the
fixed line telecommunication sector and highest in the mining sector.
2.7 Conclusion
Although agency-theoretic models are usually formulated in terms of value rather
than profit maximization, in this study both of the methods have been utilized
considering that shortfall of firms’ actual value from their potential due to agency
costs can be proportional to the similar shortfall in their accounting profits or
the other way round. Estimations of the two stochastic frontier models give quite
interesting results and are in line with the theories and previous studies on agency
cost as well. In this study, employing Battese and Coelli (1995) model, long run
corporate efficiency is predicted from the modern approach focusing on wealth
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or value maximization and the short run corporate efficiency is predicted from
the traditional approach focusing on earning maximum profit as inverse proxies
of total agency cost to bring in the dynamics of the principle agent conflict. It is
revealed in the estimation that, an average firm in the sample achieves 74.5% of
it’s best-performing peer’s market value or market value of an average firm falls
25.5% below it’s best performing peer. On the other hand, profit margin of an
average firm falls 13.4% below it’s best performing peer. Both the predicted inef-
ficiency effects are found to be highly significant in the analysis. The inefficiency
effects are clearly stochastic and significantly related to the chosen explanatory
variables as well. Market value inefficiency decreases with leverage supporting
the agency cost of outside equity hypothesis. On the contrary, profit inefficiency
increases with leverage following the agency cost of outside debt hypothesis pos-
sibly due to the agent’s short sighted growth motive. Both the short run and long
run efficiency (inefficiency) increases (decreases) with firm size and decreases (in-
creases) over time. The profit efficiency is found to be consistently higher than
the market value efficiency and there is a positive rank correlation between them
which confirms that an average firm in the UK suffers from inefficiency or agency
conflict to a certain extent, no matter whether the firm managers are driven by
short run or long run growth perspective.
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Chapter 3
Corporate Efficiency, Credit Status and
Investment
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3.1 Introduction
Chapter one illustrates in detail how informational asymmetries and related prob-
lems (imperfect information about the quality or riskiness of the borrowers’ in-
vestment projects, incentive problems and costly monitoring of managerial ac-
tions) lead to an imperfect substitutability between external and internal funds
and makes the Modigliani and Miller (1958) irrelevance theorem invalid. Faz-
zari et al. (1988), Bond and Meghir (1994) investigate the reasons why the level
of corporate investments of the financially constrained firms are most sensitive
to the availability of internal funds. However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and
Cleary (1999) find empirical evidence that while investment levels do depend sig-
nificantly positively on internal cash flows, the least financially constrained firms
are most influenced by the availability of internal funds. A vast number of liter-
atures follow this debate and the controversy is yet to be resolved.
For more than two decades, the debate over the role of internal finance (mostly
proxied by cash flow) in an investment equation has been hovering mainly on two
crucial points. The first of them stems from the difficulty in controlling for the
investment opportunities of a firm. The standard is to use Tobin’s Q, but again
finding a convincing proxy for the unobservable marginal Q is a problem. Most
studies use average Q under the assumption of constant returns to scale and
perfectly competitive product and factor markets following Hayashi (1982) and
adding cash flow to the model, they interpret residual sensitivity of investment
to cash flow as evidence of financing constraints (Fazzari et al., 1988, Oliner and
Rudebusch, 1992, Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990, Hoshi et al., 1991, Schaller,
1993, Audretsch and Elston, 2002, Bond et al., 2003, Chirinko and Schaller,
1996). On the contrary, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Erickson and Whited
(2000, 2002), Cummins et al. (2006) show that because of difficulty in measur-
ing marginal investment opportunities, cash flow may also convey information
about investment opportunities which is not reflected in the estimated Q. In such
cases, the observed cross-sectional variations in investment-cash flow sensitivity
may simply be due to variations in Q measurement error and fails to provide
convincing proof for the existence of capital market imperfections. Moreover,
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the firms facing severer information asymmetry related problems are likely to be
more severely affected by the measurement problem in Q as that incorporates
firm market value. These firms are also the ones which are most likely to be
financially constrained and if they are a priori classified as such, higher estimated
coefficients of cash flow in investment regressions is expected for them.
Such prior classification of firms into constrained and unconstrained groups is
the other crucial point behind the controversial investment cash flow sensitivity
issue. Following Fazzari et al. (1988), many subsequent studies have classified
firms a priori as financially constrained on the basis of a single and in some cases
two quantitative or qualitative indicators and the predictive power of cash flow
is shown much higher for such firms. This cross-sectional difference in the sen-
sitivity of investment to cash flow is a major theoretical prediction of capital
market imperfections. For example, Bond and Meghir (1994) use dividend pay-
out ratio, Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990), Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) use
size, age and pattern of insider trading, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) use size only,
Hoshi et al. (1991) use degree of bank affiliation, Whited (1992) use bond rating,
Schaller (1993) use degree of shareholding concentration etc. The major concern
in this technique is the endogenous selection problem as the classification criteria
can be correlated with the level of investment or with the firm-specific and time
invariant component of the error term and also with the idiosyncratic component
(Hausman and Wise, 1977). The estimation results thus can be highly sensitive
to the classification criteria and threshold value chosen for sample split and all
these are likely to cause static misclassification. There are potential problems of
dynamic misspecification as well as the exogenously classified firms are kept in
the same regime over the whole sample period. During the sample period it may
be the case that a firm that is initially faced with severe financing constraints
becomes less financially constrained later and vice versa. This will especially
be the case when the extent of capital market imperfections depends on general
macroeconomic environment and becomes more important when the time period
under consideration lengthens. Hence, although it is possible to identify firms
that may be financially constrained, it is quite often impossible to identify the
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years during which they remain constrained. This makes it almost impossible to
differentiate between firm-specific effects on investment and the effects of financ-
ing constraints (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997).
The problems associated with Tobin’s Q may also be systematically related to
the criteria used to identify financially constrained firms. Gilchrist and Himmel-
berg (1995) note three such cases. First, the pre identified financially constrained
firms are typically newer, smaller, and faster growing than other firms in the
sample and the stock market is unlikely to have accumulated the usual stock of
knowledge that arises through detailed evaluation and monitoring of firms over
time. Thus, Tobin’s Q might contain less information about investment oppor-
tunities for these firms, which can shift explanatory power away from Tobin’s Q
toward cash flow. Second, if newer, smaller, faster-growing firms are still learn-
ing about their fundamental value, then realizations of cash flow will presumably
reveal relatively more information. If the information revealed by cash flow inno-
vations is not adequately captured by Tobin’s Q, then the investment decisions of
such firms will be systematically more sensitive to cash flow fluctuations. Third,
smaller, younger firms may react more quickly to news about future profit oppor-
tunities, possibly because they have different production technologies or because
they are less encumbered by layers of bureaucracy and divisional hierarchies. If
Tobin’s Q is a poor proxy for investment opportunities, and cash flow enters
purely as a fundamental, then firms with higher adjustment speeds will tend to
have higher cash flow coefficients. All these reasons make such firms appear to
be financially constrained when in fact they may not.
In order to tackle the various problems mentioned so far, some remedial mea-
sures have been suggested by previous literatures. One of them is to use inter-
action terms between cash flow and variables measuring the severity of market
imperfections. This is based on the idea that investment-cash flow sensitivity
should change with capital market imperfection if it is at all linked with these
imperfections. Another is to assume a non-zero cash flow coefficient for uncon-
strained firms so that it can capture any residual part of future profitability which
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may not be fully controlled for. Assuming this, the cash flow coefficient of the
constrained firms should still be higher than that of the unconstrained firms re-
flecting the effect of market imperfections. In this chapter, we attempt to combine
and make use of both these remedial measures.
Firstly, we concentrate on the changing pattern of investment-cash flow sen-
sitivities with a variable measuring the extent of such imperfection. For this,
we use our two direct measures of firm efficiency as inverse proxies of agency
costs from chapter two, namely market value efficiency and profit efficiency.9 We
anticipate that investment cash flow sensitivity will vary with our predicted cor-
porate efficiencies. We further expect that the effect of efficiency on the cash flow
sensitivities will be dissimilar between firms with different degrees of financial
constraints. More importantly, efficiency can in fact affect the credit status of
the firms as a financially constrained firm may become unconstrained with the
improvement of it’s efficiency. These arguments may establish a non monotonic
effect of corporate efficiency on cash flow sensitivities.
Secondly, we try to endogenously classify firms according to their financial
constraint status and allow switching between them to avoid the static and dy-
namic misclassification problems and in line with our prediction that corporate
efficiency can simultaneously affect a firm’s financial constraint status and in-
vestment cash flow sensitivity. In order to do that, an estimator which is capable
of simultaneously incorporating the effects of efficiency on cash flow sensitivities
and on the constraint status of the firms is needed. To estimate our investment
regressions, we rely on an endogenous switching regression framework with un-
known sample separation. Hu and Schiantarelli (1998), Hovakimian and Titman
(2006), Almeida and Campello (2007) use such models in their attempt to address
the problems in testing for financial constraints. This model allows simultaneous
determination of firms’ probability of facing constrained or unconstrained access
to credit along with the variation in their investment behavior across groups.
9More detailed explanation and properties of these predicted efficiencies are given in page
53 and 56 of this thesis. Here, we will use the market value efficiency calculated from model
2 of table 2.2 (p. 51) and the profit efficiency calculated from model 2 of table 2.3 (p. 55) as
those were our final models.
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Hovakimian and Titman (2006) rely on cash from asset sales and Almeida and
Campello (2007) rely on asset tangibility to interpret their results in addition to
other standard variables used in Hu and Schiantarelli (1998). We include cor-
porate efficiencies as an inverse proxy of agency cost along with asset tangibility
and other standard variables used in the literature to differentiate investment
behaviors of constrained and unconstrained firms in line with our hypothesis.
This chapter mainly contributes to the existing literature by introducing cor-
porate efficiency in investment equation in another attempt to clarify the role of
cash flow. Despite the existing concerns over the role of cash flow, we argue that
investment-cash flow sensitivities can be used to gauge the effects of financing
frictions on investment by trying to resolve the issue of possible biases arising
from unobservable variation in investment opportunities. Further to this, the
expected non monotonic effect of corporate efficiency on cash flow sensitivities
will provide a different resolution to the highly debated Fazzari et al. (1988) and
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) issues. Our attempt to establish a link between cor-
porate efficiency and investment provides a distinctive complement to the existing
literature by suggesting new ways to study the impact of financial constraints on
firm behavior. Another interesting feature of this study is it’s contribution to the
debate with a focus on the UK rather than the US. To the best of our knowledge,
a switching regression model has not been used in any of the UK studies involving
financial constraints and investment.
Using an unbalanced panel data on 1122 UK firms listed on the London Stock
Exchange during the period 1981 to 2009, we estimate a number of endoge-
nous switching regression models incorporating our predicted corporate efficien-
cies from the stochastic frontier analysis in chapter two along with other variables
used in contemporary literatures. We mainly rely on the market value efficiency
considering it’s relative advantage in better business evaluation. However, we
also estimate the models with profit efficiency separately to check whether our
propositions are robust to this alternative measure of corporate efficiency. Our
different model specifications strive to confront the major challenges in examining
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the effects of capital-market imperfections on investment decisions of individual
firms and will mainly concentrate on inspecting the following:
1. Whether and how efficiency is affecting the likelihood of being financially
constrained or unconstrained
2. Whether investment-cash flow sensitivity is increasing or decreasing with
efficiency
3. Whether the effect of efficiency on cash flow sensitivities is monotonic or
non-monotonic
The rest of this chapter is structured into different sections as follows. Sec-
tion 3.2 draws literature survey, section 3.3 describes the methodology, section
3.4 brings model specification and description of the variables, section 3.5 intro-
duces data and descriptive statistics, section 3.6 presents the empirical results
and analysis and finally section 3.7 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Literature review
The controversial role of cash flow in an investment equation remains the main
focal point in many of the past and recent literatures on financial constraints
and investment. Many subsequent studies following Fazzari et al. (1988) rely
on cross-sectional difference in the sensitivity of investment to cash flow where
firms are classified a priori as financially constrained. Some researchers argue
that this variation is caused by market imperfection; whereas some dispute that
the sensitivity could stem from the correlation between cash flow and omitted or
mis-measured investment opportunities. Several attempts have also been made
at constructing alternative measures of investment opportunities or fitting in ad-
ditional variables uncorrelated with the investment opportunities aiming to test
whether the effect of cash flow on firm’s investment remains significant. But,
the results arising from these attempts are not that consistent. Some confirm
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that investment cash flow sensitivity can still be used as a sufficient measure of
financial constraints, whereas other studies remain sceptical. On the whole, the
literature on this field of study can be divided into three clusters. One of them
on classifying firms according to the degree of financial constraints, another on
using more adequate measures of the investment opportunities to tackle the mea-
surement error issues and the rest is on using alternative variables to verify the
performance of the cash flow sensitivity of investment or to bypass the depen-
dency on it.
3.2.1 Classification of firms into financially more or less constrained
groups
The seminal paper by Fazzari et al. (1988) use US firm-level data to inspect the
differences in the sensitivity of investment to cash flow across groups of firms di-
vided according to the degree of financial constraints. They classify low-dividend
paying firms as more likely to face financial constraints and the investment level
of such firms are found to be affected relatively more by the availability of cash
flow in comparison with the high-dividend paying unconstrained firms and thus
provide useful evidence in favor of the existence of financial constraints under
capital market imperfections. The higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow
for financially constrained firms has been scrutinized by a number of papers in-
cluding Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Using information contained in the firms’
annual reports and managements’ statements on internal liquidity, they confirm
investment of low-dividend paying firms to be less sensitive to cash flow. This
conflicting finding with Fazzari et al. (1988) recommends that higher sensitivities
of investment to cash flow may not be sufficiently used as evidence that firms
are more financially constrained. The Kaplan and Zingales (1997) classification
scheme has been condemned later by Fazzari et al. (2000) in terms of both classifi-
cation criteria and degree of financial constraints. They criticize that self-serving
managers’ statements favoring their firms’ financial status may not be a reliable
evidence of the absence of financing constraints in most situations. Also the clas-
sification criteria used in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) may be unreliable measures
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of the relative degree of financing constraints as they make their classification
from static perspective only. Kaplan and Zingales (2000) later claim that the
comparative statics analysis of Fazzari et al. (2000) are in fact supportive to their
earlier conclusions and the criticisms regarding their classification scheme and
empirical results are unjustified. Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) also doubted
that the results in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) are mainly caused by the presence
of financially distressed firms or outliers in their sample.
The opinions therefore are divided into two subsets and have been supported
by their proponents. The deviation arises mainly because of the different ways
they use to measure financial constraints, namely external and internal financial
constraints (Guariglia, 2008). Proponents of Fazzari et al. (1988) use proxies to
measure the extent of external financial constraints faced by the firms. Findings
similar with those in Fazzari et al. (1988) are observed for young and small firms
(Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990, Oliner and Rudebusch, 1992, Kadapakkam
et al., 1998, Shin and Kim, 2002), for firms having low or no credit rating
(Calomiris et al., 1995), for firms having no affiliation with industrial groups
(Hoshi et al., 1991, Shin and Park, 1999).
On the other hand, indicators related to the level of internal financial con-
straints faced by the firms have been adopted by the studies supporting Kaplan
and Zingales (1997) view. Cleary (1999) construct an index of firm’s financial
strength using a number of such variables indicating the extent of internal liq-
uidity of a firm (e.g. the current ratio, financial slack, net income margin, sales
growth, debt ratio). Lamont et al. (2001) also calculate a multivariate index by
weighting five similar variables (e.g. cash flow to fixed assets, market to book
ratio, debt to total assets, dividends to fixed assets, and cash to fixed assets).
Using varying combinations, some other classification indexes of financial con-
straints have also been developed. The appealing examples of these include the
WW index of Whited and Wu (2006), the synthetic index of Musso and Schiavo
(2008) and the SA index proposed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010).
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Aggarwal and Zong (2006) adopt discriminant analysis to estimate a beginning-
of-period financial constraint index using the variables used by Cleary (1999) and
use that index to classify firms of the four largest industrialized countries (US,
UK, Japan and Germany) into three financial constraint categories.10 Estimat-
ing a Fazzari et al. (1988) type regression equation, they show most firms face
constrained access to external finance due to financially imperfect and incom-
plete markets as a result of which investment levels are significantly positively
influenced by the levels of internal cash flows after controlling for the investment
opportunity set and the strength of this relationship increases with the degree of
financial constraints faced by the firms.
The single or multiple factor classifications applied with the investment re-
gression approach may not successfully separate firms with different levels of
investment-cash flow sensitivity and create static and dynamic misclassification
problem as already discussed. Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) first address the ex
ante classification problem using endogenous switching regression methods with
unknown sample separation, where the probability of being constrained or un-
constrained is determined by a switching function of a vector of firm specific and
some other characteristics that proxy for the severity of informational and agency
problems. They interpret the varying effect of cash flow on investment across the
two groups of US manufacturing firms in terms of imperfect substitutability be-
tween different sources of finance and their results provide strong evidence that
such effects vary with the severity of agency cost problems. Hovakimian and
Titman (2006), Almeida and Campello (2007), Adelegan and Ariyo (2008), Hob-
dari et al. (2009) also apply the switching regression technique for their financial
constraints analysis. Hobdari et al. (2009) use accelerator model of investment
instead of the Tobin’s Q. Their results are also based on the assumption that a
non-zero cash flow coefficient for unconstrained firms captures future investment
opportunity.
10In discriminant analysis, first step is to establish two or more mutually exclusive groups
according to some explicit group classification and they use fixed charge coverage ratio as the
grouping criteria. Then, ten percent of top and bottom companies have been used to identify
the extreme sets of companies with the highest and the lowest levels of financial constraints.
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3.2.2 Measurement error in investment opportunities
The main shortcoming of the Fazzari et al. (1988) methodology arises from the
fact that average Q may not be a very precise proxy for the shadow value of an
additional unit of new capital and the significance of cash flow may give biased
results. Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002) postulate that such biases induced
by measurement error in Q can be substantial and may be responsible for the
estimated coefficients on Q being low and those on cash flow being high. They
attempt to tackle this problem by using a class of measurement error-consistent
GMM estimators that utilize the information in the higher order moments of the
data. After including the estimated error adjusted Q in their model, they find
that cash flow turns out to be insignificant even for the financially constrained
firms, but Q theory has good explanatory power once the measurement error
problem is controlled for. Gomes (2001) and Alti (2003) also provide results
against Fazzari et al. (1988) by saying that the significance of cash flow can also
occur in the absence of capital market frictions.
Another major blow to the findings of Fazzari et al. (1988) comes from Bond
and Cummins (2001), Bond et al. (2004), and Cummins et al. (2006). They
construct more accurate measures of the fundamentals which affect the expected
returns on investment by using firm-specific earnings forecasts from securities an-
alysts and Cummins et al. (2006) name it “real Q”. Once expected profitability
is controlled for by using Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) an-
alysts’ earnings forecasts, the correlation between investment spending and cash
flow disappears in all subsamples of firms in their samples. Gilchrist and Himmel-
berg (1995) estimate a set of VAR (vector auto regression) forecasting equations
including cash flow as one of the observable fundamentals to construct the ex-
pected value of marginal Q conditional on observed fundamentals and they term
it as “Fundamental Q”. Since cash flow is used as one of the determinants for Q
in the VAR forecasting equations, hence the alleged role of cash flow in predicting
marginal value of capital is controlled for and all the additional predictive power
of cash flow can then be attributed to capital market imperfections. Furthermore,
as they estimate a separate VAR system for each subsample of firms, the mea-
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sure of “Fundamental Q” directly controls for the possibility that the information
content of cash flow may differ between constrained and unconstrained groups.
However, they find that investment still responds to cash flow even after control-
ling for it’s role as a forecasting variable for future investment opportunities and
suggest that the excess sensitivity of investment to cash flow is not spuriously
generated by cash flow’s ability to predict future investment opportunities.
Another way to address the measurement error issue is to estimate the Euler
equation for the capital stock by avoiding the reliance on Q to measure expected
profitability. The goal of this estimation is that the standard Euler equation de-
rived under the assumption of perfect capital markets should be misspecified for
the priori classified financially constrained firms, but not for the unconstrained
ones. Whited (1992), Hubbard et al. (1995) and Ng and Schaller (1996) estimate
the standard Euler equation and an Euler equation augmented with financial vari-
ables for various categories of firms using US data and Bond and Meghir (1994)
estimate the same using UK data. Their results support that the standard Euler
equation generally holds only for firms less likely to face financial constraints.
The problem in this estimation technique is that it may not be able to detect
the presence of financial constraints if the severity of such constraints remains
roughly constant over time.
Bond et al. (2003) employ both error correction model and an Euler-equation
specification for estimating their investment equations using panel data sets for
manufacturing firms in four European countries, Belgium, France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom, covering the period 1978-1989 to investigate the role played
by financial factors in each country. They find that financial variables like cash
flow and profit terms appear to be both statistically and quantitatively more
significant in the UK and it’s financial system performs less well in channeling
investment funds to firms with profitable investment opportunities compared to
the other three continental European countries. This is consistent with the sug-
gestion that financial constraints on investment may be relatively severer in more
market-oriented UK financial system.
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3.2.3 Alternative ways to verify the performance of the cash flow
sensitivity of investment
Agca and Mozumdar (2008) emphasize that if investment-cash flow sensitivity
is linked with capital market imperfections, then it should decrease with factors
that reduce these imperfections. Applying Erickson-Whited error correction es-
timations to US manufacturing firm data, they find significant cash flow effects
on investment in most of their sub samples and through different time periods.
Then they examine the investment-cash flow sensitivity of these firms in rela-
tion to five factors associated with capital market imperfections and find that
investment-cash flow sensitivity decreases with increasing fund flows, institutional
ownership, analyst following, antitakeover amendments and with the existence of
a bond rating. Therefore, they conclude that the sensitivity of investments to
the availability of internal funds cannot be interpreted solely as an artefact of
measurement error.
Carpenter and Guariglia (2008) use UK firms’ contracted capital expenditure
to capture information about opportunities available only to insiders and thus not
included in Q. The contracted capital expenditure variable reflects the insiders’
evaluation of investment opportunities and it is defined as contracts entered into
for the future purchase of capital items, expenditure on machinery, equipment,
plant, vehicles, and buildings, for which nothing has been paid by balance sheet
date. They use a panel of UK firms over the period 1983-2000 and classify the
firms as financially constrained or unconstrained using number of employees as a
measure of size. They estimate investment regressions applying the within group
IV estimator and Arellano and Bond (1991) first-difference GMM estimator to
control for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity and the possible endogeneity
of the regressors. When they include their new regressor along with Q and cash
flow in their investment equation to assess the overall investment opportunities
of the firm more comprehensively, the explanatory power of cash flow falls for
large firms, but still plays a significant role on the small firms’ investment. They
explain this as evidence that cash flow may still play it’s role in capturing the
effects of capital market imperfections, at least for the small firms which are more
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likely to be financially constrained as well.
In another paper, Guariglia (2008) uses an error-correction specification in-
stead of the Q model to bypass the measurement error issue. Using a panel of
unquoted UK firms, she finds that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow re-
sponds differently according to the type of constraint. The resulting relationship
between investment and cash flow is U shaped when the sample is divided on
the basis of internal financial constraints and monotonically increasing with the
degree of external financial constraints faced by firms. By combining both types
of constraints, she finds that the sensitivity is particularly large when external
constraints are strong and internal constraints are weak. These results suggest
that the controversy about whether higher investment cash flow sensitivity can
be used as evidence of financial constraints is probably due to different sample
separation criteria, may not necessarily be due to the improper measurement of Q.
The switching regression framework employed by Hu and Schiantarelli (1998)
address the problem of cash flow’s controversial role by allowing the coefficient
on cash flow to differ from zero in the low premium or unconstrained regime.
Therefore, even if cash flow contains some information about future profitabil-
ity, the estimated cash flow coefficient for the constrained firms will be relatively
higher than that of the unconstrained firms. In one version of their model, they
include sales-to-capital ratio as an additional regressor in the investment equation
to control for a firm’s future profit prospects adequately. Whereas, Hovakimian
and Titman (2006) claim that their estimated sensitivity of investment expendi-
tures to asset sales is less affected by the measurement error in their proxy for
investment opportunities as it is not likely to be positively related to asset sales.
Their switching regression results reveal that after controlling for investment op-
portunities and cash flows, cash from asset sales is a significant determinant of
corporate investment expenditures and financially constrained firms are likely to
invest more when they generate cash from asset sales, but this relation is in-
validated for financially unconstrained firms, all listed on NYSE, AMEX and
NASDAQ.
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Exploring the idea that the financial constraint status is endogenously re-
lated to the tangibility of the firm’s assets, Almeida and Campello (2007) show
that investment-cash flow sensitivity for the constrained firms increases with the
tangibility of their assets, but not so for unconstrained firms using the universe
of manufacturing firms available from COMPUSTAT. Moreover, their switching
regression results also show that asset tangibility affects the credit status of the
firms and the investment-cash flow sensitivities are not monotonically related to
the degree of financing constraints. They also claim that their proposed empirical
testing strategy sidesteps the measurement and interpretation problem with To-
bin’s Q as it does not rely on a single comparison of the level of the estimated cash
flow coefficients of constrained and unconstrained firms, but revolves around the
marginal effect of asset tangibility on the impact of income shocks on spending
under credit constraints. Even if the cash flow coefficient contains information
about investment opportunities, it is improbable that the bias is higher both for
constrained and for highly tangible firms.
Ascioglu et al. (2008) also find higher investment-cash flow sensitivity for firms
with high information asymmetry, but they use the probability of informed trade
(PIN) to classify firms as constrained which is a more direct measure of financial
constraint. According to them, only the informed investors invest in gathering
information about firms’ prospects and trade on that information and probability
of informed trading captures the information asymmetry between informed and
uninformed investors. They also claim that financial constraints matter only at
high levels of informational frictions and their results are robust to other alterna-
tive specifications that control for different time periods, firm size, debt capacity,
and probable measurement error problem of Q.
While the above studies find domestic evidence on the impact of cash flow on
investments, Islam and Mozumdar (2007) find international evidence of higher in-
vestment cash flow sensitivity for firms in countries with less developed financial
markets. This supports that firms in such countries face greater external capital
market frictions which disrupt the flow of funds to their most productive uses
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and force firms to rely more on internal financing for investments. They include
interactions of different measures of financial development with cash flow within
an investment equation to establish the above result using a pooled sample of
firms from 31 countries over 11 years. They adopt several methodological con-
siderations to tackle the measurement error and other problems and the result
is robust to different estimation procedures, to six different measures of financial
development and five different measures of cash flow.
This chapter is going to follow the model of Almeida and Campello (2007),
but will use predicted corporate efficiency from the stochastic frontier analysis
in addition to asset tangibility assuming that financial constraint status can be
endogenously related to the efficiency as well. According to the theoretical back-
ground of the model used in chapter two, higher efficiency means easing agency
conflicts which in effect makes way to optimal operating, financing and investing
decisions taken for the firm and efficiency may also positively affect firm’s access
to external financing by rendering signal to creditors or investors about the ac-
tual status of the firm. So, it is possible that the predicted corporate efficiency
may affect firms’ investment responsiveness to internal funds and credit status as
well. Our interpretation of constrained and unconstrained regimes will mainly be
based on the difference in estimated coefficients of the internal liquidity and it’s
interaction terms with efficiency.
3.3 Methodology
The main advantage of the switching regression approach is that the extent of
investment behavior differing across groups of firms and the set of multiple char-
acteristics determining their likelihood of being financially constrained or un-
constrained can be determined simultaneously. The single-factor classifications
discussed earlier may not successfully separate firms with different sensitivity of
investment to internal financing. The severity of financial constraints can even
vary among firms of the same subgroup if other factors are not controlled for. On
the other hand, multiple factor classifications increase the number of subsamples
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reducing the size of each group used for estimation or increase the number of inter-
active terms in single regressions and produce imprecise estimates. The switching
regression approach allows controlling for multiple indicators that jointly deter-
mine the group in which a firm is likely to belong without the need for splitting
the sample into many smaller parts or including many interaction terms and also
allows assessing their statistical significance. Furthermore, the selection regres-
sion incorporates more information into the estimation of the separate investment
regimes than that can possibly be captured by the creation of dummy variables
or sample splits.
In the switching regression model, it is assumed that there are two different
investment regimes, regime 1 and regime 2. While the number of investment
regimes are taken as given, the points of structural change are not observable
and are estimated together with the investment equation for each one of the
regimes. Depending on the extent of financial constraints, a firm may operate
in one of the two unobservable investment regimes and it’s investment may be
more or less sensitive to the availability of internal funds than in the other. The
model is composed of the following system of three equations that are estimated
simultaneously:
I1it = Xitβ1 + ν1it (3.1)
I2it = Xitβ2 + ν2it (3.2)
y∗it = Zitα + it (3.3)
Equations 3.1 and 3.2 are the structural equations that describe the invest-
ment behavior of firms in the alternative regimes. Equation 3.3 is the selection
equation that determines a firm’s propensity of being in one or the other invest-
ment regime. Xit are the determinants of corporate investment and Zit are the
determinants of a firm’s likelihood of being in the first or the second investment
regime at time t. β1, β2 and α are vectors of parameters and ν1, ν2 and  are
residuals. The observed investment, Iit, undertaken by firm i at time t, is defined
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as follows:
Iit = I1it, if y
∗
it < 0 (3.4)
Iit = I2it, if y
∗
it ≥ 0 (3.5)
y∗it is a latent variable measuring the tendency or the likelihood of being in
the first or second regime. Firms will not be fixed in one regime, as described
in equation (3.4-3.5), a transfer between the regimes occurs if y∗it reaches a cer-
tain unobservable threshold value. It is assumed that the vector of error terms
in the investment and switching functions (ν1it, ν2it, it)
′ is jointly normally inde-
pendently distributed with mean zero and covariance matrix
∑
, which allows a
non-zero correlation between the shocks to investment and the shocks to firms’
characteristics and endogenous switching between the two investment regimes,
where
∑
=

σ21 σ12 σ1
σ21 σ
2
2 σ2
σ1 σ2 1
 (3.6)
Here, var() is normalized to 1 as only α/σ can be estimated in equation 3.3,
but not α and σ individually (Hovakimian and Titman, 2006).
The extent to which investment spending differs across the two regimes and
the likelihood that firms are assigned to either regime are simultaneously deter-
mined. This approach yields separate regime-specific estimates for investment
equations, dispensing with the need to use ex ante regime sorting. In order to
fully identify the switching regression model, it is needed to determine which
regime is the constrained and which regime is the unconstrained. The algorithm
specified in equations (3.1-3.5) creates two groups of firms that differ according
to their investment behavior. The theoretical priors about which firm character-
istics and how they are associated with financial constraints are used to achieve
this identification.
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The model is estimated by the method of maximum likelihood, details of
which can be found in Maddala and Nelson (1994), Hu and Schiantarelli (1998)
and Hovakimian and Titman (2006). Although a specific regime in which a par-
ticular firm is in cannot be observed, but the probability with which each of the
regime occurs can be calculated as follows:
Probability of being in regime 1 is Pr(it < −Zitα | I1it = Xitβ1 + ν1it)
Probability of being in regime 2 is Pr(it ≥ −Zitα | I2it = Xitβ2 + ν2it)
The likelihood function of each observation is given by
lit = Pr(it < −Zitα | I1it = Xitβ1 + ν1it)Pr(I1it = Xitβ1 + ν1it)
+ Pr(it ≥ −Zitα | I2it = Xitβ2 + ν2it)Pr(I2it = Xitβ2 + ν2it) (3.7)
Whether the data are better characterized by a model that allows for two
regimes, as opposed to a single regime can be tested with a likelihood ratio test.
This LR test is performed by comparing the fit of a model with one regime to that
of a model with two regimes and the null hypothesis is a single regime can better
describe the data in comparison with a two regime model.11 The problem with
a switching model is that under the restriction that the coefficients of the two
investment regimes are equal, the parameters of the selection equation are not
identified which complicates the calculation of the degrees of freedom. It is also
possible that the asymptotic likelihood ratio statistic does not have a distribu-
tion. But the results of the Monte Carlo tests conducted by Goldfeld and Quandt
(1976) suggest that the χ2 distribution can be used to conduct a likelihood ratio
test by defining the degrees of freedom as the sum of the number of constraints
and the number of unidentified parameters.
The switchr package for STATA written by Zimmerman (1998) will be used
for estimating equations (3.1-3.3). The dependent variables in the two regime
11likelihood ratio test statistics = 2 {log-likelihood for alternative model - log-likelihood for
null model}
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specific equations (3.1) and (3.2) are investment and the dependent variable in
the classification equation (3.3) is a classification variable. We have to provide an
initial guess of this classification variable for each observations and switchr will
return the estimated classification vector with the same name as the initial guess
of the classification vector. The initial guess of the classification variable may be
created using the corporate efficiency index estimated by the stochastic frontier
analysis in the second chapter based on the assumption that highly efficient firms
are most likely be financially unconstrained. For example, the observations will
be coded as 1 (unconstrained) if their predicted efficiencies are above the 50th
percentile value and 0 (constrained) otherwise. However, as the predicted mar-
ket value efficiency is negatively skewed (figure 3.1), it may be a good idea to
change the initial cut off point to 60th, 70th or 80th percentile values to check the
sensitivity in the estimations. Since the estimated probabilities of observations
belonging to any of the regimes are not generally just zero or one, the elements
of the classification vector will fall throughout the interval [0; 1].
Figure 3.1: Cut off points for the predicted market value efficiency
The kernel density estimation of the predicted market value efficiency shows the
negative skewness in it’s distribution, which is why different cutoff points are used
as threshold values for the initial firm classifications.
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Two separate investment equations for the constrained and unconstrained
group of firms and one corresponding switching equation will be estimated simul-
taneously for each of our model specification. We will check how consistent our
results with theoretical underpinnings and previous empirical findings as well as
concentrate on our main research questions.
3.4 Model Specification
3.4.1 Investment equation
The literature on investment has been dominated by two theories of investment,
the neoclassical theory and the Q theory. According to the neoclassical theory,
the financial component of a firm’s user cost of capital does not depend on it’s
particular financial structure and the appropriate measure of investment oppor-
tunities is captured by the shadow value to the firm of an additional unit of
physical capital. This guides firm’s choice of the optimal capital stock (where
expected marginal profitability equates to interest rate) to be solved without
reference to any financial factors (Jorgenson, 1963, Hall and Jorgenson, 1967).
The Q-theory of investment proposes that the ratio of the market value of capital
stock to it’s replacement cost could summarize investment opportunities and thus
offers another formulation of the neoclassical model (Tobin, 1969). This is later
extended to models of investment by Hayashi (1982), who claim that average Q
can adequately capture investment opportunities and explain investment demand
under the assumption of perfect competition, constant returns, capital as the only
quasifixed factor and convex costs of adjusting the capital stock. These models
are later augmented by financial variables to examine the effects of capital mar-
ket imperfections contemplating that firms with higher net worth should invest
more for given levels of investment opportunities, information costs, and market
interest rates under the deviated market condition.
In this chapter, we rely on the extended Q theory of investment model to iden-
tify the difference in investment behavior across groups of firms in our switching
regression framework. The variables that measure liquidity, predicted corporate
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efficiency, asset tangibility, interaction terms of efficiency and tangibility with
cash flow are added to the basic reduced form equation of investment to form
the X vector of equation 3.1 and 3.2. Rather than including firm dummies for
each of the 1122 firms, we include sector dummies based on the assumption that
firm characteristics will be similar within each of the 33 sectors classified by the
FTSE/Dow Jones Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) codes. Year dum-
mies are also included to capture year specific effects.
We estimate two different models in line with the existing literature and our
propositions. As explained earlier, each of these models will have two identically
specified investment equations and one different selection equation. In model 1,
we include efficiency and it’s interaction term with cash flow in the investment
equations to check the magnitude and direction of investment-cash flow sensitivity
and it’s changing pattern with corporate efficiency across endogenously classified
group of firms.
Investmentit = β0 + β1Cash flowit + β2(Cash flow ∗ Efficiency)it
+ β3Fin. slackit + β4Tobin
′s Qit + β5Efficiencyit
+ fi + τt + νit (3.8)
In model 2, we additionally include asset tangibility and it’s interaction with
cash flow in the investment equations in a similar attempt to check the changing
pattern of investment cash flow sensitivity with tangibility following Almeida and
Campello (2007).
Investmentit = β0 + β1Cash flowit + β2(Cash flow ∗ Efficiency)it
+ β3(Cash flow ∗ Tangibility)it + β4Fin. slackit
+ β5Tobin
′s Qit + β6Efficiencyit + β7Tangiblityit
+ fi + τt + νit (3.9)
Therefore, our interpretation does not depend only on a single comparison
of the level of estimated cash flow coefficients between two groups of firms, but
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on multiple comparison of the coefficients of financial slack and two interaction
terms as well. Our expected non monotonic effect of corporate efficiency on in-
vestment cash flow sensitivity may provide useful support in favor of cash flow’s
role in capturing financial market frictions by sidestepping the bias caused by the
measurement error in Q.
3.4.2 Selection equation
The selection equation places a firm year observation in one of the more or less
financially constrained regimes and the likelihood is endogenously determined in
each period by multiple firm characteristics that proxy for the severity of infor-
mational and agency problems. This equation also allows assessing the statistical
and economic significance of a given factor, while controlling for the information
contained in other variables. We include the traditional criteria such as firms’ size,
age, dividend payout ratio and a set of balance sheet variables as an indicator of
financial strength to form our selection vector Z in equation 3.3. We also include
our predicted corporate efficiency index and tangibility in the selection vector in
order to check how a firm’s credit status changes with these two variables. As the
general macroeconomic conditions are same for all firms in the economy or in a
particular sector, their effects on the probability of facing any particular regime
are expected to be same for all firms as well. Probably due to this same reason
none of Hovakimian and Titman (2006) and Almeida and Campello (2007) in-
clude time and firm/industry dummies in their selection equations. We use the
following selection equation in both model 1 and model 2 irrespective of the
specification of the investment equation.
y∗it = α0 + α1Sizeit + α2Ageit + α3Dividendit
+ α4St. leverageit + α5Lt. leverageit + α6Tobin
′s Qit
+ α7Fin. slackit + α8Int.cov.ratioit + α9Efficiencyit
+ α10Tangibilityit + it (3.10)
85
3.4.3 Variables in the investment equation
Investment: The dependent variable investment is calculated as ratio of capital
expenditure or additions to fixed assets to total tangible assets (I/K) following
Hayashi (1982), Bond et al. (2004), Cummins et al. (2006), Aggarwal and Zong
(2006) etc. Capital expenditures represent the funds used to acquire fixed assets.
It includes additions to property, plant and equipment and investments in ma-
chinery and equipment etc.
Tobin’s Q: Tobin’s Q is used to capture firm’s investment opportunity and sim-
ilar to that in chapter two, it is calculated as the ratio of market value of assets
to the book value of assets. Market value of assets is estimated as book value
of total assets minus book value of equity plus market capitalization and book
value of total asset is simply value of total assets.
Cash flow: Much empirical work on testing the presence of financial frictions
rely on the fact that a change in net worth should effect investment and the sensi-
tivity of investment to the firms’ internal net worth should vary across firms with
different characteristics. Cash flow is used as a standard proxy for firms’ internal
net worth and we would expect that the estimated coefficient on cash flow for the
constrained firms exceeds the one for the unconstrained firms. We define cash
flow as ratio of funds from operation to total assets following D’Espallier et al.
(2008), Carpenter and Petersen (2002).
Financial slack: We include an additional financial variable as a measure of
internal liquidity, financial slack (sum of cash and short term investment) to our
investment equation. This is a stock measure of internal liquidity compared to
the flow measure described above. According to Fazzari et al. (1988), such mea-
sure of firms’ internal liquidity may also have an effect on investment for firms
that facing asymmetric information problems in capital markets. As a low-cost
source of investment finance for financially constrained firms, financial slack may
provide them a financial cushion. Therefore, we would expect the coefficients for
financial slack variables to be positive and higher for financially constrained firms
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similarly pointing to the inability of these firms to substitute between internal
and external finance.
Tangibility: According to the theory of Almeida and Campello (2007), asset
tangibility may increase investment for the financially constrained firms as it can
ease such firm’s access to external financing. An interaction term of asset tangi-
bility with cash flow is also added by them to assess how the effect of cash flow
varies with asset tangibility. We share the same thought and calculate tangibility
as ratio of total tangible assets to total assets (Hovakimian, 2009).
Efficiency: Motivated by the idea of Agca and Mozumdar (2008), we include our
predicted corporate efficiency by the stochastic frontier estimation and an inter-
action term of efficiency with cash flow to our investment equation. For inefficient
and financially constrained firms, investment cash flow sensitivity is expected to
decrease with efficiency. If the efficiency improves to a certain extent, the firms
may become financially unconstrained and the effect of efficiency on their cash
flow sensitivity may become inconsequential.
3.4.4 Variables in the selection equation
Size: Firm size has been used as one of the major proxy variables for the level of
financial constraints (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990, Oliner and Rudebusch,
1992, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994, Harris et al., 1994). Smaller firms are more vul-
nerable to information asymmetry problems and face higher and restricted access
to external finance for a number of reasons (Bernanke et al., 1996). Firstly, trans-
action costs of issuing debt or equity tend to be higher for small firms. Secondly,
small firms get less analyst coverage and comparatively little public information
is available for them. Finally, small firms tend to be younger, less diversified and
more prone to bankruptcy. We measure size as the natural logarithm of sales
keeping similarity with chapter two.
Age: Similar to size, firm age has also been used as an important classification
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criteria as it may also create wedge between the costs of external and internal
capital (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990, Oliner and Rudebusch, 1992). Younger
firms are likely to be financially constrained and face severe agency cost problem.
This is because, it is more difficult for financial institutions to gather information
about young firms as they do not have a long track record. Similar to chapter two,
natural logarithm of the number of years a firm appears in the chosen database
is used as a proxy for firm age following Almeida and Campello (2007).
Dividend payout: High-dividend paying firms signal that they have good long-
term prospects (Bhattacharya, 1979, John and Williams, 1985, Merton and Rock,
1985) and thus convey information to shareholders and outside world in an unin-
formed capital market. Firms with a high dividend payout ratio are less likely to
face moral hazard and adverse selection problems and obtaining external finance
will be relatively easier for them. Previous studies have used a dummy variable
which is equal to one if a firm paid out dividends and zero otherwise. But this
places all the dividend paying firms in the same group failing to capture the ex-
tent of dividend payment. We instead include the ratio of total cash dividend
paid to total assets and firms that pay out higher dividends are expected to be
less financially constrained.
Leverage: Highly levered firms are expected to be suffering from lack or ex-
haustion of collateralizable assets and therefore their ability to raise external
financing may be impaired. However, high leverage for a certain group of firms
may also be interpreted as high debt capacity and lower financial constraints
(Hovakimian, 2009). Also agency cost problems in highly levered firms may be
mitigated due to reduction of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) or strict monitoring
by the lenders (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) which may help the firms to obtain
further external financing. To control for these and also to differentiate between
the effects of short term and long term debt on the firm’s probability of facing
financial constraints, we include short-term leverage and long-term leverage, both
scaled by the book value of total assets. The same approach is followed by Hov-
akimian and Titman (2006) and Almeida and Campello (2007).
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Interest coverage ratio: Along with leverage, we also include a flow measure
of indebtedness, interest coverage ratio. We calculate interest coverage ratio as
ratio of interest expense on debt to earnings before interest, taxes and depreci-
ation (EBITD) following Hovakimian and Titman (2006) and the expected sign
of it’s estimated coefficient should be aligned with those of leverage.
Tobin’s Q: Tobin’s Q is also included in the selection equation, but it has an
ambiguous role on firm’s likelihood of facing one particular regime. On one hand,
firms having better investment opportunity may be in greater need of financing
and thus are likely to be more financially constrained. On the other hand, a firm
will enjoy easier access to external finance if the firm’s growth opportunities are
recognized by the market. Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) give another justification
of adding Tobin’s Q in the selection equation which is to control for problems
associated with free cash flow and they expect firms with low Q to face severe
agency problems.
Financial slack: The sum of cash and short term investment or financial slack
is also included as a determinant of financial constraints. Kaplan and Zingales
(1997), Kashyap et al. (1994) assert that firms with high levels of liquid assets
may not be liquidity constrained as their investment is not limited by a lack of
finance. On the contrary, Fazzari et al. (2000), Kim et al. (1998) recommend
that firms have more incentive to hold high levels of financial slack if they are
financially constrained or contemplating to be so. Calomiris et al. (1995) support
this view by showing that firms with low or no-credit quality ratings tend to hold
larger stocks of liquid assets and demonstrate financially constrained behavior.
Tangibility: Almeida and Campello (2007) initiated asset tangibility as a clas-
sification criterion as well. They believe that asset tangibility increases a firm’s
ability to obtain external financing because tangible assets increases value that
can be captured by creditors in default states. Moreover, asset tangibility reduces
asymmetric information problems because tangible assets’ payoffs are easier to
observe. All these make firms with more tangible assets less financially con-
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strained.
Efficiency: According to theoretical underpinnings, the severity of the agency
cost problems raises the cost of external financing and worsens a firm’s leverage
capacity. So, we include our predicted direct measure of inverse agency cost in
our selection equation assuming that efficiency may affect credit status of the
firms. We expect that the higher (lower) the efficiency (agency cost) of a partic-
ular firm, the lower will be the firm’s probability of facing constrained financial
status.
3.5 Data and descriptive statistics
We use the same data as in chapter two, collected from the Worldscope Global
Database. We have an unbalanced panel of 1122 firms from thirty three different
sectors from 1981 to 2009 with a minimum of three to a maximum of twenty
nine consecutive years of observations and a total of 13183 firm-years. These
thirty three sectors are differentiated according to FTSE/Dow Jones Industrial
Classification Benchmark (ICB) codes. All financial variables are deflated with
GDP deflator and all regression variables are winsored at the 1% and 99% level
to get rid of the extreme outliers. Table 3.1 reports means and distributional
information for all the regression variables we use in this chapter. Some of the
variables in the table overlap with those used in chapter two.
Cash flow representing the flow measure of internal liquidity has mean value
of 3.88%, but there are 21% firm year observations with negative cash flows. On
the contrary, the stock measure of internal liquidity has mean value of 15.79%.
This stock measure doesn’t have any negative observations, but there are firms
with no such short term investment. Recent literature suggests eliminating firm
years with Tobin’s Q in excess of 10 as an attempt to tackle the measurement
error problem of investment opportunities (Almeida and Campello, 2007). As
the maximum of 12.69 for Tobin’s Q in our data is close to the suggested cut-off
point, this is expected to minimize the probable measurement problem to some
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table gives mean and distributional information for all the regression vari-
ables for which data is collected from the Worldscope Global Database for 1122
UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange over the period 1981 to 2009. All
financial variables are deflated with GDP deflator and all regression variables are
winsored at the 1% and 99% level to get rid of the extreme outliers. Tobin’s Q
is calculated as the ratio of market value of assets to the book value of assets.
Market value is estimated as book value of total assets minus book value of equity
plus market capitalization and book value of total asset is simply value of total
assets. Natural logarithm of total sales and natural logarithm of the number of
years a firm appears in the database are used as proxies for firm size and firm age
respectively. Financial slack (Fin.slack) is calculated as ratio of cash and short
term investment to total assets; cash flow as ratio of funds from operation to total
assets; tangibility as ratio of total tangible assets to total assets; interest cover-
age ratio (Int.cov.ratio) as ratio of interest expense on debt to earnings before
interest, taxes and depreciation; dividend payout as ratio of total cash dividend
paid to total assets and investment as ratio of capital expenditure or additions
to fixed assets to total tangible assets. Short term debt (St.leverage) and long
term debt (Lt.leverage) are both scaled by total assets. Market value efficiency
(Mv.efficiency) and profit efficiency (Pr.efficiency) are the corporate efficiency in-
dexes derived from the estimated market value and profit frontiers respectively
in chapter two.
Mean SD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Investment .2787 .2381 .0004 .1194 .2045 .3582 1.193
Cash flow .0388 .2001 -1.015 .0198 .0836 .1345 .3385
Tobin’s Q 2.033 1.864 .5193 1.072 1.464 2.178 12.69
Tangibility .2900 .2386 .0021 .0873 .2453 .4253 .9220
Mv.efficiency .7454 .2007 .0056 .6957 .8214 .8760 1
Pr.efficiency .8663 .1625 .0994 .8530 .9332 .9595 1
Size 10.92 3.243 4.301 9.448 11.28 12.97 16.74
Age 2.114 0.862 0 1.609 2.303 2.833 3.367
Dividend .0207 .0240 0 0 .0157 .0312 .1312
St.leverage .0621 .0892 0 .0017 .0281 .0844 .4937
Lt.leverage .1043 .1352 0 .0003 .0524 .1596 .6539
Fin.slack .1579 .1843 0 .0320 .0936 .2062 .8671
Int.cov.ratio .0838 .2728 -1.318 0 .0583 .1489 1.381
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extent. The sample contains unlevered firms as well as highly levered firms if we
consider any of the short term or long term debt positions. An average firm is seen
to be more dependent on long term debt with mean value of 10.43% compared
to 6.21% of the short term debt. This divergence between the two sources of
external financing is almost consistent throughout the sample. The flow measure
of indebtness, interest coverage ratio has a mean value of 8.38% and supports the
dependency of an average firm on external debt as well. The level of investment of
an average firm is 27.88% with a median value of 20.45%. And finally an average
firm in our sample is 74.5% and 86.6% efficient compared to it’s best performing
peers, predicted from our market value and profit frontiers respectively.
3.6 Empirical results
3.6.1 Effect of efficiency on investment cash flow sensitivity
Model 1 of table 3.2 gives the maximum likelihood estimation results of our first
switching regression model (equation 3.8 along with equation 3.10). As explained
earlier, the result is composed of three parts. One selection equation presented
in table 3.2.a which determines a firm’s likelihood of being in a constrained or
unconstrained regime and two separate investment equations for constrained and
unconstrained groups presented in table 3.2.b which demonstrates how different
the firms’ investment behavior across the two groups. The investment equations
are estimated with sector and year dummies and clustering by company ID is
used to correct the error structure of the estimations.
The dependent variable in the selection equation is coded 1 for the uncon-
strained investment regime and 0 for the constrained one and as explained in the
methodology section, this coding is made using our predicted corporate efficiency
index. The observations having predicted efficiencies above the 50th percentile
value has been coded as 1 (unconstrained) and 0 (constrained) otherwise. It is
in line with the theoretical prior that firms suffering less from the agency cost
related problems enjoy relatively easier access to external financing source. As
explained earlier, we use other cutoff points due to the negatively skewed distribu-
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tion of the predicted efficiency. These coding of the dependent variable are only
needed to provide the initial guess required by the switchr package to work.
As we see later, use of different cutoff points do not make any changes in the
estimated results because switchr creates it’s own classification vector based on
the selection variables in the Z vector of equation 3.10. A positive coefficient of
any selection variable indicates that firms with higher values of that particular
variable are more likely to be in the unconstrained regime or a firm’s likelihood
of facing financially unconstrained regime is positively related with that selection
variable. The relationship will be reversed for any selection variable having a
negative coefficient. P-value tests the null hypothesis that a single investment
regime is sufficient to describe the data as opposed to two regimes.
The result supports the general consensus that larger, older and high dividend
paying firms are more likely to be in the financially unconstrained regime as these
firms are less susceptible to the effects of information asymmetries. The negative
coefficient for Tobin’s Q hints that firms may not be financially constrained when
they do not have better investment opportunity. Negative coefficient for financial
slack is also expected as financially constrained firms have the urge to hold assets
in such short term and liquid form. Our estimated coefficient for this variable
has positive sign, but statistically insignificant. Tangible asset’s positive effect
on firm’s credibility to external financiers is also supported by our findings. All
the above explanations and subsequent findings are in line with those given in
Hu and Schiantarelli (1998), Hovakimian and Titman (2006) and Almeida and
Campello (2007). Our two stock measures of indebtedness, short term and long
term leverage and also the corresponding flow measure, interest coverage ratio
have positive and statistically significant coefficients. These results indicate that
firms with a high level of external debt are associated with a lack of financial
constraints or are less dependent on internally generated funds probably due
to their high debt capacity or reduced agency cost problems. In other words,
these firms may likely to find it easy to convince lenders to provide them with
external credit on the strength of their collaterizable assets and proven track
record. Hovakimian and Titman (2006) find similar intuition for their sample
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firms in the decade of 1990-91. According to our hypothesis and theoretical
background behind predicted corporate efficiency, firm’s efficiency has significant
effect on the credit status of the firm. The more efficient a particular firm is or
less severe the agency cost problems, the lower is the firm’s probability of facing
constrained financial status.
Table 3.2: Switching regression models with market value efficiency
This table gives the maximum likelihood estimation results of our two switch-
ing regression models (investment equations 3.8 and 3.9 along with the selection
equation 3.10). The selection equation determines a firm’s likelihood of being in
a constrained or unconstrained regime. The dependent variable in the selection
equation is coded 1 for the unconstrained investment regime and 0 for the con-
strained one. A positive coefficient of any selection variable indicates that firms
with higher values of that particular variable are more likely to be in the uncon-
strained regime and vice versa. P-values of the models reject the null hypothesis
that a single investment regime is sufficient to describe the data. ***, ** and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, level respectively.
Table 3.2.a: Selection equations
Model 1 Model 2
coeff std.er coeff std.er
Size 0.021*** 0.004 0.027*** 0.004
Age 0.449*** 0.010 0.465*** 0.010
Dividend 0.039*** 0.002 0.042*** 0.002
St.leverage 0.768*** 0.054 0.497*** 0.061
Lt.leverage 0.524*** 0.046 0.428*** 0.045
Tobin’s Q -0.055*** 0.005 -0.072*** 0.005
Int.cov.ratio 0.182*** 0.014 0.158*** 0.014
Fin.slack 0.042 0.050 -0.234*** 0.049
Mv.efficiency 0.657*** 0.070 0.866*** 0.072
Tangibility 2.452*** 0.024 1.304*** 0.025
Constant -1.344*** 0.042 -1.232*** 0.043
Model p-values 0.000 0.000
Table 3.2 continues on next page.
Table 3.2.b represents the estimation results of the regime specific investment
equations derived simultaneously with the selection equation. The results reveal
that the investment behavior is significantly different between the constrained
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Table 3.2.b: Investment equations
Two separate investment equations for each of the models demonstrate how dif-
ferent the firms’ investment behavior across the two regimes. The investment
equations are estimated with sector and year dummies and clustering by com-
pany ID is used to correct the error structure of the estimations. ***, ** and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, level respectively.
Model 1 Model 2
coeff std.er coeff std.er
Unconstrained
Cash flow 0.078** 0.037 0.065* 0.037
Cash flow*Mv.efficiency 0.098** 0.049 0.031 0.050
Cash flow*Tangibility 0.383*** 0.066
Fin.slack 0.121*** 0.014 0.047*** 0.014
Tobin’s Q 0.019*** 0.001 0.017*** 0.001
Mv.efficiency -0.016 0.020 -0.011 0.018
Tangibility -0.205*** 0.012
Constant 0.163*** 0.020 0.216*** 0.019
Constrained
Cash flow 0.232*** 0.059 0.185*** 0.059
Cash flow*Mv.efficiency -0.301*** 0.083 -0.270*** 0.082
Cash flow*Tangibility 0.229** 0.090
Fin.slack 0.157*** 0.023 0.060** 0.023
Tobin’s Q 0.030*** 0.002 0.027*** 0.002
Mv.efficiency -0.474*** 0.029 -0.438*** 0.028
Tangibility -0.337*** 0.030
Constant 0.559*** 0.054 0.641*** 0.057
and unconstrained regimes. The coefficients of Tobin’s Q are positive in the
two regimes as firms having better investment opportunity are expected to invest
more. Investment is positively and significantly related to cash flow and the stock
of cash in both the regimes, but as expected magnitudes of the estimated coeffi-
cients for these two variables are larger in the constrained regime than those in
the unconstrained regime. This clearly implies that financially constrained firms’
investment is more sensitive to internal liquidity due to their inconvenience to eas-
ily switch between internal and external finance. Most interestingly, investment
cash flow sensitivity for financially constrained firms is found to be decreasing
with corporate efficiency as opposed to increasing in the unconstrained regime.
Such contrasting behavior of the two group of firms may be explicated by the
cost and revenue effect suggested by Cleary et al. (2007). This along with the
perceived effect of efficiency on firms’ credit status suggest important implication.
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Firms are financially constrained at low level of efficiency, but their investment
becomes less and less sensitive to the availability of internal funds as their level
of corporate efficiency perks up. Higher efficiency makes the agency conflict less
severe and enables the firms’ managers to take optimal financing and investment
decisions and potentially earn higher revenue for these firms. This may switch
on the “revenue effect” as higher revenue is expected to lower the firms’ default
risk subsequently. Therefore, the hindrance to constrained firms’ access to exter-
nal financing source may become less acute with improvement in their efficiency
making them less intensely dependent on internally generated funds. Once these
firms’ efficiency reaches to a certain standard, they may become financially uncon-
strained. These unconstrained firms may have high levels of internal funds, but
this may still be insufficient to finance all of their investment requirements. This
may require higher borrowing, higher repayment costs and consequently bring in
a higher risk of default. This “cost effect” may be responsible for their invest-
ment to become increasingly sensitive to cash flow as efficiency increases further.
However, we should not be concerned about this positive effect of efficiency on
their investment cash flow sensitivity considering that they are not likely to be
financially constrained, either internally or externally and they are likely to have
the privilege to choose the right mix of internal and external financing.
Overall, our findings indicate a non monotonic effect of corporate efficiency
on cash flow sensitivities. At lower level of efficiency, firms are financially con-
strained and their investment cash flow sensitivity decreases with efficiency. When
efficiency reaches to a certain level, the firms switch from constrained to uncon-
strained status and their investment cash flow sensitivity starts to increase with
efficiency. This is in line with our prediction that the financial constraint sta-
tus may be endogenously related to the corporate efficiency of the firms. To be
specific, the relationship between investment cash flow sensitivity and corporate
efficiency may be U shaped as shown in figure 3.2. The figure is hypothetically
drawn resembling with the findings explained so far. The level of efficiency where
the status changes from constrained to unconstrained can not be observed, but
as explained earlier, our main interest lies on the left part of the figure where
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efficiency drives down the comparatively high investment cash flow sensitivity for
the financially constrained firms and eventually makes them financially uncon-
strained.
Figure 3.2: Non monotonic relationship between investment cash flow
sensitivity and efficiency
This figure shows the non monotonic effect of corporate efficiency on the in-
vestment cash flow sensitivities of the firms. Investment cash flow sensitiv-
ity is found to be decreasing with efficiency for financially constrained firms.
Once these firms’ efficiency reaches to a certain level, they become finan-
cially unconstrained and their investment cash flow sensitivity starts increasing.
Investment cash flow sensitivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Efficiency 
Constrained Unconstrained 
Our findings reveal important evidence in resolving the controversial role of
cash flow in detecting the presence of capital market imperfection. If higher sen-
sitivity of investments to cash flow for the financially constrained firms is solely
generated because of the measurement error issue, then it shouldn’t be decreasing
with improvement in efficiency or agency cost. Analogues to the findings of Agca
and Mozumdar (2008), our results support the idea that cash flow may still claim
it’s role in seizing the effects of capital market imperfections, at least for the
97
financially constrained firms. Moreover, the results are free from the priori clas-
sification bias as these constrained firms are endogenously classified by our model.
3.6.2 Credit multiplier effect
Model 2 of table 3.2 gives the maximum likelihood estimation results of our sec-
ond switching regression model (equation 3.9 along with equation 3.10). Here as
well, the investment equations are estimated with sector and year dummies and
clustering by company ID is used to correct the error structure of the estimations.
Results of the selection equation of model 2 in table 3.2.a are almost similar
as that of model 1. Firms that are larger, older, have lower market-to-book ra-
tio, have lower financial slack, pay high dividends, more efficient and have more
tangible assets are more likely to operate in the unconstrained regime. Highly
levered firms’ possibility of facing unconstrained credit status remains valid in
this model as well. The findings of the two investment equations of our second
model in table 3.2.b are also consistent with those of the first. Firms operating
in the constrained investment regime demonstrate higher sensitivity to our two
measures of internal liquidity. The changing credit status of firms with efficiency
is also present here. Most importantly, the constrained firms’ investment cash
flow sensitivity decreases with efficiency in this extended model specification as
well. However, the increase in the investment cash flow sensitivity with efficiency
for the unconstrained firms is not found statistically significant.
In this model, the additional variables included in the investment equations
are tangibility and it’s interaction terms with cash flow pursuing Almeida and
Campello (2007)’s effort. Making use of the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) credit
multiplier model, they find that asset tangibility amplifies the effect of exogenous
income shock on the investment spending of financially constrained firms only
and raises their investment-cash flow sensitivity. According to them, these firms
are better able to increase their collateral value by investing more in pledgable
assets following a positive income shock which in turn allows them to raise more
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external financing, which in turn allows for more investment, and so on. How-
ever, at some point these firms become unconstrained and tangibility should no
more affect their investment-cash flow sensitivity. We find positive and significant
effect of tangibility on the investment cash flow sensitivity for both the groups.
Not only that, our estimated coefficients suggest that the credit multiplier mech-
anism is stronger for the unconstrained firms in our sample. It may be argued
here that such positive relation between cash flow and external financing should
be particularly strong for those firms with high tangible assets as new investment
in more collateralizable assets may enhance their credit capacity more than what
is observed for firms with less tangible assets (Almeida and Campello, 2010). In a
nutshell, our resulting relationship between tangibility and investment cash flow
sensitivity is monotonic in contrast with the previous findings.
3.6.3 Predicted probability of facing financially unconstrained regime
Another important outcome of the switching regression model is that it calcu-
lates probabilities of firm years operating in the financially unconstrained regime
and this can be used as a single time varying and continuous indicator of credit
status. Table 3.3 gives the mean and distributional information for the predicted
likelihood of facing financially unconstrained status (PFU) from the two models
in table 3.2. As both of them are predicted from the same selection equation,
it is not surprising that they are quiet similar in terms of their distributions, in
terms of the rank correlation (.971) and also in terms of their correlation with
the selection variables. The correlation matrix of the PFU’s with the selection
variables are presented in table B.1 of appendix B (p. 165).
Table 3.3: Probability of facing financially unconstrained regime
This table gives mean and distributional information for our predicted probability
of facing financially unconstrained regime from model 1 and 2 of table 3.2.
Mean SD Skewness Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
PFUModel1 .857 .186 -1.684 .111 .793 .943 .985 .999
PFUModel2 .864 .181 -1.955 .064 .819 .946 .980 .999
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3.6.4 Robustness check
We conduct a series of robustness check of our proposed hypothesis and results.
Firstly, it could be a matter of concern to create the initial classification variable
(dependent variable, y∗it) of our selection equation 3.10 using efficiency and at the
same time including efficiency as an independent variable of the same equation.
In order to tackle this, we estimate both the models excluding efficiency from the
Z vectors. The results reported in table 3.4 are found robust to this change in
the model specification. Our suggested effect of efficiency on firm’s credit status
is still sustained by the resulting non monotonic relationship between efficiency
and investment cash flow sensitivity.
Table 3.4: Switching regression models excluding efficiency from the
selection equation
This table gives the maximum likelihood estimation results of our two switching
regression models. Here, market value efficiency is excluded from the selection
equation to check robustness of our earlier results. The selection equation de-
termines a firm’s likelihood of being in a constrained or unconstrained regime.
The dependent variable in the selection equation is coded 1 for the unconstrained
investment regime and 0 for the constrained one. A positive coefficient of any se-
lection variable indicates that firms with higher values of that particular variable
are more likely to be in the unconstrained regime and vice versa. P-values of the
models reject the null hypothesis that a single investment regime is sufficient to
describe the data. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%,
level respectively.
Table 3.4.a: Selection equations
Model 1 Model 2
coeff std.er coeff std.er
Size 0.057*** 0.003 0.074*** 0.003
Age 0.439*** 0.010 0.454*** 0.010
Dividend 0.036*** 0.002 0.037*** 0.002
St. leverage 0.799*** 0.053 0.531*** 0.060
Lt. leverage 0.497*** 0.046 0.394*** 0.045
Tobin’s Q -0.034*** 0.004 -0.045*** 0.004
Int.cov.ratio 0.183*** 0.014 0.157*** 0.014
Fin.slack 0.007 0.049 -0.269*** 0.049
Tangibility 2.505*** 0.024 1.376*** 0.024
Constant -1.248*** 0.037 -1.112*** 0.038
Model p-values 0.000 0.000
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Table 3.4.b: Investment equations
Two separate investment equations for each of the models demonstrate how dif-
ferent the firms’ investment behavior across the two regimes. The investment
equations are estimated with sector and year dummies and clustering by com-
pany ID is used to correct the error structure of the estimations.
Model 1 Model 2
coeff std.er coeff std.er
Unconstrained
Cash flow 0.074** 0.038 0.059 0.037
Cash flow*Mv.efficiency 0.105** 0.050 0.040 0.050
Cash flow*Tangibility 0.384*** 0.066
Fin.slack 0.119*** 0.014 0.045*** 0.014
Tobin’s Q 0.020*** 0.001 0.017*** 0.001
Mv.efficiency -0.020 0.020 -0.016 0.019
Tangibility -0.204*** 0.012
Constant 0.167*** 0.020 0.220*** 0.020
Constrained
Cash flow 0.232*** 0.059 0.187*** 0.059
Cash flow*Mv.efficiency -0.294*** 0.083 -0.271*** 0.082
Cash flow*Tangibility 0.235*** 0.091
Fin.slack 0.151*** 0.023 0.056** 0.024
Tobin’s Q 0.030*** 0.002 0.027*** 0.002
Mv.efficiency -0.492*** 0.029 -0.460*** 0.028
Tangibility -0.332*** 0.030
Constant 0.566*** 0.054 0.647*** 0.056
Following Hu and Schiantarelli (1998), we also include sales-to-capital ratio as
an additional regressor in our investment equations to reduce the possible role of
cash flow as a predictor of firm’s future profit prospects and to capture possible
effects of imperfect competition in the output market. We do the same for our
two models and the results are reported in table 3.5. As expected, magnitude of
the estimated cash flow coefficient declines for both the constrained and uncon-
strained regimes which may be due to the correlation between cash flow and sales.
However, the pattern of the cash flow coefficients across the two regimes remain
same as in the models without sales. Investment continues to show higher sen-
sitivity to our two internal liquidity measures for the constrained firms and also
the variation of the investment cash flow sensitivity with efficiency and tangibility
and their divergence between the two regimes persists.
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Table 3.5: Switching regression models with sales-to-capital ratio
This table gives the maximum likelihood estimation results of our two switch-
ing regression models. Here, sales-to-capital ratio is added to the investment
equations to check robustness of our earlier results. The selection equation de-
termines a firm’s likelihood of being in a constrained or unconstrained regime.
The dependent variable in the selection equation is coded 1 for the unconstrained
investment regime and 0 for the constrained one. A positive coefficient of any se-
lection variable indicates that firms with higher values of that particular variable
are more likely to be in the unconstrained regime and vice versa. P-values of the
models reject the null hypothesis that a single investment regime is sufficient to
describe the data. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%,
level respectively.
Table 3.5.a: Selection equations
Model 1 Model 2
coeff std.er coeff std.er
Size 0.039*** 0.004 0.035*** 0.004
Age 0.436*** 0.010 0.456*** 0.010
Dividend 0.050*** 0.002 0.046*** 0.002
St. leverage 0.560*** 0.065 0.499*** 0.064
Lt. leverage 0.405*** 0.046 0.376*** 0.045
Tobin’s Q -0.064*** 0.005 -0.067*** 0.005
Int.cov.ratio 0.158*** 0.014 0.148*** 0.014
Fin.slack -0.071 0.049 -0.216*** 0.049
Mv.efficiency 0.488*** 0.071 0.657*** 0.072
Tangibility 1.602*** 0.024 1.142*** 0.024
Constant -1.185*** 0.042 -1.146*** 0.042
Model p-values 0.000 0.000
Table 3.5 continues on next page.
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Table 3.5.b: Investment equations
Two separate investment equations for each of the models demonstrate how dif-
ferent the firms’ investment behavior across the two regimes. The investment
equations are estimated with sector and year dummies and clustering by com-
pany ID is used to correct the error structure of the estimations.
Model 1 Model 2
coeff std.er coeff std.er
Unconstrained
Cash flow 0.052 0.037 0.061 0.037
Sales/Capital 0.002*** 0.0001 0.001*** 0.0001
Cash flow*Mv.efficiency 0.168*** 0.048 0.050 0.050
Cash flow*Tangibility 0.357*** 0.063
Fin.slack 0.106*** 0.013 0.058*** 0.013
Tobin’s Q 0.017*** 0.001 0.016*** 0.001
Mv.efficiency -0.010 0.018 -0.011 0.018
Tangibility -0.147*** 0.013
Constant 0.154*** 0.019 0.197*** 0.019
Constrained
Cash flow 0.146** 0.058 0.174*** 0.059
Sales/Capital 0.002*** 0.0001 0.002*** .0002
Cash flow*Mv.efficiency -0.102 0.082 -0.246*** 0.082
Cash flow*Tangibility 0.266*** 0.086
Fin.slack 0.151*** 0.022 0.088*** 0.022
Tobin’s Q 0.030*** 0.002 0.030*** 0.002
Mv.efficiency -0.543*** 0.028 -0.518*** 0.028
Tangibility -0.201*** 0.030
Constant 0.598*** 0.061 0.636*** 0.061
The models estimated so far include all contemporary variables, both in the
selection and the investment equation. The variables like cash flow, financial
slack, Tobin’s Q in the investment equation may create endogeneity problems.
To account for that, we reestimate the two models replacing the contemporary
explanatory variables in the investment equation by their one year lagged values
keeping variables in the selection equation same as before. In this case, the se-
lection equation still determines whether the contemporary investment belongs
to the constrained and unconstrained regime, but that contemporary investment
is now explained by one year lagged explanatory variables. The outcomes are
reported in table 3.6 and assert the results already obtained.
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Table 3.6: Switching regression models controlling for endogeneity
This table gives the maximum likelihood estimation results of our two switching
regression models. Here, all the right hand side variables in the investment equa-
tion are included as one year lagged to check for endogeneity problems in our
earlier results. The selection equation determines a firm’s likelihood of being in
a constrained or unconstrained regime. The dependent variable in the selection
equation is coded 1 for the unconstrained investment regime and 0 for the con-
strained one. A positive coefficient of any selection variable indicates that firms
with higher values of that particular variable are more likely to be in the uncon-
strained regime and vice versa. P-values of the models reject the null hypothesis
that a single investment regime is sufficient to describe the data. ***, ** and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, level respectively.
Table 3.6.a: Selection equations
Model 1 Model 2
coeff std.er coeff std.er
Size 0.031*** 0.004 0.0003 0.004
Age 0.437*** 0.010 0.461*** 0.010
Dividend 0.045*** 0.002 0.041*** 0.002
St. leverage 0.489*** 0.061 0.472*** 0.063
Lt. leverage 0.654*** 0.047 0.427*** 0.045
Tobin’s Q -0.108*** 0.005 -0.103*** 0.005
Int.cov.ratio 0.117*** 0.015 0.148*** 0.014
Fin.slack -0.148*** 0.051 -0.008 0.050
Mv.Efficiency 0.995*** 0.070 1.449*** 0.073
Tangibility 2.890*** 0.024 1.740*** 0.023
Constant -0.955*** 0.041 -1.373*** 0.043
Model p-values 0.000 0.000
Table 3.6 continues on next page.
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Table 3.6.b: Investment equations
Two separate investment equations for each of the models demonstrate how dif-
ferent the firms’ investment behavior across the two regimes. The investment
equations are estimated with sector and year dummies and clustering by com-
pany ID is used to correct the error structure of the estimations.
Model 1 Model 2
coeff std.er coeff std.er
Unconstrained
L.Cash flow 0.079** 0.036 0.031 0.040
L.Cash flow*L.Mv.Efficiency 0.120** 0.048 0.083 0.054
L.Cash flow*L.Tangibility 0.350*** 0.070
L.Fin.slack 0.151*** 0.014 0.071*** 0.014
L.Tobin’s Q 0.019*** 0.001 0.016*** 0.001
L.Mv.Efficiency 0.033** 0.016 0.034* 0.018
L.Tangibility -0.222*** 0.013
Constant 0.124*** 0.018 0.187*** 0.019
Constrained
L.Cash flow 0.226*** 0.056 0.168*** 0.055
L.Cash flow*L.Mv.Efficiency -0.297*** 0.077 -0.273*** 0.069
L.Cash flow*L.Tangibility 0.239*** 0.079
L.Fin.slack 0.192*** 0.022 0.069** 0.024
L.Tobin’s Q 0.017*** 0.002 0.015*** 0.002
L.Mv.Efficiency -0.276*** 0.029 -0.219*** 0.035
L.Tangibility -0.377*** 0.036
Constant 0.213*** 0.044 0.197*** 0.047
We replace the predicted market value efficiency with the profit efficiency in
our attempt to check how robust our already established results to this alternative
form of corporate efficiency. The results presented in table 3.7, are robust and
firm’s credit status is similarly affected by profit efficiency as well. The higher
the profit efficiency (less severe agency cost) of a particular firm, the better is
it’s possibility to enjoy unrestricted access to external capital and as a result,
it’s investment becomes less sensitive to the measures of internal funds. Not only
that, investment cash flow sensitivity is still non monotonically related with profit
efficiency. The sensitivity decreases with profit efficiency for the constrained firms
and increases for the unconstrained. The coherence of our results is logical if we
recall that our both forms of predicted efficiencies have a positive rank correlation
between them.
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Table 3.7: Switching regression models with profit efficiency
This table gives the maximum likelihood estimation results of our two switch-
ing regression models. Here, market value efficiency is replaced by the profit
efficiency to check robustness of our earlier results. The selection equation de-
termines a firm’s likelihood of being in a constrained or unconstrained regime.
The dependent variable in the selection equation is coded 1 for the unconstrained
investment regime and 0 for the constrained one. A positive coefficient of any se-
lection variable indicates that firms with higher values of that particular variable
are more likely to be in the unconstrained regime and vice versa. P-values of the
models reject the null hypothesis that a single investment regime is sufficient to
describe the data. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%,
level respectively.
Table 3.7.a: Selection equations
Model 1 Model 2
coeff std.er coeff std.er
Size 0.049*** 0.003 0.069*** 0.003
Age 0.406*** 0.010 0.405*** 0.010
Dividend 0.039*** 0.002 0.038*** 0.002
St. leverage 0.671*** 0.052 0.485*** 0.061
Lt. leverage 0.510*** 0.044 0.456*** 0.043
Tobin’s Q -0.055*** 0.004 -0.063*** 0.005
Int.cov.ratio 0.124*** 0.015 0.093*** 0.015
Fin.slack 0.041 0.047 -0.181*** 0.047
Pr.efficiency 0.183*** 0.056 0.166*** 0.057
Tangibility 2.791*** 0.023 1.629*** 0.023
Constant -1.158*** 0.050 -1.001*** 0.052
Model p-values 0.000 0.000
Table 3.7 continues on next page.
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Table 3.7.b: Investment equations
Two separate investment equations for each of the models demonstrate how dif-
ferent the firms’ investment behavior across the two regimes. The investment
equations are estimated with sector and year dummies and clustering by com-
pany ID is used to correct the error structure of the estimations.
Model 1 Model 2
coeff std.er coeff std.er
Unconstrained
Cash flow 0.184*** 0.030 0.144*** 0.032
Cash flow*Pr.efficiency 0.307*** 0.047 0.387*** 0.045
Cash flow*Tangibility 0.238*** 0.074
Fin.slack 0.114*** 0.014 0.032** 0.014
Tobin’s Q 0.011*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.002
Pr.efficiency -0.340*** 0.028 -0.388*** 0.027
Tangibility -0.198*** 0.009
Constant 0.463*** 0.029 0.554*** 0.024
Constrained
Cash flow 0.300*** 0.050 0.323*** 0.057
Cash flow*Pr.efficiency -0.077 0.077 -0.226*** 0.079
Cash flow*Tangibility 0.232* 0.130
Fin.slack 0.241*** 0.021 0.173*** 0.022
Tobin’s Q 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002
Pr.efficiency -0.526*** 0.055 -0.509*** 0.058
Tangibility -0.274*** 0.034
Constant 0.562*** 0.065 1.180*** 0.052
As explained earlier, the switchr package for estimating our switching re-
gression models needs to be provided with an initial guess for the classification
variable for every model. Initially we model this initial guess by sorting out all
observations with predicted efficiencies above the 50th percentile value as finan-
cially unconstrained. Switchr calculates it’s own classification vector based on
the variables comprising the Z vector of equation 3.10 to estimate the two regime
specific investment equations. Later 60th, 70th and 80th percentile values are
used as the initial cut-off points, but the results are not found to be sensitive
to these changes at all. This confirms that the two regimes are indeed endoge-
nously selected by the model, no matter how we create the initial exogenous
classification.
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3.7 Conclusion
This chapter provides a distinctive complement to the existing literature by sug-
gesting new ways to study the impact of capital market imperfections on in-
vestment decisions of individual firms. Using an unbalanced panel data on 1122
UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange during the period 1981 to 2009,
we estimate endogenous switching regression models incorporating our predicted
corporate efficiencies from the stochastic frontier analysis in our effort to confront
the major challenges in this line of studies. Our selection equation reveals that
firms that are larger, older, have lower market-to-book ratio, have lower financial
slack, pay high dividends and have more tangible assets are more likely to operate
in the unconstrained regime. Firms with high level of external debt are associated
with a lack of financial constraints. Financially constrained firm’s investment is
more sensitive to both measures of internal liquidity (i.e., cash flow and financial
slack) which points to the imperfect substitutability between internal and exter-
nal source of finance. Most importantly, firm’s efficiency has significant effect
on the credit status of the firms as their access to external financing eases with
the improvement of efficiency. Our findings suggest a non monotonic effect of
corporate efficiency on cash flow sensitivities which is found to be decreasing for
financially constrained firms as opposed to increasing for the unconstrained ones
and such contrasting behavior may be explicated by the revenue and cost effect.
This provides important evidence in resolving the controversial role of cash flow
in detecting the presence of capital market imperfections and provides a different
resolution to the highly debated Fazzari et al. (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) issues. If the comparatively higher sensitivity of investments to the avail-
ability of internal funds for the financially constrained firms is solely generated
because of the measurement error issue, then it shouldn’t be decreasing with im-
provement in efficiency or agency cost. So, we argue that investment cash flow
sensitivities can still be used to capture the effects of capital market frictions on
firms’ investment, at least for the financially constrained firms. Moreover, the
results are free from the priori classification bias as these constrained firms are
endogenously classified by our model.
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Chapter 4
Financial constraints and the dynamics
of firm size and growth
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4.1 Introduction
Building on the idea that internal and external finance becomes imperfect sub-
stitute of each other under the presence of market imperfections, most of the
theoretical and empirical studies investigate the effect of financing constraints
on firms’ investment decisions. The results show relatively higher sensitivity of
investment to internally generated funds for firms which are likely to be more
severely affected by these market imperfection problems, hence are financially
constrained. Chapter three of this thesis is not an exception where we agree with
Fazzari et al. (1988) that the cashflow sensitivity is a useful indicator for the rela-
tive importance of financing problems across different groups of firms after taking
into account the critiques of this approach. Following this strand of literature,
empirical studies investigating the effect of financing constraints on firm growth
have recently started to flourish as well. Most of these studies start with Gibrat
(1931) “Law of Proportionate Effects” (LPE) as an empirical benchmark, which
states that the growth rate of any firm is independent of it’s size at the beginning
of the period examined and that the firm size distribution (FSD) is stable over
time and approximately log normal. A large body of empirical studies challenge
three main implications of this law while working on it’s further implications upon
industrial organization. Firstly, firm size distribution (FSD) often displays shapes
diverse from the lognormal. Secondly, both growth and volatility of growth at the
firm level decrease with firm size and age, generating heteroskedasticity in firm
size and growth distribution. Finally, firm growth rates often display a fat-tailed
empirical distribution which cannot be easily explained if growth shocks to firms
are assumed to be identically and independently distributed. An extensive survey
of 60 papers made by Santarelli et al. (2006) concludes that evidence is rather
mixed and it is not possible either to generally validate or systematically reject
this law.12 However, Stam (2010) express that Gibrat’s Law still plays a remark-
12The robustness of the existing evidence favoring or rejecting a LPE type of dynamics has
been questioned on three specific grounds. Firstly, if investigations of firm growth and size
dynamics are carried out using aggregated data covering a large collection of heterogenous
firms, then LPE may hold simply because of the aggregation of persistently heterogeneous firm
dynamics (Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003). Secondly, the first two implications of the law may
depend to a certain extent on sample selection as well. Evans (1987b), Hall (1987), Cabral
and Mata (2003) assert that, the independence hypothesis is accepted when investigation is
carried with a sample of certain sectors or size classes only, but may be rejected otherwise.
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able and prominent role in the progress made by most recent studies involving
firm growth.
Based on this set of findings on the size-growth relationships, recent papers
propose an explanation for this behavior of the FSD based on financing con-
straints after it has been clarified that the departure from the LPE cannot be
entirely explained by firms’ age. In particular, Cooley and Quadrini (2001),
Cabral and Mata (2003) and Desai et al. (2003) argue that the presence of finan-
cial constraints can account for the observed skewness in the firm size distribution
and firm size distribution becomes more symmetric as financial constraints eases
up. In contrast, studies by Fagiolo and Luzzi (2006) and Angelini and Generale
(2008) fail to affirm that financial constraints are the main determinant of FSD
evolution. In a different approach, Carpenter and Petersen (2002) employ the in-
ternal finance theory of growth to help explain the stylized facts of firm growth.
They also rely on the Fazzari et al. (1988) approach, but switched to investigating
how possible finance constraints could affect the growth of total assets instead
of investment in fixed capital only. Thus, their test on the relevance of finance
constraints uses the same principle as that applied to investment models: higher
growth-cash flow sensitivities are a sign of bigger financing problems. They pre-
fer to examine the growth of the whole firm as it allows controlling firm’s all
potential uses of internal finance and it helps to make a quantitative prediction
about the relationship between internal finance and growth in contrast to the
qualitative predictions usually made with the investment cash flow sensitivity.
They prescribe this quantitative prediction as a stronger test for the existence of
financing constraints as it is more likely to be unbiased from measurement error
problem of investment opportunities, more restrictive and allows fewer alterna-
tive interpretations of the results.13 Therefore, their methodological approach
And finally, if panel data regressions investigating the growth-size relationships are carried on
without controlling for other determinants of firm growth and size dynamics, such as financial
factors (Becchetti and Trovato, 2002).
13It can be recalled here from the literature review section of chapter three that, if the
Hayashi (1982) conditions are not satisfied or if investment opportunity is not properly mea-
sured, a positive investment cash flow sensitivity may still be generated by a regression which
not necessarily indicate the presence of financing constraints. According to Carpenter and Pe-
tersen (2002), their suggested quantitative prediction are unlikely to be affected by the bias from
an omitted variable or mismeasured investment opportunities and any alternative explanations
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gives a different resolution to the highly debated issue of detecting the presence
of financial constraints.
The model developed by Carpenter and Petersen (2002) further predicts that
a small firm facing a binding financing constraint may generate more than a one
to one relationship between internal finance and the growth of it’s assets through
“leverage effect” which occurs when firm’s access to debt depends on collateral.
Bernanke et al. (1999) explain this leverage effect through their model which
shows that each firm’s capital expenditures are proportional to the net worth
of the owner or entrepreneur and the proportionality factor is positively related
to the expected discounted return to capital or external finance premium. For
financially constrained firms, a rise in this expected discounted return to capital
induce entrepreneurs to finance more of their capital investment out of their net
worth and the expected default probability will reduce as a result. Also, a rise in
net worth for a given project size can be considered as a rise in their collateral
value and hence can give a positive signal to the lenders about future prospects
of these firms in situations with asymmetric information. These will require less
monitoring from the lenders and reduce the required premium on external fi-
nance. As a result, these firms will be able to take on more debt to expand the
size of the firm and enjoy a magnified effect of a positive income shock on growth
(Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 1995). The graphical presentation of this leverage effect
by Carpenter and Petersen (2002) is given as figure C.1 in appendix C (p. 167)
of this thesis. When firms’ access to external financing become easier or firms
become less financially constrained, their new assets can be easily financed by
new debt or equity along with their undistributed retained earnings. Therefore,
growth is expected to become less sensitive to internally generated funds or net
worth and the relationship between internal finance and growth should become
much weaker. Later, this model is followed by Oliveira and Fortunato (2006) for
Portugal, Hutchinson and Xavier (2006) for Belgium and Slovenia, Fagiolo and
Luzzi (2006) for Italy and Wagenvoort (2003) and Coluzzi et al. (2012) for Europe.
of their results accounting for such bias would generate the same quantitative predictions that
their model generates.
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A major problem affecting almost all these investigations arises from the fact
that financial constraints are not directly observable. To overcome this issue,
this strand of literature follows the conventional way of classifying financially
constrained and unconstrained firms a priori using proxies such as size or age of
the firm in order to estimate the sensitivity of a firm’s growth rate to it’s cash
flow. They implicitly assume that firms’ records with respect to the chosen proxy
determine the lenders’ willingness to grant credit to them. Introducing financial
constraints within the framework of firm growth dynamics may also create a new
problem. This is because, firms’ size and age used to identify financial constraints,
are themselves related to the FSD independently of their effect through financial
constraints. Angelini and Generale (2008) use an alternative survey based mea-
sure of financial constraints where firms are asked to give a self-assessment of the
difficulty they face to access financing from banks or other institutions. However,
such survey based measures can also suffer from misreporting and sample selec-
tion bias, whose effect is difficult to quantify. Moreover, such measures only take
account of the demand side of credit relations by collecting the opinion of the
credit seeker about their own financing conditions. But, practically the opinion
of the credit supplier on the credit seeker plays the crucial role in determining
credit conditions in capital market suffering from strong informational asymme-
tries.14
This chapter attempts to tackle this issue by using the outcomes from previ-
ous two empirical chapters of this thesis. The main motivation of using switching
regression model in chapter three was to overcome the static and dynamic mis-
classification problem associated with this issue, but will not be suitable for es-
timating dynamic growth equations as they are expected to suffer from dynamic
panel bias and give inconsistent results. These are explained in more details in
the methodology section. But, one additional benefit of using the switching re-
gression model is that it predicts the probability of facing unconstrained financial
status. This is a single time varying and continuous indicator of financial sta-
14Angelini and Generale (2008) themselves admit the criticisms of the survey based measures
of financial constraints and use alternative balance sheet based proxies to check robustness of
their results.
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tus for all firm year observations, accounts for the different degree of difficulty a
firm faces in accessing external finance and generated from a multivariate selec-
tion equation which simultaneously considers all possible aspects of firm financial
structure used in the literature. All these are prescribed as necessary features to
be a good financial constraint proxy (Cleary, 1999, Lamont et al., 2001). This
index is mainly used in this chapter to classify financially constrained and uncon-
strained status.15 Apart from that, the predicted corporate efficiency index from
chapter two is used as well to serve the same purpose. According to theoreti-
cal background, this predicted efficiency originates from managerial routine and
can affect firms’ technical capabilities, organizational characteristics and overall
competence. All these are likely to affect firms’ recognition as a borrower and
thus set their financial constraint status as well. The selection equation of the
switching regression model in chapter three also strongly suggests that a firm’s
constrained credit status improves with the level of it’s corporate efficiency.16
Therefore, the empirical strategy in this chapter employs the financing con-
straint literature to explain whether the heterogeneity in firms’ growth can be
explained by the degree of financial constraints they face by developing the Car-
penter and Petersen (2002) model. Even though such analysis is done by Wagen-
voort (2003) and Coluzzi et al. (2012) for Europe, this is the first time UK data
has been used. The complex interactions of size, age and financial constraints
within the framework of an augmented Gibrat’s regression to determine growth
dynamics of firms is going to be the main contribution of this chapter. On the way
to achieve that, our two novel proxies for financial constraints allow us to make
quantitative assessment of the extent to which different degrees of financial con-
straints are interlinked with these interactions. To do this, the cash flow variable
is interacted with different category financial constraint dummy variables cre-
ated using the unique proxies for financial constraint status, rather than splitting
the sample based on firm size or age. This specification is another improvement
15More detailed explanations and properties of this index are given in page 99 of this thesis.
Here, we will use the index calculated from model 2 of table 3.2 (p. 94) as that was our final
model.
16More detailed explanation and properties of this index are given in page 53 of this thesis.
Here, we will only use the long run efficiency calculated from the second market value frontier
model of table 2.2 (p. 51) considering it’s relative advantage in better business evaluation.
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from the contemporary studies in this field which allows the estimated cash flow
coefficient to differ across observations in the different financial constraint cate-
gories without estimating the equations on separate sub-samples of firms. This
approach can help to avoid problems of endogenous sample selection,17 to gain
degrees of freedom besides allowing transition between groups (Carpenter and
Guariglia, 2008, Guariglia, 2008). Finally, we use system-GMM estimator devel-
oped by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) because of it’s
considerable advantages over simple cross-section regressions or other estimation
methods for dynamic panel data according to a growing consensus in the context
of empirical growth models (Bond et al., 2001). This estimation procedure con-
trols for the presence of unobserved firm-specific effects that can be correlated
with the firm growth rate and with the explanatory variables and hence avoids
the bias that arises in this context. This also allows parameters to be estimated
consistently in models that include endogenous right-hand side variables, for ex-
ample cash flow in this case. Using the unbalanced panel of 1122 firms listed on
London stock exchange during the period 1981-2009, we estimate our dynamic
regression models to check the following key hypothesis:
1. Smaller firms grow more after controlling for liquidity constraints.
2. Younger firms grow more after controlling for liquidity constraints and firm
size.
3. Liquidity constraints negatively affect growth after controlling for size and
age.
4. The effect of liquidity constraints on firm growth differs according to the
degree of financial constraint.
The rest of this chapter is structured into different sections as follows. Sec-
tion 4.2 draws literature survey, section 4.3 describes the methodology, section
17Truncating the data based on some proxy for financial constraints are suspected to give
biased and inconsistent estimates for our parameter of interest as these proxies are likely to be
correlated with growth (Hausman and Wise, 1977).
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4.4 brings model specification and description of the variables, section 4.5 intro-
duces data and descriptive statistics, section 4.6 presents the empirical results
and analysis and finally section 4.7 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Literature review
We previously discussed the investment and financing constraint literature in
chapter three. To study the relationship between financing constraints and firm
growth and to explain the dynamics of firm growth, we make use of that corporate
finance literature in this chapter in combination with the industrial economics lit-
erature. Since Gibrat (1931)’s seminal study, the patterns of firm growth and their
implications for the observed firm size distribution have been studied both from
a theoretical and an empirical perspective by several authors and the evidence
provided by them is rather mixed. Overall, the recent research trying to establish
a link between financial constraints and firm dynamics, has developed into two
interrelated directions. One of them highlights the possible role played by age
and financial constraints in determining the observed skewness in the aggregate
firm size distribution. The other one focuses on estimating the standard Gibrat’s
regressions of growth on size, age and various financial variables to test the LPE
“null hypothesis” and it’s further implications upon industrial organization.
4.2.1 Skewness in the firm size distribution
Studies working with a particular class of firms in the economy which are gener-
ally large enough to overcome the minimum efficiency scale of a given industry,
mostly support the Gibrat’s law.18 But the law is generally found to be violated
when firms of all sizes, sectors and industries are taken into account. Researchers
moving away from the growth size independence towards a negative dependence
of growth rates on size, suggest that the distribution of firm size may evolve over
time and differ from a lognormal distribution. The majority of the studies observe
18Simon and Bonini (1958) and Mowery (1983) for USA, Hart and Oulton (1996) for UK,
Becchetti and Trovato (2002) for Italy, Geroski and Gugler (2004) for Europe.
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firm age to have a negative influence on it’s growth as well. Such a negative age
growth relationship is explained theoretically by Jovanovic (1982) who highlight
the role of learning in explaining the firm size dynamics. Their model assumes
that output is an increasing concave function of managerial efficiency and firms
can discover their true efficiencies only when they decide to enter and operate in
an industry. It is more likely that an old, large operating firm has already made
a series of positive discoveries about it’s true efficiency, leaving less scope for fur-
ther efficiency gains from learning. Whereas, a young firm is more probable to
make positive discoveries about it’s true efficiency which encourages it to invest
more rapidly in order to close the gap between it’s start-up size and the minimum
efficient scale (MES) and thus experiences higher growth rates immediately after
start-up. Such negative age-growth relationship has been found empirically for
different countries.19
Further investigations of the effect of age on growth include financial con-
straints as a potential and significant factor affecting firm size distribution. Ac-
cording to the theoretical explanation given by Cooley and Quadrini (2001), firms’
technological differences in the presence of financial market frictions can be one
reason behind the negative age growth relationship. They show that capital con-
straints can potentially explain why small firms pay lower dividends, are more
highly levered, have higher Tobin’s Q, invest more, and have investments that are
more sensitive to cash flows. Using a large sample of Portuguese manufacturing
firms, Cabral and Mata (2003) find that the firm size distribution can be well ap-
proximated by a log-normal distribution as firm age increases, but remains highly
skewed to the right at birth when they are more likely to be capital rationed. Us-
ing a theoretical model, they further show that financial constraints can explain
such FSD evolution which is supported by empirical evidence as well. They argue
that financial constraints tend to weaken over time so that firms are allowed to
raise the resources to invest and reach their optimal size which gives rise to a
more symmetric size distribution in turn. Other than these, some of the newly
19Evans (1987a,b); Dunne et al. (1989) for US; Dunne and Hughes (1994) and Rahman (2011)
for UK; Kamshad (1994) for France; Farias and Moreno (2000) for Spain; Becchetti and Trovato
(2002) for Italy.
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entrant firms can remain small because they are reluctant to grow because of effi-
ciency grounds, even if they are not severely capital constrained. Considering the
roles of the institutional environment and capital constraints on entrepreneurial
activity across Europe, Desai et al. (2003) also observe the skewness in the size
distribution of European firms which is also found to be decreasing with firm age.
Comparing the overall distribution of firm size between Western Europe and Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, they conclude that the firm size distribution is more
highly skewed for Central and Eastern Europe than Western Europe. When they
perform a similar analysis for Great Britain only, the overall distribution is found
to be much less skewed which they suggest is due to Britain’s highly developed
capital market.
Using data on Italian manufacturing firms, Fagiolo and Luzzi (2006) find that
the negative impact of firm size on growth worsens with the severity of liquidity
constraints and the magnitude of the size-growth correlation decreases substan-
tially over time for any level of internal liquidity. Their findings concur with
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) in that presence of financial constraints can explain
the negative association between firm age and growth. However, their FSD re-
mains positively skewed over time contradicting with Cabral and Mata (2003).
Using non parametric estimates for Italian firms, Angelini and Generale (2008)
also find skewness in firm size distribution, but diminishing with age supporting
Cabral and Mata (2003). They test whether the firm size distributions for con-
strained firms are different from those for the unconstrained ones, where firms
are classified using a survey based proxy of financial constraints. Their results
suggest that financial constraints cannot be the main determinant of the FSD
evolution for financially developed economies, even though financial constraints
problems are likely to be more severe among younger firms. Lotti and Santarelli
(2004), Cirillo (2010) also support the positive skewness in the firm size distribu-
tion of Italian firms. Size distribution is found to vary appreciably with the firms’
age but remain fairly stable over time for every age class and different industries
are found to display different paths and speeds of convergence toward the limit
distribution.
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4.2.2 Gibrat’s regression
Simple empirical investigations of Gibrat’s law rely on estimation of equations
where current firm size is defined as a function of initial firm size. Sometimes,
the equation is altered slightly to present firm growth as a function of initial firm
size and can be augmented by other factors related to firm growth and the re-
searchers focus on the estimated coefficient of the initial firm size. If firm growth
is independent of size, then it takes the value of zero. If it is greater than zero,
then larger firms grow more rapidly leading to concentration and monopoly. If it
is smaller than zero, then smaller firms grow faster than their larger counterparts.
The last result is frequently labeled as reversion to the mean size and is evident
in the majority of the studies. Through the inclusion of additional variables like
cash flow as a proxy for liquidity constraints to the LPE regression, researchers
interpret high growth-cash flow sensitivities as an indicator of firms’ excessive de-
pendence on internal funds to finance new investment projects. Therefore, growth
of these firms will be restricted by the profit generating capacity of their existing
production facilities.
One of the influential studies to investigate the effect of finance constraints on
overall firm growth, Carpenter and Petersen (2002) necessitate the inclusion of
cash flow in a growth regression to show higher growth-cash flow sensitivities as
a sign of bigger financing problems. They give similar reasoning as Fazzari et al.
(1988), but prefer to examine the effect on firm growth rather than on investment
in fixed assets. This is because investment in fixed assets covers only one part of
the use of a firm’s internal finance, failing to take into account of their alternative
usage in production, cash holdings, late payments etc. Therefore, they propose
to measure the growth rate by the relative change in firms’ total assets which will
capture not only firms’ growth in physical capital, but also gross working capital.
They apply standard first differenced regression along with an instrumental vari-
able procedure using an unbalanced panel data set of 1,600 small quoted firms
in the United States. Their estimates are on three subgroups of the data defined
by their use of external equity finance. The results reveal that the relationship
between growth and cash flow is higher than one because of the leverage effect
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for firms that make no use of external equity which indicates a binding financing
constraint for these firms. On the contrary, firms that have easy access to exter-
nal equity face a more relaxed financial constraint which makes their growth-cash
flow sensitivity much weaker. Even though Carpenter and Petersen (2002) do not
incorporate the Gibrat’s framework in their regressions, they use their internal
finance theory to explain some stylized facts regarding the law.
Wagenvoort (2003) estimate a similar model for different size classes of firms
of the EU countries adding the impact of leverage and firm size to their empir-
ical analysis and supports the same conclusion that growth-cash flow sensitivi-
ties decrease as firms become less financially constrained. He further split the
sample into quoted and unquoted companies and finds that unquoted firms face
higher growth cash flow sensitivities than quoted firms and the difference is espe-
cially pronounced for small firms. He argues that outside investors do not have
proper information regarding these firms which makes them capital rationed and
their growth determined by the availability of internal funding to a great extent.
Hutchinson and Xavier (2006) also prefer to make quantitative comparison of the
level of internal finance constraints on the growth of SMEs in the manufacturing
sector between Slovenia and Belgium using the GMM-difference estimator devel-
oped by Arellano and Bond (1991) and according to their findings, the growth
of Slovenian firms are more sensitive to internal finance than their Belgian coun-
terparts. They also find that young firms and firms with longterm debt are most
constrained and micro and SME firms20 face great difficulties in accessing exter-
nal sources of finance. Using European data as well, Coluzzi et al. (2012) choose
to test an augmented version of the LPE by including size, past growth and a
direct measure of financial obstacles obtained from survey data to the Carpenter
and Petersen (2002) model. They estimate the determinants of financial obstacles
first and then use the estimated coefficients to compute the predicted probability
of facing financial obstacles for a firm. They apply the GMM-system estimator
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998) to esti-
20They apply the definition of firm size proposed by European Commission; Micro-firms:
employee < 10 & realturnover < 2 million euors; SME firms: employee < 250 & realturnover
< 50 million; Large firms: employees ≥ 250 & realturnover ≥ 50 million.
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mate their dynamic LPE equation and find that their proxy for financial obstacles
negatively affects firm growth and the impact appears to be comparatively larger
in those countries having larger shares of SMEs in the sample. They also find
firms’ growth responding positively to cash flow, which means that firms’ growth
are hampered by liquidity constraints and this is likely to be linked with the ex-
istence of financial obstacles.
Motivated by the same idea of using liquidity constraints to explain the firm
size growth dynamics, Fagiolo and Luzzi (2006) show on 14,277 (surviving) Ital-
ian manufacturing firms from 1995 to 2000 that younger and smaller firms grow
more, but their growth significantly suffer from the liquidity constraints. More-
over, they find that the negative impact of size on growth increases in magnitude
as liquidity constraints become more severe. They perform a standard Gibrat’s
type regression as well, but rely on employment growth rather than total assets
growth. Oliveira and Fortunato (2006) also analyze employment growth using a
large unbalanced panel data set of 7653 Portuguese manufacturing firms surviving
over the period from 1990 to 2001 in their effort to explain the relationship be-
tween firm size and growth by financial constraints. Their standard Gibrat type
model specification also incorporated lagged growth as an additional regressor for
addressing persistence of chance or serial correlation on firm growth. Following
the conventional method, they split their sample by firm size and age as it is ex-
pected that different size and age categories of firms may face different degree of
financial constraints and estimate separate regression for the full, small, medium,
large, young and old firms using the GMM-system estimator. Their overall results
reject Gibrat’s law of proportionate effect and suggest that the growth of small
and young Portuguese firms are more finance constrained compared to their large
and old counterparts. In another of their papers published later, they investigate
similar issues with 419 surviving services firms in Portugal during the period from
1995 to 2001. Using the same estimator, they conclude that negative size-growth
and age-growth relationship exists for services too and size, age along with past
growth mostly explains the growth of firms (Oliveira and Fortunato, 2008).
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Angelini and Generale (2008) also apply the system GMM estimator to assess
the relationship between financial constraints and employment growth using two
datasets of Italian firms. They use both a direct measure of financial constraints
from the survey data and interest coverage and asset tangibility as alternative
balanced sheet based proxies for financial constraints. Using all these different
measures separately, they create dummy variables taking zero-one to differentiate
financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Their results suggest that finan-
cial constraints in a given year negatively and significantly affects firm growth in
that year and this effect is valid for small constrained firms, but not for young
constrained ones. Furthermore, more profitable firms are found to grow faster
and older firms to grow slower. Rahman (2011) provides evidence that effects of
various sources of financing (i.e., internal funds, bank credit facility) on firm em-
ployment growth are statistically significant and quantitatively important using
5214 private and publicly incorporated and surviving firms in the UK and Ireland
during the period of 1991-2001. He stratifies the sample into small, medium and
large firms using the year 1991 employment as the initial size of the firm and
estimates separate regression for these subgroups and also for the quoted and
unquoted samples within each of these groups. He focuses on a firm’s access to a
bank credit facility as a measure of external financing constraints following Sufi
(2009). His results using the GMM-difference estimator show that the incremen-
tal effect of internal financing on firm growth decreases with alleviation of the
external financing constraints and as a result firms switch to external financing
sources as their primary source of financing for growth and such a pattern of
transition is particularly pronounced in small unquoted firms. His results further
show that higher leverage and a better governance structure has a favorable effect
and firms’ size and age has a negative effect on firm growth.
From a slightly different approach by using revenue growth, Huynh and Petru-
nia (2010) investigate the relationship between different financial factors (i.e.,
leverage, initial financial size) and firm growth particularly focusing on the hy-
pothesis that age effect occurs because of financial factors using 19233 Canadian
manufacturing firms during 1985 to 1997. Further, they use an interaction of
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leverage with leverage quintile dummy variables to account for any non-linearity
in the growth leverage relationship. Their overall result using the GMM-system
estimator reveals a positive and nonlinear relationship between leverage and firm
growth where the sensitivity of growth to leverage is highest for firms in the low-
est to intermediate leverage quintiles. A non-monotonic U-shaped relationship
between firm growth and age and a positive relationship between current growth
and firm’s initial financial size is also observed.
All the above papers mention some common problems with estimating growth
equations due to endogenous explanatory variables and time invariant firm spe-
cific effects and propose different ways to tackle these problems. In this chapter,
we will mainly follow the spirit of Carpenter and Petersen (2002) and Oliveira
and Fortunato (2006) and will potentially try to make some contribution and
improvement through our model specification to give some different insights in
the firm size-growth relationship.
4.3 Methodology
Starting with a simple AR (1) specification of firm size with unobserved firm-
specific effects ηi and year specific effects τt respectively,
sizei,t = αsizei,t−1 + ηi + τt + νi,t (4.1)
Where, size is in natural logarithm form, E[ηi] = 0, E[νi,t] = 0, E[ηiνi,t] = 0
for i = 1,......, N firms and t = 2,.....T years.
Also, it is assumed that errors νi,t are serially uncorrelated and that the initial
conditions sizei1 are predetermined. That is, E[νitνis] = 0 for i=1,.......,N and
s 6= t and E[sizei1νit] = 0 for i = 1,......, N firms, t = 2,.....T years.
Subtracting sizei,t−1 from both sides,
sizei,t − sizei,t−1 = αsizei,t−1 − sizei,t−1 + ηi + τt + νi,t (4.2)
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growthi,t = (α− 1)sizei,t−1 + ηi + τt + νi,t (4.3)
Equation (4.3) is equivalent to (4.1) and can be considered either as a model
for level or growth. Equation (4.3) can be augmented by a set exogenous or
endogenous variables controlling for different firm characteristics, Xi,t.
growthi,t = (α− 1)sizei,t−1 + βX ′i,t + ηi + τt + νi,t (4.4)
In estimating the firm growth equation, some researchers include lagged growth
to check for growth persistency. However, the results are quite mixed and con-
flicting as positive, negative and insignificant persistency has often been reported
(Caves, 1998, Coad, 2007). We do not include lagged growth due to the presence
of inactive firms in our panel because it is not possible to analyze the persistence of
growth for firms that leave the industry during the observation period (Santarelli
et al., 2006). Estimating such a dynamic regression model of firm growth con-
trolling for different possible determinants on a panel of heterogeneous firms may
raise several econometric problems (Roodman, 2009a, Bond et al., 2001):
• Omitted variable or time-invariant firm characteristics (fixed effects) ηi may
be correlated with the explanatory variables and cause biased estimation.
• The idiosyncratic disturbances νi,t may have individual-specific patterns of
heteroskedasticity.
• Due to the shorter time and larger firm dimension of the panel data, a
shock to the firm’s fixed effect may not dissipate with time and hence cause
significant correlation of the sizei,t−1 with the error term.
• Apart from sizei,t−1, some other regressors may be endogenous and thus
may be correlated with the error term in the regression.
All these problems make OLS and the within estimator biased and inconsis-
tent. As sizei,t−1 is endogenous to the fixed effects, OLS gives rise to “dynamic
panel bias” (Nickell, 1981). The within group estimator removes the fixed effect,
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but may still suffer from dynamic panel bias (Roodman, 2009a). Baltagi (2005)
emphasizes that only if T → ∞, the within estimator can be consistent. But,
the bias can be as much as 20% of the true coefficient of interest even for T=30.
Another way to tackle these problems is to use first differenced GMM estimator
(Arellano and Bond, 1991), which is basically taking the first differences of the
equation to remove the time invariant effects and instrument the endogenous ex-
planatory variables using levels of the series lagged two periods or more, under
the assumption that the time-varying disturbances in the original levels equation
are serially uncorrelated.
But that is also suspected to suffer from serious finite sample biases when the
time series from short panels are even moderately persistent making the avail-
able instruments weak (Blundell and Bond, 1998, 2000, Bond et al., 2001, Bond,
2002). The presence of serious finite sample biases can be detected by comparing
the first-differenced GMM results to alternative estimates of the autoregressive
parameter α in equation 4.1 or equivalently (α − 1) in equation 4.3. It is well
established in the literature that in the AR(1) specification like equation 4.3, OLS
gives an estimated co-efficient of (α− 1) which is biased upwards in the presence
of individual specific effects. FE gives the estimated co-efficient of (α− 1) which
can be seriously biased downward. This suggests that a consistent estimate of
(α− 1) should lie in between the OLS levels and within groups estimates. If the
estimated coefficient of (α − 1) by difference GMM is close to FE estimates or
lower than that, then that is also suspected to be biased downwards due to weak
instruments. This is expected to happen when there is persistency in the series,
or α→ 1, and when the variance of the individual effects ηi increases relative to
that of the νi,t.
In such a case, more reasonable and preferred results are shown to be achieved
by using a system GMM estimator which exploits an assumption about the ini-
tial conditions to obtain additional moment conditions that remain informative
even for highly persistent series. In system GMM, a system of equations in both
first differences and levels are estimated, where the instruments used in the levels
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equation are lagged first differences and instruments used in the first differenced
equation are lagged levels of the series. Although the levels of the dependent
variable are correlated with the individual specific effect, the first differenced
dependent variable is not which permits lagged first-differences to be used as in-
struments in the level equations. Blundell and Bond (1998) gives evidence from
Monte Carlo simulations which shows that there can be dramatic reductions in
finite sample bias and gains in precision from exploiting these additional moment
conditions in system GMM estimators as compared with the first-differenced es-
timators.
A common conclusion about GMM estimators should be noted here that
GMM estimators using the full set of moments available can be severely biased,
especially when the instruments are weak and the number of moment conditions
is large compared with N and that should be dealt with caution in estimating
different model specifications. To avoid instrument proliferation, a mixture of
restricting the lag structure and collapsing of the instruments can be applied
as suggested by Roodman (2009b). The usual and reasonable test for two-step
system GMM is the Hansen (1982) J-test because the older Sargan (1958) is
not valid under heteroskedasticity. The Hansen J-statistics basically tests for
the joint validity of the instruments used and the structural specification of the
model. This statistic is asymptotically distributed as χ2 with degrees of freedom
equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions (i.e., the number of instru-
ments less the number of estimated parameters). Under the null hypothesis, the
instruments are orthogonal to the errors. In addition, no second order serial cor-
relation (AR(2)) in the first difference of the disturbance term should be observed
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) which checks the key identifying assumption that the
level of the disturbances term are serially uncorrelated needed for some lagged
instruments (i.e., sizei,t−2 and further lags) to be valid and GMM estimates to be
consistent. Under the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in the
differenced residuals, the test asymptotically follows a standard normal distribu-
tion. The two step robust system GMM estimator uses corrected standard errors
(Windmeijer, 2005) and makes the estimations more efficient and robust to any
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patterns of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals (Roodman,
2009a).
Another concern may be the maximum T of 29 in our unbalanced panel data
because the GMM estimators are mainly developed for panel data with small T
and large N where the asymptotic statistical theory works by letting N →∞ and
T fixed. The panel where T is also allowed to increase to infinity raises two sets of
caveats according to the recent literature. One of them rejects the homogeneity of
the regression parameters implicit in the use of a pooled regression model in favor
of heterogeneous regressions and this relies on T being large enough to estimate
separate regression for each groups. However, such heterogeneity in the param-
eters is particularly crucial in country, region or industry level analysis where T
may not be too small as compared with N and there are fairly long time-series
available for a large number of groups. Even though the maximum T is 29 in
our panel, the number of firms survived for that long period is only few making
the average T of our unbalanced panel to 9.6 only. And it has been shown that,
the fixed T results for GMM remain valid when T/N → 0 (Alvarez and Arellano,
2003). Another concern of having large T is non-stationarity, spurious regression
and co-integration. The null hypothesis of unit root in all panels are tested by
the Fisher unit root test for unbalanced panels for all the series we use in the
model (results are reported in section 4.5).
4.4 Model specification
In the first stage, we estimate the following baseline dynamic regression model of
firm growth.
Growthit = β1Sizei,t−1 + β2Size2i,t−1 + β3Agei,t + β4Age
2
i,t
+ β5Cashflowi,t + β6Tobin
′s Qi,t + ηi + τt + νi,t (4.5)
The above model is then extended further as below to check the differential
effects of cash flow on growth across firm years facing different degrees of financial
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constraints:
Growthit = β1Sizei,t−1 + β2Size2i,t−1 + β3Agei,t + β4Age
2
i,t
+
n∑
k=1
δk(dkit ∗ Cashflowi,t) + β6Tobin′s Qi,t + ηi + τt + νi,t (4.6)
where, dkit stands for two, three or five category financial constraints dummy
variables as explained below.
4.4.1 Variables in the growth equation
Firm size and growth: In this chapter we use total assets as a proxy for firm
size and growth in total assets as a proxy for overall firm growth in line with
our model specification and also to make the quantitative predictions about the
relationship between growth and internal finance as suggested by Carpenter and
Petersen (2002). Firm size is calculated as natural logarithm of total assets and
growth of firms is calculated as the difference in natural logarithm of total assets
between two consecutive periods. Square terms of firm size is also included to
check for the possible nonlinearity in the size-growth relationship following Au-
dretsch and Elston (2006). However, as we have used sales as a proxy for firm
size in chapter two and three, we will check the robustness of our results using
sales as a proxy for firm size and growth in sales as a proxy for firm growth in the
model. Rahman (2011) also use the logarithm of total assets and sales revenues
interchangeably to control for size in his regression analysis, but only reports the
regression results for the logarithm of total assets. Also, it could be mentioned
here that there is no single best way to measure firm size and growth and the
choice of the appropriate way of measuring firm growth depends on the research
questions (Coad and Ho¨lzl, 2010, Davidsson and Wiklund, 2006).
Age: A negative age growth relation is revealed in a number of empirical stud-
ies which conclude that young firms grow more rapidly. Similar to previous two
chapters, natural logarithm of the number of years a firm appears in the chosen
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database is used as a proxy for firm age following Almeida and Campello (2007).
Cash flow: Cash flow is used as a standard proxy for firms’ internal liquidity
and it’s inclusion will serve a twofold purpose. On one hand, this will potentially
capture the impact of liquidity constraints on a firms growth. It is expected that
the estimated coefficient on cash flow will be positive, which means firms with
less liquidity problems will grow faster. On the other hand, this will also alow
the actual relationship between firm size and growth to be determined keeping
liquidity constraints constant. Keeping similarity with chapter three, we define
cash flow as ratio of funds from operation to total assets following D’Espallier
et al. (2008) and Carpenter and Petersen (2002).
Tobin’s Q: Following the standard practice in the literature, Tobin’s Q is in-
cluded to control for a firm’s investment opportunities. This controls for the fact
that firms with good investment opportunities are likely to grow more rapidly
than firms with comparatively limited investment opportunities. Controlling for
investment opportunities also make sure that the growth-cash flow sensitivity can
indicate the presence of financial market frictions only. Similar to that in previ-
ous chapters, it is calculated as the ratio of market value of assets to the book
value of assets. Market value is estimated as book value of total assets minus
book value of equity plus market capitalization and book value of total asset is
simply value of total assets.
Financial constraint dummy: We will allow firms to transit between different
financial constraint categories as it is discussed in chapter three that financially
constrained firms can become financially unconstrained and vice versa. For this
reason, we will conduct the empirical analysis based on firm-years rather than
firms. Bond and Meghir (1994), Guariglia and Schiantarelli (1998), Carpen-
ter and Guariglia (2008) and Guariglia (2008) adopt a similar approach in their
studies. Therefore, the two category time varying dummy variables dkit using the
predicted likelihood of facing financially unconstrained status are constructed in
the following way:
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1. Cd21it is equal to 1 if firm i has a likelihood of facing financially uncon-
strained status in year t, which falls below the 50th percentile of the distri-
bution of the corresponding likelihood of facing financially unconstrained
status of all firm years, and equal to 0 otherwise.
2. Cd22it is equal to 1 if firm i has a likelihood of facing financially uncon-
strained status in year t, which falls above the 50th percentile of the distri-
bution of the corresponding likelihood of facing financially unconstrained
status of all firm years, and equal to 0 otherwise.
Here, it should be made clear that interacting cash flow with these two dum-
mies in a single regression will not create any multicollinearity problem because
Cd21it + Cd22it will always be equal to 1. Cd21it will pick the cash flows of the
likely financially constrained firm years and Cd22it will pick the cash flows of the
likely financially unconstrained firm years and therefore, cash flow for a particular
firm year will appear only once in the regression.
The three category variables Cd31it, Cd32it and Cd33it are constructed in
similar way by putting firm i with likelihood of facing financially unconstrained
status in year t falling below the 25th percentile in first category, between 25th and
75th percentile in second category and above 75th percentile in the third category.
And, finally the five category variables Cd51it, Cd52it, Cd53it, Cd54it, Cd55it are
constructed by putting firm i with likelihood of facing financially unconstrained
status in year t falling below the 20th percentile in first category, between 20th
and 40th percentile in second category, between 40th and 60th percentile in third
category, between 60th and 80th percentile in fourth category and above 80th
percentile in the fifth category. Similarly, two, three or five category dummy
variables Edit are created using the predicted corporate efficiency index from
chapter two.
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4.5 Data and descriptive statistics
We use the same data as in earlier chapters, collected from the Worldscope Global
Database. We have an unbalanced panel of 1122 firms from thirty three different
sectors from 1981 to 2009 with a minimum of three to a maximum of twenty
nine consecutive years of observations and a total of 13183 firm-years. These
thirty three sectors are differentiated according to FTSE/Dow Jones Industrial
Classification Benchmark (ICB) codes. All financial variables are deflated with
GDP deflator and all regression variables are winsored at the 1% and 99% level
to get rid of the extreme outliers. Table 4.1 reports means and distributional
information for all the regression variables used in this chapter.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table gives mean and distributional information for all the regression vari-
ables for which data is collected from the Worldscope Global Database for 1122
UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange over the period 1981 to 2009. All
financial variables are deflated with GDP deflator and all regression variables are
winsored at the 1% and 99% level to get rid of the extreme outliers. Natural
logarithm of total assets and natural logarithm of the number of years a firm ap-
pears in the database are used as proxies for firm size and firm age respectively.
Growth of firms is calculated as the difference in natural logarithm of total assets
between two consecutive periods. Cash flow is calculated as ratio of funds from
operation to total assets. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio of market value of
assets to the book value of assets. Market value is estimated as book value of
total assets minus book value of equity plus market capitalization and book value
of total asset is simply value of total assets.
Mean SD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Size 11.35 2.280 6.722 9.681 11.14 12.82 17.07
Growth .0761 .3759 -3.901 -.0648 .0388 .1707 3.967
Age 2.114 0.862 0 1.609 2.303 2.833 3.367
Cash flow .0388 .2001 -1.015 .0198 .0836 .1345 .3385
Tobin Q 2.033 1.864 .5193 1.072 1.464 2.178 12.69
Here firm size is in natural logarithm of total assets, mean of which is 11.35.
Figure 4.1 shows the pooled distribution of the logarithm of total assets of the
sample firms with the superimposing normal distribution and as expected, the
log transformation minimizes the positive skewness in the distribution of the level
series (skewness of the level series is 13.48). Even after that, the firm size distri-
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Figure 4.1: Firm size distributions
Figure (a) shows the pooled distributions of the logarithm of total assets of the
sample firms. The distribution for the youngest firm years in (b) has the highest
skewness, that for the middle aged firm years in (c) and the oldest firm years in
(d) have lower skewness comparatively. The p-values of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test reject the null hypothesis that firm size distributions of two age classes are
equal.
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bution remains positively skewed and the skewness is highest for younger firms
and decreasing thereafter with firm age and this confirms the stylized fact that
firm size tends to increase with age. The null hypothesis of equality of the FSDs
is strongly rejected for any two contiguous age classes using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests following Angelini and Generale (2008). The test results are re-
ported in the figure.
Figure 4.2 shows distribution of pooled growth rate which is tent-shaped with
tails fatter than those of a normal one. Most firms in the sample have a growth
rate close to zero, while a small number of firms experience accelerated growth
and decline. Coad and Ho¨lzl (2010) confirm that such distribution of growth
rates is a robust feature of firm growth process as it has been found in datasets
from a number of countries, industries and years.
Figure 4.2: Firm growth distribution
This figure shows distribution of pooled growth rate which is tent-shaped with
tails fatter than those of a normal one.
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Null hypothesis of all panels contain unit roots against an alternative hy-
pothesis that at least one panel is stationary for any series is tested using the
Fisher-type test which does not require strongly balanced data and allows gaps
within the individual series. The Fisher-type panel-data unit-root tests are based
on the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regressions which fits a model of the
following form.
∆yt = α + βyt−1 + ζ1∆yt−1 + ζ2∆yt−2 +−−−+ ζk∆yt−k + t (4.7)
Testing β = 0 is equivalent to testing that yt series follows a unit root process.
The Fisher test first conducts unit-root tests individually for each panel included
in the dataset, and then combines the p-values from these tests to produce an
overall test. Z and L* statistics combine p-values using inverse normal and in-
verse logit transformations respectively. The p-values for these statistics strongly
reject the null hypothesis for all the series we are using in this chapter (table
4.2). For the results reported in the table, we have allowed for drift and used
k=1. However, the null hypothesis is rejected as well when we use lags 2 and 3.
Table 4.2: Fisher-type panel-data unit-root test
This table reports Fisher-type panel-data unit-root tests for the variables to be
used. Z and L* statistics combine p-values using inverse normal and inverse
logit transformations, respectively. The p-values for these statistics test the null
hypothesis that all panels contain unit roots against an alternative hypothesis
that at least one panel is stationary for the underlying series.
Z p-value L* p-value
Size -29.96 0.000 -31.01 0.000
Growth -53.04 0.000 -59.54 0.000
Age -146.75 0.000 -286.63 0.000
Cash flow -44.95 0.000 -48.19 0.000
Tobin Q -47.85 0.000 -52.20 0.000
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4.6 Empirical results
4.6.1 Presence of finite sample bias
The results of the simple AR(1) specification for the growth equation (equation
4.3) is presented in table 4.3. The four columns of the table report the results
using OLS, within groups, difference-GMM and system-GMM estimators respec-
tively. The results indicate that finite sample biases are present in this case.
In particular, the estimated coefficient (α − 1 = −0.368) of initial firm size in
the first-differenced GMM results is lower than that in the within group esti-
mates (-0.195) and hence is expected to be seriously biased downwards. The two
step robust system GMM performs better in estimating the dynamic equation by
keeping the estimated coefficient (-0.034) in between the OLS and within group
estimates. Equation 4.1 and 4.3 are equivalent and so are their estimated results.
The results for the level equation (equation 4.1) is presented in table C.1 of ap-
pendix C (p. 168).
Table 4.3.a reports p-values for the AR(2) and Hansen J statistics, number
of instruments used, number of firms and firm years involved in the estimations.
In both the difference and system-GMM estimations, only limited numbers of
instruments are used. Out of the 31 and 32 instruments, there are two to four
years lagged firm size for the differenced equation in both the estimators and one
year lagged first differenced firm size for the level equation in the system GMM
estimator and the rests are year dummies used as standard instruments. In both
the cases, instruments are collapsed which creates one instrument for each vari-
able and lag distance, rather than one for each period as well. These instruments
are found to be jointly valid by the p-value of the estimated Hansen-J statistics.
The Arellano-Bond AR(2) tests also do not provide any evidence for the presence
of second-order serial correlation in first difference of the residuals which indicate
that the instruments that we use in our estimations are appropriate. In estimat-
ing this particular model specification and all the others to follow, similar types
instruments for similar model specifications are always used, so that the results
are not driven by the choice of instruments.
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Table 4.3: AR(1) specification with growth as dependent variable
This table shows the estimated results of equation 4.3 using OLS, FE, Difference
and System GMM. OLS estimates include a full set of sector and year dummies
as regressors, FE estimates include a full set of year dummies as regressors,
GMM estimates include a full set of year dummies both as regressors and
instruments. In addition to these, difference GMM estimates include L(2/4).
size collapsed and system GMM estimates include L(2/4). size collapsed and
DL(1/1). size collapsed as instruments for the difference and level equations
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10%, level respectively.
OLS FE Diff-GMM Sys-GMM
L.size -0.019*** -0.195*** -0.368*** -0.034***
(0.002) (0.011) (0.059) (0.008)
Constant 0.393*** 2.227*** 0.337***
(0.041) (0.115) (0.087)
Table 4.3.a: Diagnostics
The figures reported for the AR(2) and Hansen J tests are the p-values for their
respective null hypotheses. AR(2) accepts the null hypothesis of no second-order
serial correlation in the differenced residuals and Hansen J test accepts the
null hypothesis that all instruments are jointly valid which implies that the
instruments satisfy the required orthogonality conditions, i.e., their moments
with the error term are zero.
OLS FE Diff-GMM Sys-GMM
AR(2) p-value 0.185 0.102
Hansen p-value 0.209 0.294
No of instruments 31 32
No of firms 1122 1122 1122
No of observations 11995 11995 10807 11995
Table 4.4 shows the results of the full augmented baseline model (4.5) using
different estimators, OLS, FE, difference and system GMM in it’s four columns
which indicate the presence of finite sample biases in this case as well. The esti-
mated coefficient of lagged firm size is biased in opposite direction in OLS and FE
and the coefficient lies in between the two in the system-GMM. Table 4.4.a shows
the relevant diagnostic tests. The strength of the p-value of the Hansen J statistics
also hints that the additional first differenced instruments used in system-GMM
estimation make the results more appropriate and consistent. Therefore, only
two-step robust system GMM is used for estimating all model specifications later.
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Table 4.4: Baseline equation using different estimators
This table shows the estimated results of equation 4.5 using OLS, FE, Difference
and System GMM. OLS estimates include a full set of sector and year dummies
as regressors, FE estimates include a full set of year dummies as regressors, GMM
estimates include a full set of year dummies both as regressors and instruments.
In addition to these, difference GMM estimates include lagged levels of size, age,
cash flow and Tobin’s Q as instruments for the first differenced equation and
system GMM estimates include lagged levels and lagged first differences of size,
age, cash flow and Tobin’s Q as instruments for the differenced and the level
equations respectively. Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, level respectively.
OLS FE Diff-GMM Sys-GMM
L.size -0.236*** -0.681*** -0.528*** -0.341***
(0.020) (0.055) (0.189) (0.081)
L.size2 0.009*** 0.021*** 0.010 0.013***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.012) (0.003)
Age -0.157*** -0.255*** -0.226 -0.218***
(0.027) (0.071) (0.194) (0.060)
Age2 0.024*** 0.094*** 0.147 0.039***
(0.005) (0.026) (0.097) (0.011)
Cash flow 0.796*** 0.964*** 0.736*** 1.193***
(0.029) (0.044) (0.269) (0.116)
Tobin Q 0.006* -0.024*** 0.070** 0.118***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.033) (0.023)
Constant 1.913*** 5.178*** 2.130***
(0.133) (0.347) (0.491)
Table 4.4.a: Diagnostics
The figures reported for the AR(2) and Hansen J tests are the p-values for their
respective null hypotheses. AR(2) accepts the null hypothesis of no second-order
serial correlation in the differenced residuals and Hansen J test accepts the
null hypothesis that all instruments are jointly valid which implies that the
instruments satisfy the required orthogonality conditions, i.e., their moments
with the error term are zero.
OLS FE Diff-GMM Sys-GMM
AR(2) p-value 0.637 0.793
Hansen p-value 0.385 0.514
No of instruments 77 83
No of firms 1122 1122 1122
No of observations 11995 11995 10807 11995
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4.6.2 Dynamics of size-growth relationship
Table 4.5 presents the twostep system GMM results of the baseline model (equa-
tion 4.5), where the explanatory variables are added sequentially in the four
models according to the key propositions. In these estimations, firm size, cash
flow and Tobin’s Q are considered as endogenous and firm age is considered as
pre-determined as described by the contemporary studies. All these variables
are included as instruments, but distinctly for the level and difference equation
(Oliveira and Fortunato, 2006, Angelini and Generale, 2008, Roodman, 2009a).
• M1. Law of proportionate effect which examines whether the growth rate
of any firm is independent of it’s size.
• M2. Adding cash flow to differentiate between the financial-related and
sheer size effect on firm growth.
• M3. Adding firm age to see whether younger firms are growing faster than
their older counterpart.
• M4. Adding Tobin’s Q to control for investment opportunity so that the
growth cash flow sensitivity can be seen as an indicator of the presence of
financial constraints only.
Model 1 of table 4.5 shows that there are negative and significant size effects
on growth present in the data. Therefore, small firms are inclined to grow faster
than large firms. However, a positive and significant non-linear size effect is also
found. Overall, the resulting size effect implies rejection of the Gibrat’s law of
proportionate effect, but the departure from the law subsides as the firm’s size
increases. This growth size relationship remains consistent in rest of the models.
Besides testing the proportionate growth of a firm is independent of it’s size,
there are studies which investigate the LPE by testing whether the variability
of growth is independent of size according to the second testable proposition of
Tschoegl (1983). To examine the independence of growth variability of size for
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Table 4.5: Twostep robust system GMM results for the baseline equa-
tion
This table shows the estimated results of equation 4.5 using twostep robust
system GMM, where the explanatory variables are added sequentially according
to the key propositions. In addition to the full set of year dummies both as
regressors and standard instruments, the estimates include lagged levels and
lagged first differences of size, age, cash flow and Tobin’s Q as instruments for
the difference and level equations respectively. Standard errors in parentheses;
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, level respectively.
M1 M2 M3 M4
L.size -0.534*** -0.467*** -0.371*** -0.341***
(0.137) (0.094) (0.063) (0.081)
L.size2 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.013***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Cash flow 1.045*** 1.178*** 1.193***
(0.098) (0.106) (0.116)
Age -0.269*** -0.218***
(0.048) (0.060)
Age2 0.046*** 0.039***
(0.009) (0.011)
Tobin Q 0.118***
(0.023)
Constant 3.075*** 2.898*** 2.591*** 2.130***
(0.760) (0.550) (0.367) (0.491)
Table 4.5.a: Diagnostics
The figures reported for the AR(2) and Hansen J tests are the p-values for their
respective null hypotheses. AR(2) accepts the null hypothesis of no second-order
serial correlation in the differenced residuals and Hansen J test accepts the
null hypothesis that all instruments are jointly valid which implies that the
instruments satisfy the required orthogonality conditions, i.e., their moments
with the error term are zero.
M1 M2 M3 M4
AR(2) p-value 0.106 0.203 0.188 0.793
Hansen p-value 0.331 0.319 0.324 .514
No of instruments 36 72 80 83
No of firms 1122 1122 1122 1122
No of observations 11995 11995 11995 11995
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the firms in the panel, we estimate the following regression.
σGrowthi = αk + α2Sizei + i (4.8)
where, σGrowthi represents the standard deviation of growth for firm i over t,
Sizei represents the average size for firm i over t, αk represents sector-level dummy
variables and i is a random disturbance term. For the full sample, the estimated
size coefficient (α2) is -0.0321, with a heteroskedasticity-consistent standard er-
ror of 0.0009. This rejects the independence of the variance of growth of firm size.
The comparison of model 1 and model 2 reveals that impact of only firm size
on growth in model 1 may infact give a composite effect of “financial related”
and “other” size effects as warned by Audretsch and Elston (2006). Model 2 ex-
hibits similar size effects on growth even when liquidity constraints is controlled
for, but as expected the magnitude of the size effect is reduced. Overall, liquid-
ity constraints generate a negative, statistically significant effect on growth or in
other words, firms with liquidity problems suffer from lower growth rates after
separating out the size effect.
Model 3 of table 4.5 further suggests that younger firms experience higher
growth rates after controlling for firm size and liquidity constraint. So, the neg-
ative age growth relation as predicted by Jovanovic (1982) is also present in
our data. Overall, the relationship between firm growth and age is found non-
monotonic U-shaped as described by number of earlier studies (Evans, 1987a,b,
Huynh and Petrunia, 2010). Finally, we added Tobin’s Q in model 4 to con-
trol for investment opportunity so that the observed growth cash flow sensitivity
does not reflect that and can only indicate the presence of capital market im-
perfection following the similar practice we followed in chapter three. Even after
including Tobin’s Q, the growth cash flow sensitivity remains positive and sig-
nificant advocating for the perceived effect of liquidity constraints on firm growth.
All the above findings are in line with those obtained by Carpenter and Pe-
tersen (2002), Audretsch and Elston (2006), Oliveira and Fortunato (2006) or
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Fagiolo and Luzzi (2006), which show that smaller and younger firms experience
higher growth rates, but their growth are hampered by liquidity constraints. The
non-monotonic firm growth relationships with size and age are also prominent in
studies which prefer to test such non-linearity.
4.6.3 Differential effects of internal finance on firm growth
The main proposition to be tested in this chapter is that the stronger the financial
constraints, the larger the value of the observed growth-cash flow sensitivity. The
same rational is applied here as in the empirical investment models that liquidity
problems are exacerbated in the presence of capital market imperfections. As al-
ready discussed in chapter three, asymmetric information between borrowers and
lenders of funds raises the cost of external finance and creates credit rationing and
constrained access to credit. This influences real firm decisions such as investment
in capital and as a consequence, firm growth as well. Firms with limited access
to external capital markets will be highly reliant on the internal funds to finance
their growth and their growth is thus likely to be severely affected by liquidity
constraint problems. These firms can overcome such constraints by developing
their credit status and with an increase in the firm’s access to external financing,
the effect of internal financing on firm growth should decrease.
In light of the Carpenter and Petersen (2002) model and the leverage effect,
the range of values that the growth-cashflow sensitivity can exhibit from equation
4.6 can be explained by
0 <
dGrowth
dCash flow
≤ 1 + λ (4.9)
where, λ is the raised collateral value of the firm by each additional unit of
internally financed investment enabling constrained firms to take on more debt
to finance growth and results in a more than one-to-one growth cash flow rela-
tionship. The value of λ or the magnified effect will be highest for firms facing
the most binding financial constraints. On the other end, there are firms with
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most easy access to external finance. Even though such firms can in principle
finance new investment projects or new assets completely by issuing new debt or
equity, they still favor utilizing retained earnings over external funding for doing
so. Therefore, their growth-cashflow sensitivity is expected to be small, but still
greater than zero.
Table 4.6 shows the results of equation 4.6, where the predicted likelihood of
facing unconstrained status is used to separate firm year observations into differ-
ent categories and 4.6.a gives results of the corresponding diagnostics and other
hypothesis tests. The estimates include only restricted lag levels and lag differ-
ences of size, age, cash flow interaction with different dummies and Tobin’s Q as
instruments for the difference and level equations respectively which are found to
be jointly valid. In model 1, 2 and 3 cash flow is interacted with two category,
three category and five category dummies respectively and in all the models, fi-
nancial constraints are likely to be most binding for firm year observations in the
lowest category according to the construction of the dummy categories variables.
The general results of the baseline equation 4.5 are found to be effectual in all the
three models in table 4.6, i.e, the non-monotonic U shaped relationship of firm
growth with both firm size and age along with the negative impact of liquidity
constraint on growth. Moreover, these three models bring out the heterogeneous
responses of growth to cash flow among firm year observations in different parts
of the predicted likelihood of facing unconstrained financial status distribution.
In Model 1, the estimated coefficient of cash flow for the most constrained
group of firm year observations (those falling below the 50th percentile of the
distribution of the predicted likelihood of facing unconstrained financial status)
is positive and significant. The estimated growth-cashflow sensitivity implies that
one unit increase of cash flow generates 1.53 unit growth in total assets. There-
fore, according to equation 4.9, λ = 0.53, which is the raised collateral value for
firm year observations in this group enabling them to get more leverage and have
a multiplier effect on their growth by each additional unit cash flow (Carpenter
and Petersen, 2002). The multiplier effect is more than 150% of the additional
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Table 4.6: Differential effects using likelihood of facing financially un-
constrained status
This table shows the differential effect of cash flow on growth across financially
constrained and unconstrained firm years (separated with likelihood of facing
financially unconstrained status with the lowest category as likely to be most
financially constrained). Model 1 is estimated with two category dummies
(50-50), Model 2 is estimated with three category dummies (0-25, 25-75, 75-100),
Model 3 is estimated with five category dummies (0-20, 20-40, 40-60, 60-80,
80-100). Here, Cd stands for the dummies created by likelihood of facing
unconstrained status. In addition to the full set of year dummies both as
regressors and standard instruments, the estimates include lagged levels and
lagged first differences of size, age, cash flow interaction with different dummies
and Tobin’s Q as instruments for the difference and level equations respectively.
Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10%, level respectively.
M1 M2 M3
L.size -0.323*** -0.304** -0.321**
(0.112) (0.127) (0.127)
L.size2 0.013*** 0.012** 0.013**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age -0.296*** -0.220*** -0.279***
(0.061) (0.058) (0.061)
Age2 0.054*** 0.043*** 0.051***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Chf*Cd21 (< 50thp) 1.530***
(0.135)
Chf*Cd22 (> 50thp) 0.525***
(0.158)
Chf*Cd31 (< 25thp) 1.764***
(0.180)
Chf*Cd32 (25thp− 75thp) 0.810***
(0.152)
Chf*Cd33 (> 75thp) 0.442**
(0.209)
Chf*Cd51 (< 20thp) 1.810***
(0.202)
Chf*Cd52 (20thp− 40thp) 1.334***
(0.165)
Chf*Cd53 (40thp− 60thp) 0.879***
(0.311)
Chf*Cd54 (60thp− 80thp) 0.408*
(0.230)
Chf*Cd55 (> 80thp) 0.256
(0.395)
Tobin Q 0.105*** 0.117*** 0.107***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Constant 2.142*** 1.955*** 2.127***
(0.668) (0.744) (0.755)
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Table 4.6.a: Diagnostics
The figures reported for the AR(2) and Hansen J tests are the p-values for their
respective null hypotheses. AR(2) accepts the null hypothesis of no second-order
serial correlation in the differenced residuals and Hansen J test accepts the
null hypothesis that all instruments are jointly valid which implies that the
instruments satisfy the required orthogonality conditions, i.e., their moments
with the error term are zero.
M1 M2 M3
AR(2) p-value 0.811 0.969 0.970
Hansen p-value 0.366 0.410 0.685
No of instruments 86 89 95
No of firms 1122 1122 1122
No of observations 11995 11995 11995
Wald tests to check hypotheses that the impact of cash flow on firm growth is
same across firm years with two different financial constraint statuses.
M1 M2 M3
Hypothesis p-value p-value p-value
Chf*Cd21=Chf*Cd22 0.0000
Chf*Cd31=Chf*Cd32 0.0000
Chf*Cd32=Chf*Cd33 0.0427
Chf*Cd51=Chf*Cd52 0.0500
Chf*Cd52=Chf*Cd53 0.0741
Chf*Cd53=Chf*Cd54 0.0668
Chf*Cd54=Chf*Cd55 0.6049
Calculation of the effect of one standard deviation change in cash flow on firm
growth under different financial constraint status.
M1 M2 M3
Cd21 0.385
Cd22 0.051
Cd31 0.520
Cd32 0.113
Cd33 0.039
Cd51 0.549
Cd52 0.264
Cd53 0.102
Cd54 0.041
Cd55 0.022
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unit of cash flow generated for this group. In a different note, this estimate
means that an increase in cash flow by one standard deviation from the group
mean raises the growth rate by 0.385 for this group (table 4.6.a). As expected,
the second group in model 1 shows lower than one but positive (0.525) growth
cash flow sensitivity and one standard deviation increase in cash flow for this
category have a much lower impact (0.051) on growth rate. This lower cash flow
effect is consistent with the fact that the firm year observations in this group have
easy access to external financing which is reducing their dependence on cash flow
for financing their growth. The p-value of the Wald test also reported in table
4.6.a rejects the null hypothesis that the impact of cash flow on firm growth is
same across firm years between these two different financial constraint statuses
as the estimated coefficients 1.530 and 0.525 are found statistically different.
In model 2, the estimated growth cash flow sensitivity of firm year observa-
tions under the 25th percentile of the distribution of the predicted index is 1.764
and gradually decreasing thereafter to 0.810 and 0.442 for firm year observations
in the middle 50 percent and above the 75th percentile respectively. The effect of
one standard deviation increase in cash flow on growth rate also monotonically
decreases and the null hypotheses of equivalent cash flow affect on growth be-
tween any of the two categories are rejected.
In the most disaggregated model 3 where firm year observations are divided
into five financial constraint categories, more heterogeneity in the growth cash
flow sensitivity is revealed. However, the resulting pattern of the relationship are
consistent with the first two models. As firm year observations moving from most
to least financially constrained categories, the effect of internal financing on firm
growth decreases monotonically with the estimated cash flow coefficient ranging
from highest 1.810 to the lowest 0.256.
In all these models, the results consistently indicate a substantially greater
sensitivity of growth to cash flow for firm years belonging to the most constrained
categories which are most likely to face severe asymmetric information related
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problems leading to binding financial constraints on their growth. Furthermore,
these firms can actually expand their size more than the extent of increase in cash
flow they may have supporting the leverage effect hypothesis. The estimated im-
pact decreases monotonically thereafter as their financial constraints become less
binding. The estimated differentials between different classes are mostly statis-
tically significant. These results are consistent with the cost differential between
internal and external finance described earlier.
Table 4.7 represents the estimated results of equation 4.6, where the only
difference is the index used to separate firm year observations into different fi-
nancial constraint categories. Instead of the likelihood of facing unconstrained
financial status, the predicted corporate efficiency index from chapter two is used
here to construct the dummy category variables, but in similar fashion. That
means firm year observations in the lowest category have least corporate effi-
ciency and hence, are likely to face most binding financing constraints. As it has
been found in chapter three that corporate efficiency positively affects a firm’s
probability of facing unconstrained financial status, classification using this index
can also successfully expose the heterogeneous impact of liquidity constraints on
firm growth. Similarity between the three model specifications in table 4.7 with
the corresponding ones in table 4.6 are strictly maintained in all other aspects
including the sets of instruments and their lag structure.
The estimated growth cash flow sensitivity of the most financially constrained
group of firm year observations in model 1, 2 and 3 are all greater than one which
demonstrates the leverage effect, i.e, each additional unit of internally generated
funds enable firms to achieve a magnified effect on their growth. And within each
of these models, the estimated coefficients monotonically decrease with firm year
observations moving from left to right of the distribution of the corporate effi-
ciency index. This is consistent not only within each model, but also across the
three models. Growth of firm year observations on top 20% of the distribution
in model 3 are less sensitive to cash flow in comparison with those on top 25%
in model 2 or top 50% in model 1. The same is true at the other ends of the
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Table 4.7: Differential effects using corporate efficiency index
This table shows the differential effect of cash flow on growth across financially
constraint and unconstrained firm years (separated with corporate efficiency
index with the lowest category as likely to be most financially constrained).
Model 1 is estimated with two category dummies (50-50), Model 2 is estimated
with three category dummies (0-25, 25-75, 75-100), Model 3 is estimated with
five category dummies (0-20, 20-40, 40-60, 60-80, 80-100). Here, Ed stands for
the dummies created by corporate efficiency index. In addition to the full set
of year dummies both as regressors and standard instruments, the estimates
include lagged levels and lagged first differences of size, age, cash flow interaction
with different dummies and Tobin’s Q as instruments for the difference and level
equations respectively. Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, level respectively.
M1 M2 M3
L.size -0.378*** -0.394*** -0.397***
(0.122) (0.125) (0.096)
L.size2 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Age -0.235*** -0.224*** -0.277***
(0.063) (0.056) (0.064)
Age2 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.045***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Chf*Ed21 (< 50thp) 1.348***
(0.130)
Chf*Ed22 (> 50thp) 0.880***
(0.168)
Chf*Ed31 (< 25thp) 1.485***
(0.177)
Chf*Ed32 (25thp− 75thp) 1.100***
(0.118)
Chf*Ed33 (> 75thp) 0.589**
(0.242)
Chf*Ed51 (< 20thp) 1.670***
(0.193)
Chf*Ed52 (20thp− 40thp) 1.363***
(0.142)
Chf*Ed53 (40thp− 60thp) 1.056***
(0.131)
Chf*Ed54 (60thp− 80thp) 0.885***
(0.154)
Chf*Ed55 (> 80thp) 0.373
(0.242)
Tobin Q 0.102*** 0.099*** 0.083***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.021)
Constant 2.401*** 2.497*** 2.605***
(0.721) (0.739) (0.550)
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Table 4.7.a: Diagnostics
The figures reported for the AR(2) and Hansen J tests are the p-values for their
respective null hypotheses. AR(2) accepts the null hypothesis of no second-order
serial correlation in the differenced residuals and Hansen J test accepts the
null hypothesis that all instruments are jointly valid which implies that the
instruments satisfy the required orthogonality conditions, i.e., their moments
with the error term are zero.
M1 M2 M3
AR(2) p-value 0.761 0.755 0.735
Hansen p-value 0.444 0.334 0.323
No of instruments 86 89 95
No of firms 1122 1122 1122
No of observations 11995 11995 11995
Wald tests to check hypotheses that the impact of cash flow on firm growth is
same across firm years with two different financial constraint statuses.
M1 M2 M3
Hypothesis p-value p-value p-value
Chf*Ed21=Chf*Ed22 0.009
Chf*Ed31=Chf*Ed32 0.021
Chf*Ed32=Chf*Ed33 0.021
Chf*Ed51=Chf*Ed52 0.097
Chf*Ed52=Chf*Ed53 0.030
Chf*Ed53=Chf*Ed54 0.226
Chf*Ed54=Chf*Ed55 0.010
Calculation of the effect of one standard deviation change in cash flow on firm
growth under different financial constraint status.
M1 M2 M3
Ed21 0.318
Ed22 0.112
Ed31 0.392
Ed32 0.180
Ed33 0.069
Ed51 0.452
Ed52 0.275
Ed53 0.164
Ed54 0.106
Ed55 0.046
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distribution. Therefore, in line with the findings in chapter three, these results
indicate that firms can recover from their credit constraints through the improve-
ment of corporate efficiency. They can finance successively bigger portion of their
growth through external financing source without being severely constrained by
internally generated funds which is making their growth successively less sensitive
to cash flow. Results of AR(2) and Hansen test in 4.7.a suffices the validity of
the estimates. Wald test results also support the differential effect of liquidity
constraints on growth rate between any of the two different categories with only
one exception in model 3.
4.6.4 Robustness check
In place of the two novel proxies used to classify firm years into different financial
constraint status, we use other traditional measures to construct the financial
constraint dummy variables in similar ways to categorize firm year observations
into financially constrained or unconstrained status.
The propositions and the results obtained so far in this chapter are all based
on the fact that the cashflow sensitivity is a practicable mode of detecting the
relative importance of financing problems across firms of different credit status
following Fazzari et al. (1988). They classify low dividend paying firms as finan-
cially constrained as such firms prefer to retain all of their low-cost internal funds
they can generate before going to high cost external funds to finance their invest-
ment and we use the same classification criteria as the first robustness check of
our results.
Sufi (2009) and Rahman (2011) use line of credit as the classification criteria
arguing that the degree of access to a bank credit facility is a good measure of a
firm’s external financing constraints. According to the theoretical literature, lines
of credit are committed liquidity insurance that ensures availability of funds for
valuable projects and thus protects firms against future capital market frictions.
However, lines of credit can only provide sufficient liquidity insurance to those
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firms in the economy which find it convenient to obtain and maintain. These
firms can be labeled as financially unconstrained. Therefore, with greater access
to a bank credit facility, the firms will become more financially unconstrained and
the effect of internal financing on firm growth should decrease. We calculate line
of credit as the ratio of short term debt to total liability following Rahman (2011).
Firm size and age are two of the most widely used classification criteria in the
investment and financial constraint literature and have been used by Wagenvoort
(2003) and Oliveira and Fortunato (2006) in their examination of differential ef-
fect of liquidity constraints on growth. They expect that the liquidity problems
to be particularly severe for smaller and younger firms who have limited access
to capital both in terms of availability and accessibility because such firms are
characterized by idiosyncratic risk, may not have sufficient industry experience to
be distinguished as credit worthy by outside investors and may not have enough
collateral and all these make them face costly and limited access to external cred-
its.
Table 4.8 shows the estimated results where firm year observations are sep-
arated with dividend in model 1, line of credit in model 2, firm size in model
3 and firm age in model 4. All models here are estimated with two category
dummies with firm year observations lying below the 50th percentile of the re-
spective distributions as financially constrained and unconstrained otherwise. In
all these models, the previously obtained results are found robust. The estimated
investment cash flow sensitivity for all different financial constraint classes remain
positive and significant with the estimated coefficient always greater than one for
the most financially constrained firm year observations supporting the leverage ef-
fect hypothesis. The estimated cash flow coefficient for the unconstrained classes
are significantly lower and the difference in cash flow effects among the two classes
are always statistically significant (4.8.a).
Finally, as sales is used as a proxy for firm size in the first two chapters, nat-
ural logarithm of sales is used to capture firm size and growth in sales is used to
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Table 4.8: Robustness checks using other traditional measures of fi-
nancial constraints
This table shows the differential effect of cash flow on growth across financially
constrained and unconstrained firm years (separated with dividend in model 1,
line of credit in model 2, firm size in model 3 and firm age in model 4 with the
lowest category as likely to be most financially constrained). All models here are
estimated with two category dummies. Here, Dd, Ld, Sd and Ad stands for the
dummies created by dividend, line of credit, size and age respectively. In addition
to the full set of year dummies both as regressors and standard instruments,
the estimates include lagged levels and lagged first differences of size, age, cash
flow interaction with different dummies and Tobin’s Q as instruments for the
difference and level equations respectively. Standard errors in parentheses; ***,
** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, level respectively.
M1 M2 M3 M4
L.size -0.358*** -0.352*** -0.309*** -0.339***
(0.101) (0.105) (0.114) (0.096)
L.size2 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age -0.229*** -0.225*** -0.285*** -0.279***
(0.062) (0.064) (0.066) (0.065)
Age2 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.048*** 0.057***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Chf*Dd21 (< 50thp) 1.747***
(0.139)
Chf*Dd22 (> 50thp) 0.541*
(0.302)
Chf*Ld21 (< 50thp) 1.234***
(0.162)
Chf*Ld22 (> 50thp) 0.897***
(0.227)
Chf*Sd21 (< 50thp) 1.561***
(0.144)
Chf*Sd22 (> 50thp) 0.726**
(0.323)
Chf*Ad21 (< 50thp) 1.397***
(0.141)
Chf*Ad22 (> 50thp) 0.516***
(0.198)
Tobin Q 0.115*** 0.083*** 0.103*** 0.103***
(0.025) (0.021) (0.027) (0.025)
Constant 2.322*** 2.262*** 2.057*** 2.191***
(0.592) (0.630) (0.691) (0.572)
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Table 4.8.a: Diagnostics
The figures reported for the AR(2) and Hansen J tests are the p-values for their
respective null hypotheses. AR(2) accepts the null hypothesis of no second-order
serial correlation in the differenced residuals and Hansen J test accepts the
null hypothesis that all instruments are jointly valid which implies that the
instruments satisfy the required orthogonality conditions, i.e., their moments
with the error term are zero.
M1 M2 M3 M4
AR(2) p-value 0.661 0.592 0.644 0.852
Hansen p-value 0.514 0.583 0.341 0.308
No of instruments 86 86 86 86
No of firms 1122 1122 1122 1122
No of observations 11995 11995 11995 11995
Wald tests to check hypotheses that the impact of cash flow on firm growth is
same across firm years with two different financial constraint statuses.
M1 M2 M3 M4
Hypothesis p-value p-value p-value p-value
Chf*Dd21=Chf*Dd22 0.001
Chf*Ld21=Chf*Ld22 0.032
Chf*Sd21=Chf*Sd22 0.023
Chf*Ad21=Chf*Ad22 0.000
Calculation of the effect of one standard deviation change in cash flow on firm
growth under different financial constraint status.
M1 M2 M3 M4
Dd21 0.427
Dd22 0.042
Ld21 0.268
Ld22 0.162
Sd21 0.398
Sd22 0.053
Ad21 0.349
Ad22 0.058
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measure firm growth to carry on the final robustness check of our results. How-
ever, this output based measure of growth may not necessarily allow to make the
quantitative prediction about the growth-cash flow relationship as all potential
usage of internal funds may not be properly reflected by growth in sales and thus
may not be suitable for capturing the real effects of financial constraints on firm
growth. The results using this alternative measure of firm size and growth are
presented in appendix C. The re-specified baseline equation 4.5 is estimated again
using OLS, FE, difference and system-GMM to check for the presence of finite
sample biases and table C.2 (pp. 169) reiterate the similar conclusion came out
earlier that the system-GMM produces better results in estimating such dynamic
equations. Growth rate in sales is also found to have the U shaped relationship
with size and age and liquidity constraints similarly generate a negative impact
on sales growth. Table C.3 (p. 170) shows the estimated results of the extended
models where the two novel proxies (likelihood of facing financially unconstrained
status in model 1 and corporate efficiency index in model 2) along with two tra-
ditional ones (dividend in model 3 and line of credit in model 4) are used to bring
out differential effects of internal finance on firm growth and here as well, all
models are estimated with two category dummies only. The results are robust in
the sense that the estimated coefficients of cash flow for the unconstrained firm
year observations fall significantly short of those for the constrained ones in any
of these models. The estimations pass the usual diagnostics tests as shown in
C.3.a. However, the constrained firm years are now showing less than a one to
one relationship between cashflow and growth of their sales which is a contradic-
tion with the leverage effect hypothesis tested earlier.
4.7 Conclusion
Combining two aspects of economic literature, this chapter attempts to relate
financial constraints to the dynamics of firm size and growth to explain whether
the heterogeneity in firms’ growth can be explained by the degree of financial con-
straint status they face by developing the Carpenter and Petersen (2002) model.
On the way to do that, our empirical strategy strives to tackle the common prob-
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lems in estimating dynamic growth equation and makes quantitative predictions
about the relationship between growth and internal finance across firm years in
different credit status using our two novel proxies for financial constraints. The
results in general reject Gibrat’s law of proportionate effect and we find that
smaller and younger firms grow faster. Overall, the relationship of firm size and
age with growth is found non-monotonic U-shaped which is consistent with pre-
vious literatures. The availability of internal funds is also found to be important
for overall firm growth. Not only that, the estimated results from all our model
specifications consistently indicate a substantially greater sensitivity of growth
to cash flow for firm years belonging to the most financially constrained cate-
gories which are most likely to face more severe asymmetric information related
problems leading to binding financial constraints on their growth. Furthermore,
these firms can actually expand their size more than the extent of positive income
shock they may face supporting the leverage effect hypothesis. The estimated im-
pact decreases monotonically thereafter as their financial constraints become less
binding which allow them to finance successively bigger portion of their growth
through external financing source without being severely constrained by inter-
nally generated funds. These empirically important differences across firm years
are consistent with financial constraints arising from capital market imperfections.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
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The primary aim of this thesis is to study the impact of financial market
frictions on firm performance employing different empirical strategies and econo-
metric techniques. However, all our empirical investigations are carried out using
one single dataset covering the same unbalanced panel of 1122 UK firms listed
on the London Stock Exchange over the period 1981 to 2009. This final chapter
summarizes the major findings from the three empirical chapters of the thesis
and acknowledges their possible limitations. It also portrays the implications for
policy pertaining to real and financial activities of the firms and suggests poten-
tial extensions that can be conducted in the future.
5.1 Summary and implications of the findings
In the first empirical chapter, we have predicted long run corporate efficiency
focusing on value maximization and short run corporate efficiency focusing on
profit maximization approach. Our predictions indicate that an average firm in
the UK suffers from performance shortfall due to inefficiency or agency conflicts,
no matter which approach is adopted. However, these two different perspectives
have important bearing on how the predicted efficiencies evolve. The short run
efficiency supports the agency cost of outside debt and the long run efficiency
supports the agency cost of outside equity hypothesis. Also, the long run effi-
ciency is found to be consistently lower than the short run efficiency which may
be considered as the cost of focusing on an array of objectives rather than on
maximizing profit only. Contrary to such costs, these longer term broader objec-
tives can potentially ensure a healthy and sustainable firm performance. This is
why managers of modern corporations are expected to follow this modern value
maximization approach of financial management, which can lead to better and
more accurate evaluation of business.
Inspired by the findings of chapter two, we have taken up the proposition that
corporate efficiency can simultaneously affect a firm’s financial constraint status
and investment responsiveness to internal financing. Our endogenous and inter-
changeable firm classification results reveal that financially constrained firms are
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more likely to be smaller, younger, deficient in capturing better investment op-
portunity, reserve higher safety stock, pay low dividends, have less collaterizable
assets, less external debt and most importantly, are inferior in terms of corporate
efficiency. Turning to their investment behavior, they are comparatively more
sensitive to the availability of both the stock and flow measure of internal liq-
uidity pertaining to the idea of imperfect substitutability between internal and
external financing source under market imperfections. The much controversial
role of cash flow in detecting such imperfections is also given a critical resolution
by the decreasing investment cash flow sensitivity with corporate efficiency for
these firms. If the mismeasured investment opportunity solely drives the high in-
vestment cash flow sensitivity, then it shouldn’t be decreasing with improvement
of efficiency. Our direct measure of corporate efficiency as an inverse proxy of
the extent of asymmetric information and agency conflict problems, thus plays
a convincing role here. Our results also support the credit multiplier theory ac-
cording to which the investment cash flow sensitivity increases with tangibility for
both the constrained and unconstrained firms. The important implications of our
findings to managers and financiers is that, by improving corporate efficiency or
in other words, by mitigating agency conflict, taking optimal operating, financing
and investment decisions, borrowers can render signals to the outside investors
about the actual status of the firm which will then determine the availability and
accessibility of external finance for them. An implication of our findings for re-
searchers is that, cross-sectional variation in the investment sensitivity to internal
finance may still be interpreted as a consequence of capital market imperfections.
The final empirical chapter reaffirms the finding that a differential effect of
internal finance arises due to capital market imperfections, but from a different
conceptual and analytical perspective. In contrast to the qualitative predictions
made in chapter three, here we have attempted to determine the extent of growth
that can be generated by an additional unit of internal finance. Our results consis-
tently reveal that the sensitivity of growth to cash flow for a firm is highest when
the financial constraints is most binding for the firm. Moreover, due to a leverage
effect, the firm can actually expand it’s size more than the extent of change in
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cash flow. With the easing of financial constraints, a firm can increasingly finance
it’s growth by external sources and the incremental effect of internal finance on
growth falls monotonically. The results suggest important policy implications
for financially constrained firms which should be taken into consideration while
formulating their real activities because growth is particularly restricted by the
profit generating capacity of their existing production facilities. By improving
this capacity, they can potentially enjoy an accelerated and magnified effect of a
potential positive income shock on their growth.
5.2 Limitations
We are also aware of some possible limitations of the empirical results we have
presented in this thesis. First of all, in the stochastic frontier model, relating the
shortfall from the frontier to monitoring and incentive variables could explain the
reasons for the failure to maximize value or profit. Even though, our explanatory
variables for the inefficiency equation give reasonable explanations for the short-
fall, a different set of variables like ownership and corporate governance structure
could provide further insight about our measured corporate efficiency. We could
not manage to collect any proxy for such variables for our sample firms from the
chosen database.
Cash flow, financial slack and Tobin’s Q in an investment equation can be
endogenous and we have checked the robustness of our results by including these
variables as one period lagged form. Even though our results suggest that the
sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal funds is not solely driven by
measurement error in investment opportunity, we are not claiming that Tobin’s Q,
as our proxy for such is free from measurement error. Usually, an instrumental
variable technique or error correction models are suggested for tackling these
problems, but none of those could be incorporated within the switching regression
framework. For the same reason, we have not estimated our investment equation
in a dynamic form. However, we believe that the advantages of the switching
regression model outweigh these disadvantages.
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5.3 Implications for future research
Our sample consists of only the quoted firms in the UK, on which all our em-
pirical results are obtained. It will be an worthy venture to conduct similar
investigations after including the unquoted firms in our sample as well because
the unquoted firms are prone to a comparatively wider range of adverse financial
attributes and thus may face more restricted access to external finance than the
quoted ones. This will not only benefit us from having wider range of variation
across observations in the sample, but also allow us to deal with more extensive
research questions. However, this may require us to change the methodology we
have followed in this thesis and also the interpretations we have made. Inclusion
of unquoted firms will restrict us from estimating market value efficiency or using
Q theory of investment in our switching regression model as Tobin’s Q cannot
be calculated for unquoted firms. However, we can still measure the short run
efficiency using the profit frontier. For estimating the investment equations in
the switching regression model, we can use the accelerator model of investment
following Hobdari et al. (2009) which will similarly allow us to capture the dif-
ferential effects of cash flow on investment.
In this thesis we have focused on investment cash flow sensitivity and growth
cash flow sensitivity to determine the impact of financial constraints arising from
capital market imperfections. Almeida et al. (2004) suggest a third approach
named as cash flow sensitivity of cash, which relies on the fact that financial
constraints should be related to a firm’s propensity to save cash out of cash
inflows as well. According to their proposition, financially unconstrained firms
should not display a systematic propensity to save cash, while firms that are
constrained should have a positive cash flow sensitivity of cash. They estimate
this sensitivity for a priori classified unconstrained and constrained subsamples
using payout policy, asset size, bond ratings, commercial paper ratings, and the
“KZ” index derived from the results in Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Therefore,
similar static and dynamic misclassification problems may affect their results.
We can attempt to predict the differential cash flow sensitivity of cash by using
the switching regression framework. Tobin’s Q as proxy for investment oppor-
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tunity is included by Almeida et al. (2004) in their model specification, however
excluded by D’Espallier et al. (2008) in making similar predictions. Therefore,
we can follow any of these in specifying our equations based on our sample.
Any three of these sensitivities to measure the effect of financial constraints on
constrained and unconstrained firms’ financial policies can be altered to capture
the similar impact on that of quoted and unquoted firms. Guariglia (2008) inves-
tigates the investment cash flow sensitivity for the unquoted firms and Rahman
(2011) compares the growth cash flow sensitivity between quoted and unquoted
firms. A stark difference with the unobserved constrained and unconstrained sta-
tus is that a firm’s private and public status is readily observable. Further, taking
into consideration that firms can switch between these two status, we can use the
endogenous switching regression model with one regime observed following Lok-
shin and Sajaia (2004) or a dummy variable interaction technique.
These plausibly can give us an indication about the wideness of the domain
of our selected research area. Despite having some limitations, the research ques-
tions taken up for this thesis, the methodologies used to find out their answers
and finally the results and implications that come forth can possibly fill up some
gaps in the existing literature and help us to better understand the channels
through which market imperfections led financial constraint problems may affect
firm performance.
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Appendix A:
Figure A.1: Market imperfections and investment cash flow sensitivity
This figure taken from Hubbard (1998) shows the links among net worth, the
cost of external financing, and investment. Holding information costs con-
stant, when net worth increases from W0 to W1, the supply-of-funds curve
shifts right. For firms facing high information costs, this increase in net worth,
holding both information costs and investment opportunities constant, increases
the capital stock from K0 to K1. But, for a firm facing no information costs
or with sufficient net worth (or internal funds) to finance it’s desired capital
stock, an increase in net worth independent of changes in investment opportu-
nities has no effect on investment and equilibrium capital stock remains at K∗.
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Table A.1: FTSE/Dow Jones Industrial Classification Benchmark
(ICB) codes
The FTSE/Dow Jones Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) is adopted by
Thomson Financial as it’s standard classification tool across a number of it’s
global databases and these ICB codes are available within Worldscope. Financial
industry (8000) along with it’s supersectors and sectors has been dropped from
this table.
Industry Supersector Sector
0001 Oil & Gas 0500 Oil & Gas 0530 Oil & Gas Producers
0570 Oil Equipment, Services
& Distribution
0580 Alternative Energy
1000 Basic 1300 Chemicals 1350 Chemicals
Materials 1700 Basic Resources 1730 Forestry & Paper
1750 Industrial Metals &
Mining
1770 Mining
2000 Industrials 2300 Construction 2350 Construction & Materials
& Materials
2700 Industrial Goods 2710 Aerospace & Defense
& Services 2720 General Industrials
2730 Electronic &
Electrical Equipment
2750 Industrial Engineering
2770 Industrial Transportation
2790 Support Services
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3000 Consumer 3300 Automobiles 3350 Automobiles & Parts
Goods & Parts
3500 Food & Beverage 3530 Beverages
3570 Food Producers
3700 Personal & 3720 Household Goods
Household Goods & Home Construction
3740 Leisure Goods
3760 Personal Goods
3780 Tobacco
4000 Health Care 4500 Health Care 4530 Health Care
Equipment & Services
4570 Pharmaceuticals &
Biotechnology
5000 Consumer 5300 Retail 5330 Food & Drug Retailers
Services 5370 General Retailers
5500 Media 5550 Media
5700 Travel & Leisure 5750 Travel & Leisure
6000 Telecom 6500 Telecom 6530 Fixed Line Telecom
6570 Mobile Telecom
7000 Utilities 7500 Utilities 7530 Electricity
7570 Gas, Water &
Multi-utilities
9000 Technology 9500 Technology 9530 Software & Computer
Services
9570 Technology Hardware
& Equipment
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A.2 Worldscope data definition along with their field
number/ identifier
Total assets (02999): Total asset represent the sum of total current assets,
long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other
investments, net property plant and equipment and other assets.
Common equity (03501): Common equity represents common shareholders’
investment in a company. It includes but is not restricted to: common stock
value, retained earnings, capital surplus, capital stock premium etc.
Market capitalization (08001): Market Price-Year End * Common Shares
Outstanding. Common shares outstanding represent the number of shares
outstanding at the company’s year end. It is the difference between issued
shares and treasury shares.
Net sales or revenue (01001): Net sales or revenues represent gross sales
and other operating revenue less discounts, returns and allowances.
Long term debt (03251): Long term debt represents all interest bearing
financial obligations, excluding amounts due within one year. It is shown net of
premium or discount.
Short term debt and current portion of long term debt (03051): Short
term debt and current portion of long term debt represents that portion of debt
payable within one year including current portion of long term debt and sinking
fund requirements of preferred stock or debentures. It includes but is not
restricted to: current portion of long-term debt (the amount of long term debt
due within the next twelve months), notes payable arising from short-term
borrowings, current portion of advances and production payments, bank
overdrafts, advances from subsidiaries/associated companies, current portion of
preferred stock of a subsidiary etc.
Capital expenditures (04601): Capital expenditures represents the funds
used to acquire fixed assets other than those associated with acquisition. It
includes but is not restricted to: additions to property, plant and equipment,
investments in machinery and equipment.
Total intangible other assets-net (02649): Total intangible other assets
(net) represent other assets not having a physical existence. The value of these
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assets lies in their expected future return.
Property, plant and equipment-net (02501): Property, plant and
equipment (net) represents gross property, plant and equipment less
accumulated reserves for depreciation, depletion and amortization.
Cash dividend paid-total (04551): Total cash dividends paid represent the
total common and preferred dividends paid to shareholders of the company. It
excludes dividends paid to minority shareholders.
Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (18198 ): Earnings
before interest, taxes and depreciation represent the earnings of a company
before interest expense, income taxes and depreciation. It is calculated by
taking the pre-tax income and adding back interest expense on debt and
depreciation, depletion and amortization and subtracting interest capitalized.
Funds from operation (04201): Funds from operations represents the sum
of net income and all non-cash charges or credits. It is the cash flow of the
company. If a statement of changes in financial position has not been provided,
but the company discloses an aggregate cash flow, this amount has been used.
Where cash flow has not been disclosed in any manner, it is estimated based on
net profit before preferred dividends plus depreciation, reserves charges,
provision for loan losses for banks, and provision for future benefits for
insurance companies.
Cash and short term investment (02001): Cash and short term
investment represents the sum of cash and short term investments. It includes
but is not restricted to: cash on hand, undeposited checks, cash in banks, checks
in transit, credit card sales, drafts, money orders, letters of credit, demand
deposits (non-interest bearing), stocks, bonds, or other marketable securities
listed as short-term investments, time deposits, corporate securities - stocks,
bonds, commercial paper, money market mutual fund shares, central bank
deposits, temporary investments etc.
Interest expense on debt (01251): Interest expense on debt represents the
service charge for the use of capital before the reduction for interest capitalized.
If interest expense is reported net of interest income, and interest income cannot
be found the net figure is shown.
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Appendix B:
Table B.1: Correlation of the probability of facing unconstrained fi-
nancial status with the selection variables
This table gives the correlation coefficients along with the significance level (5%)
of the predicted likelihood of facing unconstrained financial statuses from the two
models in table 3.2 with the selection variables in equation 3.10.
PFUModel1 PFUModel2
Size 0.711* 0.779*
0.000 0.000
Age 0.725* 0.737*
0.000 0.000
Dividend 0.362* 0.373*
0.000 0.000
St.leverage 0.170* 0.158*
0.006 0.006
Lt.leverage 0.284* 0.274*
0.000 0.000
Tobin’s Q -0.342* -0.396*
0.000 0.000
Int.cov.ratio 0.197* 0.203*
0.000 0.000
Fin.slack -0.532* -0.584*
0.000 0.000
Mv.efficiency 0.650* 0.710*
0.004 0.004
Tangibility 0.613* 0.517*
0.000 0.000
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Appendix C:
Figure C.1: Growth cash flow sensitivity and “leverage” effect
This figure taken from Carpenter and Petersen (2002) shows the lever-
age effect which occurs when firms’ access to debt depends on collateral.
Due to increase in cash flow, the external finance curve (S) shifts right-
ward to (S ′′). This allows a change in internal finance (CF ′ − CF ) to
have a multiplier effect on asset growth (4A′′ − 4A) through leverage.
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Table C.1: AR(1) specification with size as dependent variable
This table shows the estimated results of equation 4.1 using OLS, FE, Difference
and System GMM. OLS estimates include a full set of sector and year dummies
as regressors, FE estimates include a full set of year dummies as regressors,
GMM estimates include a full set of year dummies both as regressors and
instruments. In addition to these, difference GMM estimates include L(2/4).
size collapsed and system GMM estimates include L(2/4). size collapsed and
DL(1/1). size collapsed as instruments for the difference and level equations
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10%, level respectively.
OLS FE Diff-GMM Sys-GMM
L.size 0.981*** 0.805*** 0.632*** 0.966***
(0.002) (0.011) (0.059) (0.008)
Constant 0.393*** 2.227*** 0.337***
(0.041) (0.115) (0.087)
Table C.1.a: Diagnostics
The figures reported for the AR(2) and Hansen J tests are the p-values for their
respective null hypotheses. AR(2) accepts the null hypothesis of no second-order
serial correlation in the differenced residuals and Hansen J test accepts the
null hypothesis that all instruments are jointly valid which implies that the
instruments satisfy the required orthogonality conditions, i.e., their moments
with the error term are zero.
OLS FE Diff-GMM Sys-GMM
AR(2) p-value 0.185 0.102
Hansen p-value 0.209 0.294
No of instruments 31 32
No of firms 1122 1122 1122
No of observations 11995 11995 10807 11995
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Table C.2: Robustness check using sales as proxy for firm size
This table shows the estimated results of equation 4.5 using sales as a proxy
for firm size and growth in sales as a measure of firm growth instead and OLS,
FE, Difference and System GMM results are presented in it’s four columns.
OLS estimates include a full set of sector and year dummies as regressors, FE
estimates include a full set of year dummies as regressors, GMM estimates
include a full set of year dummies both as regressors and instruments. In
addition to these, difference GMM estimates include lagged levels of size, age,
cash flow and Tobin’s Q as instruments for the first differenced equation and
system GMM estimates include the lagged levels and lagged first differences of
size, age, cash flow and Tobin Q as instruments for the differenced and the level
equations respectively. Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, level respectively.
OLS FE Diff-GMM Sys-GMM
L.size -0.231*** -0.754*** -0.505** -0.235***
(0.026) (0.070) (0.211) (0.057)
L.size2 0.009*** 0.024*** 0.006 0.009***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.014) (0.002)
Age -0.355*** -0.275* -0.231 -0.178*
(0.055) (0.141) (0.188) (0.101)
Age2 0.060*** 0.110** 0.127* 0.042**
(0.011) (0.048) (0.066) (0.018)
Cash flow 0.708*** 1.092*** 0.887* 0.713***
(0.072) (0.115) (0.455) (0.206)
Tobin Q -0.004 -0.028** 0.041 0.081**
(0.006) (0.013) (0.039) (0.033)
Constant 2.079*** 5.490*** 1.458***
(0.163) (0.354) (0.295)
Table C.2.a: Diagnostics
The figures reported for the AR(2) and Hansen J tests are the p-values for their
respective null hypotheses. AR(2) accepts the null hypothesis of no second-order
serial correlation in the differenced residuals and Hansen J test accepts the
null hypothesis that all instruments are jointly valid which implies that the
instruments satisfy the required orthogonality conditions, i.e., their moments
with the error term are zero.
OLS FE Diff-GMM Sys-GMM
AR(2) p-value 0.185 0.181
Hansen p-value 0.019 0.230
No of instruments 77 83
No of firms 1122 1122 1122
No of observations 11995 11995 10807 11995
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Table C.3: Differential effects on sales growth using different proxies
for financial constraints
This table shows the differential effect of cash flow on growth across financially
constrained and unconstrained firm years (separated with likelihood of facing
unconstrained financial status in model 1, predicted corporate efficiency in
model 2, dividend payout in model 3 and line of credit in model 4 with the
lowest category as likely to be most financially constrained). All models here
are estimated with two category dummies. Here, Cd, Ed, Dd and Ld stands for
the dummies created by constraint status, efficiency index, dividend and line of
credit respectively. In addition to the full set of year dummies both as regressors
and standard instruments, the estimates include lagged levels and lagged first
differences of size, age, cash flow interaction with different dummies and Tobin’s
Q as instruments for the difference and level equations respectively. Standard
errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%,
level respectively.
M1 M2 M3 M4
L.size -0.233*** -0.224*** -0.220*** -0.239***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.054)
L.size2 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age -0.185** -0.185** -0.191** -0.173**
(0.087) (0.093) (0.084) (0.086)
Age2 0.038** 0.039** 0.039** 0.035**
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016)
Chf*Cd21 (< 50thp) 0.837***
(0.276)
Chf*Cd22 (> 50thp) 0.450*
(0.249)
Chf*Ed21 (< 50thp) 0.751***
(0.291)
Chf*Ed22 (> 50thp) 0.501***
(0.183)
Chf*Dd21 (< 50thp) 0.860***
(0.274)
Chf*Dd22 (> 50thp) 0.367*
(0.190)
Chf*Ld21 (< 50thp) 0.924***
(0.255)
Chf*Ld22 (> 50thp) 0.540**
(0.235)
Tobin Q 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.095*** 0.085***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.027)
Constant 1.428*** 1.373*** 1.369*** 1.452***
(0.316) (0.326) (0.319) (0.301)
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Table C.3.a: Diagnostics
The figures reported for the AR(2) and Hansen J tests are the p-values for their
respective null hypotheses. AR(2) accepts the null hypothesis of no second-order
serial correlation in the differenced residuals and Hansen J test accepts the
null hypothesis that all instruments are jointly valid which implies that the
instruments satisfy the required orthogonality conditions, i.e., their moments
with the error term are zero.
M1 M2 M3 M4
AR(2) p-value 0.181 0.186 0.179 0.177
Hansen p-value 0.415 0.366 0.342 0.400
No of instruments 86 86 86 86
No of firms 1122 1122 1122 1122
No of observations 11995 11995 11995 11995
Wald tests to check hypotheses that the impact of cash flow on firm growth is
same across firm years with two different financial constraint statuses.
M1 M2 M3 M4
Hypothesis p-value p-value p-value p-value
Chf*Cd21=Chf*Cd22 0.086
Chf*Ed21=Chf*Ed22 0.124
Chf*Dd21=Chf*Dd22 0.031
Chf*Ld21=Chf*Ld22 0.087
Calculation of the effect of one standard deviation change in cash flow on firm
growth under different financial constraint status.
M1 M2 M3 M4
Cd21 0.182
Cd22 0.081
Ed21 0.191
Ed22 0.037
Dd21 0.215
Dd22 0.041
Ld21 0.231
Ld22 0.061
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